Violent conflicts of one type or another have afflicted Africa and exacted a heavy toll on the continent’s societies, polities and economies, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic possibilities. The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. But their costs cannot be in doubt, nor the need, indeed the urgency, to resolve them, if the continent is to navigate the twenty-first century more successfully than it did the twentieth, a century that was marked by the depredations of colonialism and its debilitating legacies and destructive post-colonial disruptions. The magnitude and impact of these conflicts are often lost between hysteria and apathy – the panic expressed among Africa’s friends and the indifference exhibited by its foes – for a continent mired in, and supposedly dying from, an endless spiral of self-destruction. The distortions that mar discussions and depictions of African conflicts are rooted in the long-standing tendency to treat African social phenomena as peculiar and pathological, beyond the pale of humanity, let alone rational explanation. Yet, from a historical and global perspective, Africa has been no more prone to violent conflicts than other regions. Indeed, Africa’s share of the more than 180 million people who died from conflicts and atrocities during the twentieth century is relatively modest: in the sheer scale of casualties there is no equivalent in African history to Europe’s First and Second World Wars, or even the civil wars and atrocities in revolutionary Russia and China. The worst bloodletting in twentieth-century Africa occurred during the colonial period in King Leopold’s Congo Free State (White 2003).

This is not to underestimate the immense impact of violent conflicts on Africa. It is merely to emphasize the need for more balanced debate and commentary, to put African conflicts in both global and historical perspectives. Not only are African conflicts inseparable from the conflicts of the twentieth century – the most violent century in world history; many postcolonial conflicts are rooted in colonial conflicts. There is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history and even the late nineteenth century. ‘For instance’, to quote Niels Kastfelt (2005:2), ‘the region from the southern Sudan through northern Uganda to Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo – now the scene of brutal civil
wars and genocide – has a long history of colonial violence in the form of slave trading, slave labor, plantation labor, plantation terror and a violent gun culture which all have to be taken into account when explaining the contemporary situation. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that African conflicts are remarkably unexceptional: they have complex histories; they exhibit multiple and multidimensional causes, courses and consequences.

The papers in this two-volume collection seek to advance our understanding of African conflicts by going beyond the conventional and fashionable analyses of Africanist scholarship, often infected with, if not infected by, Afropessimism, or the simplistic stereotypes conveyed in the Western media that are infused with Afrophobia. The first volume examines the causes and costs of violent conflicts in Africa, and the second focuses on the challenges of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Combining sophisticated theoretical insights and rich empirical details, the authors, collectively, illuminate the forces and factors that generate violent conflicts and the effects that these conflicts have on socioeconomic development, political stability, democratic freedoms, human rights, cultural progress, and even environmental sustainability. There can be no singular explanation for or solution to Africa’s conflicts. At best, one can only say that these conflicts are rooted in the complex constructions and conjunctures of Africa’s political economies, social identities, and cultural ecologies as configured out of specific local, national, and regional historical experiences and patterns of insertion into, and engagement with, an ever-changing world system. In so far as the causes of the conflicts are multiple in their dynamics – internal and external, local and transnational, economic and political, social and cultural, historical and contemporary, objective and subjective, material and ideological, concrete and emotive, real and rhetorical – the strategies for managing and resolving them can only be multidimensional. This collection of essays is as strong in unraveling the sources of violent conflict in postcolonial Africa as it is in unveiling the various conflict resolution mechanisms that have been tried across the continent, and in showcasing the successes and failures of several post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Its strength lies in the sobriety and seriousness of its analysis and the solutions proffered that transcend the facile observations often encountered in the academic literature and popular media.

This Introduction is divided into three parts. First, I provide a broad historiographical survey of the typologies of wars in Africa in which I distinguish between five types, namely, what I call imperial wars, anti-colonial wars, intra-state wars, inter-state wars, and international wars. Second, I look at the current US ‘war on terror’, its causes, its connections with Africa’s other wars, and its unfolding consequences for the continent. Third, I examine the political economy and cultural ecology of war, singling out the political and structural dynamics of African wars, their economic and social dimensions, gender inflections and implications, their transnational and imperial contexts, and their costs and consequences, subjects on which the chapters in this volume concentrate. In the conclusion, I briefly explore other critical aspects of African wars, especially the generational, religious and diasporic dimensions of these wars.
Typologies of War in Twentieth-Century Africa

During the twentieth century Africa was ravaged by wars of one type or another. Some of them, especially the liberation wars, were part of the momentous mission to remake African societies, to regain Africa’s historical agency so cruelly seized by Europe through colonialism. At the dawn of the twenty-first century Africa, is faced with a new form of war even as it desperately seeks to quench the wars of the last century. This is the US-led ‘war on terror’, a crusade that knows no spatial or temporal bounds, spares no expense, leaves a trail of wanton destruction, and wrecks havoc on the infrastructures of global order, development and democracy. To date, two governments have been toppled, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, by savage wars of conquest reminiscent of the wars of colonization of a bygone era.

Africa’s wars since the late nineteenth century can be differentiated in terms of their causal factors and dynamics, spatial scales and locations, temporal scope and duration, composition of perpetrators and combatants, military equipment and engagements deployed, impacts on military and civilian populations, and consequences on politics, the economy, society, the environment, and even on cultural structures and mental states as mediated and filtered, as all social processes and practices are, through the enduring and hierarchical inscriptions of gender, class, age, ethnicity, and sometimes race and religion. Each of these dimensions could be singled out for analytical and classificatory purposes. In this essay, I distinguish between five types of wars, basing the distinction primarily on their political thrust and ideological tendencies: imperial wars, anti-colonial wars, intra-state wars, inter-state wars, and international wars. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that in reality there are close and complex interconnections between these wars. Nevertheless, the classification does have heuristic value. According to this schema, the ‘war on terror’ is not new; it exhibits various characteristics of four of the five typologies, especially imperial and international wars.

For each of these typologies further subdivisions can be made. Three main forms of imperial wars can be identified in twentieth-century African history. The first two, the First and Second World Wars, were fought when much of Africa was still under colonial rule. African involvement in the two wars consisted, first, of providing troops, second, of serving as a theatre of war, and third, of the mobilization of production for the war effort. Hundreds of thousands of people from the colonies were conscripted into colonial armies or incorporated into metropolitan armies to fight on behalf of their imperial power against the other European powers, and, in the case of the Second World War, against imperial Japan as well. During the First World War parts of East and West Africa served as important theaters of war, while North Africa was a crucial combat zone during both wars. Colonial production, extraverted and coercive as it already was, was ruthlessly reorganized to produce record amounts of primary agricultural and mineral commodities for the imperial armies and economies. All in all, Africa made
massive contributions to the two world wars at the expense of its own development, although the wars created the conditions and contradictions that galvanized anti-colonial nationalism (Page 1987, 2000; Miller 1974; Osuntokun 1979; Kerslake 1997; Killington and Rathbone 1986; UNESCO 1985; Sainsbury 1979; Oberst 1991; Akurang-Parry 2002a, 2002b).

The Cold War constituted the third imperial war of the twentieth century in which Africa was implicated directly and indirectly, ideologically and militarily, politically and economically. It started when most African countries were still under colonial rule, but heated up during decolonization and after independence. This may have been a Cold War for the superpowers and their key allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but it generated hot proxy-wars in many parts of the global South, especially in a postcolonial Africa desperately trying to forge nation-states out of the cartographic contraptions of colonialism and to rid itself of the last vestiges of colonialism in the settler laagers of Southern Africa. From the Congo to the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa, the Cold War fomented or facilitated destructive wars and conflicts (Kalb 1982; Issa-Salwe 2000; Percox 2004; Noer 1985; Borstelmann 1993; Harbeson and Rothchild 1995; Munene et al. 1995; Akinrinade and Sesay 1999; Oyebade and Alao 1998; Gordon et al. 1998).

In fact, Mahmood Mamdani (2004) claims, it was in Africa that the US strategy of proxy-war to ‘roll back’, not simply ‘contain’, radical states, was first concocted with the formation of what he calls Africa’s first terrorist organization, RENAMO in Mozambique, which was bankrolled by racist Rhodesia and later apartheid South Africa and received American political support. Soon, the RENAMO model was exported to Nicaragua where the Contras were set up. It all culminated in the attempted ‘rollback’ of the Soviet empire itself in Afghanistan. It was then that the process began of ideologizing war as religious and privatizing it through the creation of a global network of Islamic fighters who would later come to haunt the US. Thus, while the Cold War may have created auspicious conditions for, and even accelerated, decolonization and enabled African states to gain international influence by manipulating superpower rivalries, the developmental, democratic and humanitarian costs of the wars it engendered or aggravated were extremely high, and persisted even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Indeed, it could be argued that the current US ‘war on terror’ is a direct outcome of the late Cold War.

Anti-colonial wars can be subdivided into two groups. To begin with, there were wars waged against the colonial conquest itself, that were later followed by wars of liberation from colonial rule. The first set of wars involved both conventional and guerrilla wars against invading imperial armies that often contained African troops from other territories or communities within the territory already brought to colonial heel. On the whole, strong centralized states tended to wage conventional wars and after their defeat embark on guerrilla war, while smaller and weaker states or acephalous societies resorted to guerrilla warfare from the beginning. Examples of this abound across the continent and are well illustrated in the case of West Africa and Southern Africa where colonial conquest lasted for decades (Crowder 1978; Ranger 1967; Isaacman 1976; Boahen 1990). As is well known, only Ethiopia managed to win decisively against the
European invaders to retain its independence, although in 1935 Mussolini’s fascist Italy returned to avenge the defeat of 1896 and redeem its lost imperial glory, and brutally occupied the country for six years (Dilebo 1996; Milkias 2005). The wars of conquest – pacification they were called in the self-serving and sanitized rhetoric of empire – exacted a heavy demographic price, which, when combined with the predations of primitive colonial accumulation, most graphically and grimly illustrated in King Leopold’s genocidal ‘red rubber’ tyranny in the Congo that slaughtered 10 million people (Hochschild 1998), led to the deaths of many millions of people and spawned such vast dislocations that some medical historians have called the years between 1890 and 1930 ‘the unhealthiest period in all African history’ (Patterson and Hartwig 1978: 4).

The wars of liberation, often triggered by the obduracy of settler minority regimes supported by the Western powers in defence of global wealth and whiteness, against appeals of common sense and decades of peaceful protests by the colonized, also exacted horrendous costs. The brutal story and statistics from Algeria are well known – more than a million dead (Horne 1978; Talbott 1980; Shepard 2006; Alexander et al. 2002; Maran 1989). So do Zimbabwe where a protracted guerrilla war was fought under the delusionary obstinacy of Ian Smith’s regime (Ranger 1985; Lan 1985; Kriger 1992; Bhebe and Range 1995, 1996), and Namibia under the illegal usurpation of apartheid South Africa (Herbstein and Evenson 1989; Leys and Saul 1995; Namhila 1997; Emmett 1999). And that beloved country itself, South Africa, trapped longer than any in murderous racial fantasies, was rendered increasingly ungovernable by civil unrest and guerrilla attacks that led to the demise of apartheid in 1994. Even Kenya’s war of national liberation – dubbed Mau Mau by the colonialists – that was once seen as less ferocious than the liberation wars of Southern Africa, now appears to have been waged with a staggering level of imperial viciousness; some 1.5 million people were detained, a far cry from the official figure of 80,000 (Elkins 2005).

The anti-colonial wars were protracted and brutal; in some cases hardly a generation passed before wars against colonization turned into wars from colonialism. These were defensive, unavoidable wars, waged at enormous cost in African lives and livelihoods, driven by the desire to maintain or regain political autonomy, the precondition for establishing the social contract of democracy, the political culture of human rights, and the economic possibilities of development. While these struggles liberated African societies from colonialism, in many cases they left a lasting legacy of conflict that, sooner or later, festered and erupted into vicious post-colonial conflicts, as happened in Algeria in the 1990s (Martinez 2000; Volpi 2003) and in postcolonial Angola and Mozambique where UNITA and RENAMO served as ‘apartheid’s contras’, as William Minter (1994) calls them (also see Ciment 1997; Ekwe-Ekwe 1996; Dinerman 2006). Indeed, the unfinished business of liberation is at the heart of the current crisis and conflict in Zimbabwe (Hammar et al. 2003; Carmody 2001; Campbell...
not to mention other countries in the region, including South Africa where high levels of violence persist and struggles are raging for the future of the country and the soul of the ruling ANC (Melber 2003; Gumede 2005; Gordon 2006). It is also important to remember that Africa’s anti-colonial wars, which helped to bring to an end the ‘age of empire’ transformed European and world history. For example, the crisis engendered by the Algerian war ushered in the Fifth Republic in France and decolonization in Mozambique and Angola liberated Portugal itself from four decades of fascism. Thus, by dismantling the colonial empires and undermining the architecture of imperial racism, Africa’s liberation wars encouraged Europe to ‘re-humanize itself’, in Ali Mazrui’s (2003: 21) memorable phrase.

Unfortunately, independence brought little respite from the ravages of war for people in many countries. The instabilities and insecurities of postcolonial Africa are rooted in the political and cultural economies of both colonialism and the post-independence order itself that are latched on to the shifting configurations and conjunctures of the international division of labor, especially the legacies and challenges of state-making and nation-building, on the one hand, and the struggles over underdevelopment, dependency, and sustainable development, on the other; how to establish modern societies that are politically, economically and technologically viable in a highly competitive, unequal and exploitative world. The diversities of Africa’s nation-states, the fact that they are almost invariably multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural in the midst of relatively high levels of material poverty and uneven spatial and social development, and have until recently been dominated by authoritarian and corrupt governments, created a combustible mix that periodically erupted into open conflict and warfare. At the heart of all these conflicts and wars are struggles over power and resources; power cohered around the state and its governance structures, developmental capacities, delegative practices and distributional propensities, and resources in terms of their availability, control and access. Resources may be abundant or scarce, and either condition can be a source of conflict, depending on the organization and patterns of control and access. Control can be articulated in binding legal or flexible customary terms, embodied in community, corporate or state entities, and it might imply exclusionary or open access. The mediations of access include the trinity of contemporary analytical discourse – class, gender, and ethnicity (race in the global white North) – to which we have to add, at least in the African context, the constructions and identities of religion, region and generation. The regimes of access are further characterized and affected by gradations or scales of limitation.

It is obviously not possible in an introduction to give an extended account of Africa’s postcolonial wars, except to point out that they have taken two major forms, intra-state and inter-state wars. Each in turn can be further subdivided. In terms of their objectives, we could distinguish six types of intra-state wars: secessionist wars, irredentist wars, wars of devolution, wars of regime change, wars of social banditry, and armed inter-communal insurrections. By secessionist wars I refer to wars fomented by groups or regions that seek to secede from the postcolonial polity and establish an independent nation-state. The most famous example is that of the secession of the Igbo-dominated provinces in south-eastern Nigeria that proclaimed
an independent republic of Biafra, which triggered the civil war that cost Nigeria dearly in terms of the numbers of people who died – up to a million – not to mention the destruction of material resources and the social and political capital of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, national cohesion, and democratic governance (Harneit-Sievers et al. 1997; Okocha 1994; Oyeweso 1992).

Irredentist wars are generated when a group in one country seeks to be united or reunited with the country to which it is ethnically or historically related. Struggles by Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia wishing for unification with Somalia constitute the best known cases of irredentist conflicts and wars (Carment 2006; Laitin and Samatar 1987; Schraeder 2006; Mburu 2005). The Somali government often supported Somali rebels in the neighboring countries, thereby turning irredentist claims and conflicts into inter-state wars, as was the case during the Somali-Ethiopian wars over the Somali-populated Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1964-67 and 1977-78 (Dougherty 1982; Gorman 1981; Selassie 1980).

Wars of devolution are spawned by attempts by marginalized ethnic, religious and regional groups to renegotiate the terms of incorporation into the state and the national political space and their objective is decentralization rather than outright secession (Veney 2006). The long-running civil war in the Sudan, rooted in the history of colonial divisions, uneven development, exploitation and marginalization between the North and the South, was reignited in 1983 following the introduction of Sharia – Islamic law – by the Numeiri regime and disputes over sharing oil riches, and it persisted until the signing of a peace agreement in early January 2005 by which time more than 4 million people had been displaced and many more killed (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006; Johnson 2003; Khalid 2003; Kebbede 1999). But in the meantime, another regional conflict, also based on the effects of marginalization and resource disputes, had erupted in the Dar Fur region (Ardenne-van der Hoeven et al. 2006; Flint and de Waal 2005; Totten and Markusen 2006).

Wars of regime change are those often engineered by self-described revolutionary movements that seek to overthrow the existing government and establish a new socio-economic dispensation, including conditions and content of citizenship. An important example is the National Resistance Movement-Army (NRM-A) of Yoweri Museveni, which captured power in Uganda in 1986, the second guerrilla organization in an African country – after Chad – to succeed in doing so (Amaza 1998; Kasozi 1994; Mamdani 1995; Kabwegyere 2000). Since then, wars of regime change have been waged in various countries from Liberia to Sierra Leone to Ivory Coast (Adebajo 2002; Moran 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006), and from Somalia to Ethiopia to the two Congos, often with disastrous results that have often led, not to state reconstruction as in Uganda and Ethiopia, but rather to state retrenchment or even collapse, as in Somalia (Kusow 2004; Lyons and Samatar 1995). Some of the movements waging these wars are best considered, like RENAMO, as ‘terrorist’ in their unwillingness to distinguish between military and civilian targets; indeed, they thrive on perpetrating systematic violence against civilians to demonstrate the incapacity of the state to protect them.
By wars of social banditry I mean widespread acts of violence that are socially organized against the state and other social institutions, with the objective not of capturing state power as such but of creating chaotic conditions that are conducive to predatory accumulation. There is a rich historical literature that distinguishes between criminal banditry and constructive banditry that is redressive, redistributive and protective in nature (Isaacman 1976; Crummey 1986). While mindful of such distinctions and of the role of social banditry in traditions of anti-colonial resistance and protest, in this context I use the notion less in its heroic conception and context and more in terms of its corrosive effects on state institutions, its propensity, indeed purpose, to destroy organized collective political life, to dissipate it in fiercely competitive and combative enclaves of power and accumulation led by warlords (Reno 1998; Thomas et al. 2005; Alao et al. 1999; Lezhne 2005). To be sure, warlords and ‘terrorists’ became interchangeable in some parts of Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but the inability of some of these groups to capture and restructure state power might be an indication of their very banditry, of their lack of interest in exercising state power. Post-Siad Barre Somalia presents the quintessential manifestation of social banditry in postcolonial Africa.

For their part, armed inter-communal insurrections are often episodic eruptions of violence, sparked by specific incidents that stoke long simmering antagonisms, anxieties and aggressions. They can lead to great loss of life and if unchecked can mutate into prolonged warfare between ethnic and regional militias, which in turn can develop into guerrilla armies that threaten the viability of the nation-state. The periodic explosions of genocidal violence in Rwanda and Burundi, demonstrated most horrifically in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, show the potential destructiveness of inter-communal conflicts abetted by the state and reinforced by the devastations of economic stagnation, as well as the politicization and manipulation of ethnic differences by a cynical and bankrupt political class. Militant or militarized ethnicity is evident in many other countries currently undergoing democratization, as the tensions and twists arising from the competitive politics of democracy often find articulation in the entrenched identities, idioms and institutions of ethnic solidarity. In Nigeria, for example, democratization has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and the proliferation of regional and local struggles over the entitlements of citizenship expressed in the language of ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. These struggles have increasingly spilled into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on Nigeria’s civil society, unleashing periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence (Vickers 2000; Aghu 2004; Osaghae 1996).

Postcolonial Africa has experienced inter-state wars, although on a far lesser scale than other regions and in comparison with the prevalence of intra-state conflicts. This is perhaps a lingering tribute to the inviolability of national borders in the collective African political imaginary that was sanctified by the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union inaugurated in 2001. One can distinguish, in terms of the combatants involved, between bilateral wars and multilateral wars. Bilateral include the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1978–9,
the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978–9, and the Eritrea-Ethiopian war of 1998–2000, and the multilateral wars are illustrated by the multinational war over the DRC that started in 1998 and was still going on by the end of 2004. The war between Tanzania and Uganda was prompted by Uganda’s invasion of northern Tanzania, and Tanzania was only too keen to rid the region of the detested Idi Amin regime (Avirgan and Honey 1982; Kiwanuka 1979). The rather senseless war between the two impoverished neighbors and erstwhile allies, Ethiopia and Eritrea, was provoked by border, currency and trade disputes and characterized by mass deportations and mobilization, and trench warfare reminiscent of the First World War (Negash and Tronvoll 2000; Fessehatzion 2002; Jacquin-Berdal and Plaut 2005). The DRC war, bred and superimposed on an already ferocious civil war, was fueled by a mad scramble for the country’s vast mineral, forestry and agricultural resources, and involved Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe on the side of the DRC government and Rwanda and Uganda on the side of the rebels (Khadiagala 2006; Nest 2006; Adelman and Rao 2004; Clark 2002). The destructiveness of these wars was incalculable in the loss of human life and damage to material infrastructure and environmental resources. By the end of 2004, according to several estimates, the war in the DRC alone had claimed a staggering 3 to 4 million lives (Institute for Peace and Justice 2005; Care News 2005; Fonseca 2004; Hawkins 2004).

International wars, fought either outside the continent’s borders in which African troops are involved or against foreign countries, constitute the fifth major form of wars in which postcolonial Africa has been involved. Here we can identify four major types of international wars: first, the use of African troops in international peace-keeping operations, mostly under the auspices of the United Nations; second, the Arab-Israeli war; third, the recruitment of African combatants or mercenaries in international theaters of war; and fourth, African participation in the American-led ‘war on terror’. Since the end of the Cold War the developed countries have become increasingly reluctant to deploy peace-keeping troops in conflicts in the global South, including those in Africa. While it is widely known that thousands of foreign troops, often under UN auspices, as well as African troops under regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the AU, are deployed in peace-keeping missions in regions and countries plagued by conflict across the continent, it is little appreciated that African peace-keeping troops are deployed in foreign conflicts (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Singer 2001; Rotberg et al. 2000; Adebajo and Sriram 2001; Francis 2005). For example, in 2003, 21 African countries reportedly contributed 10,191 troops – or 23 per cent – out of 43,007 troops deployed worldwide, with contributions ranging from four from Côte d’Ivoire to 3,340 from Nigeria (Sura and Hagen 2005).

Several African countries, principally in North Africa led by Egypt, have been directly involved in four of the six Arab-Israeli wars: the first in 1948–9 following the establishment of the Israeli state; the second in October-November 1956, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, in which Israel was supported by Britain and France; the third in June 1967 in which Israel captured more Arab lands and Egypt’s Sinai peninsula; the fourth in October 1973 in which Egypt and its allies scored some early
victories and after which the OAU called for African states to break diplomatic relations with Israel and all but three did; the fifth in 1982–4 involving the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, by which time Egypt had signed a peace treaty with Israel; and the sixth in July-August 2006 when Israel invaded Lebanon again, this time to fight the Lebanese movement, Hezbollah (Gawrych 2000; Laskier 2004; Kokole 1993; Peters 1992; Ojo 1988; Oded 1987).

The conflicts in Western Asia – the Middle East of imperial cartography – became a magnet for recruits from several African countries. In the 1980s Afghanistan became the epicenter of the last gasps of the Cold War. The US was determined to turn the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan into the Soviet Vietnam, and it was only too happy to recruit, train and support the mujahadeen (Mamdani 2004). Among the militant Muslims who flocked to Afghanistan were thousands from Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan and other African countries who would later return and form the backbone of radical Islamist movements – what the Western media call Islamic fundamentalism – that launched campaigns of terror against discredited secular states and institutions and individuals associated with Western modernity. Algeria found itself caught in this bloody maelstrom following the aborted elections of 1992 in which the Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win. In the ensuing civil war multitudes were killed, up to an estimated 150,000 by 2000. The case of the Algerian civil war brings into sharp relief the intricate connections in some of Africa’s contemporary wars between domestic and international factors, reformist and reactionary motivations, secular and religious movements. This war and many others represent the clash of modernisms – modern political Islam and the modernizing neocolonial state (Volpi 2003; Bonora-Waisman 2003).

Africa & the Current ‘War on Terror’

The US-led ‘war on terror’ that Africa and other parts of the world are increasingly being expected to fight is clearly not new. It has elements of the imperial wars, inter-state wars, intra-state wars and international wars described above. Fundamentally lacking in many of these wars and the ‘war on terror’ is the liberatory logic of anti-colonial wars. The ‘war on terror’ is an imperial war in so far as it seeks to advance the agenda of the world’s pre-eminent imperial power, the United States. It obviously involves intense conflicts between and within states, and is international in its scope. While wars against terror are not new, the current US-led war is occurring in new contexts characterized by four key developments in the world system. The first is globalization, both as a historical process and as an ideological project. Interconnectedness among the world’s continents, countries and cultures, in temporal and spatial terms, has intensified through new communication and transport technologies that have accelerated the flows of capital and commodities, ideas and individuals, and values and viruses, and facilitated the growth of transnational movements and reflexivities. At the same time, the world political economy is becoming more regionalized as blocs emerge or are consolidated to fulfill long-
standing dreams of pan-territorial or racial solidarities and to mediate the corrosive and competitive pressures of contemporary globalization.

It is also a conjuncture characterized by democratization as marked by an increase in the number of states following and abiding by features of democratic governance, minimally characterized by elections and multi-party politics, the pluralization of associational life and the expansion of political space thanks to the unrelenting struggles of social movements, and the emergence of a global rhetoric of democracy – the so-called ‘third wave’. Most of these developments coincided, or became more visible, with the end of the Cold War. The US emerged as the single superpower, which in its triumphalism sought to impose a new order on a world that was less amenable to superpower management and manipulation because it was becoming more globalized, regionalized and democratized. This is at the heart of the conundrum of US global policy and standing, a hyperpower whose hysterical unilateralism finds few adherents even among its European allies. Faced with diminishing global economic power and little political and moral capital, the US increasingly relies on naked military force to enforce its will, now in the name of an amorphous ‘terrorism’. And the rest of the world is expected to embrace the ‘war on terror’ as its own.

In discussing the ‘war on terror’, we need to pay attention to the analytical problems it poses, namely, its conceptions, causes, constructions, consequences and challenges, that is, how it is defined, generated, waged, and the effects it leaves behind and the political and policy issues it presents. Needless to say, there is considerable controversy on how the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘war’ are defined. Africans remember only too well how their liberation movements and leaders used to be called ‘terrorists’ by the imperialists. There is also the problem of the identity of ‘terrorists’ as state and non-state actors. The tendency is to depict ‘terrorists’ as non-state actors and to talk of states in terms of ‘state-sponsors of terrorism’ when in fact historically states have perpetrated some of the worst acts of terrorism. After years of much deliberation and disagreement, the United Nations finally in December 2004 issued a report that recognized that the perpetrators of terrorism can be both state and non-state actors and placed emphasis on attacks on civilians and non-combatants, noting that terrorism flourishes in conditions of poverty, inequality, oppression, humiliation, conflict and occupation (United Nations 2004).

No less problematic is the description of the ‘war on terror’ as ‘war’. What sort of war is it? Who are the combatants and enemies in this war? What are its spatial and temporal boundaries? If it is a ‘war’, then surely it must be subject to international conventions of war, yet the US treats the prisoners of its ‘war on terror’ outside any acceptable legal standards at the ‘legal black hole’ of Guantánamo Bay in Cuba where abducted suspects from around the world, including children, have been subjected to incommunicado interrogations and indefinite detentions without trial. The scandal of Abu Ghraib in Baghdad, with its pornographic images of torture, primal degradation and gratuitous humiliation of Iraq prisoners, which unleashed a wave of worldwide dismay, contempt and anger against the United States, shows that the US believes that this ‘war’ can be waged without civilized constraints (Hoffman 2004).
The causes of the ‘war on terror’ are no less difficult to decipher. Some find an explanation in official US rhetoric about the historic effects of September 11, or doctrinal shifts in foreign policy to pre-emptive strikes and spreading democracy as the new overriding goal. Others find greater explanatory power in the structural forces of the needs of a permanent war economy and efforts to manage the opportunities and problems of globalization that reinforce US tendencies toward exceptionalism and unilateralism, or they stress the imperatives of US Western Asia policy anchored in the political economy of oil and the uncompromising defense of Israel, all of which entail and buttress what I call the republicanization of America (Zeleza 2004b).

It could be argued that terrorism has become for the US a convenient substitute for communism, a new enemy essential for a permanent war economy and necessary to produce nationalism and promote patriotism in this new era of ‘globalization’. For a country that spends nearly half of the world’s military expenditures – there have been huge increases in US military spending since 2002 – enemies are essential, and the more ubiquitous they are the better. Terrorism fits the bill. The prefix ‘Islamic’ as in ‘Islamic terrorism’ allows for the substitution of the political language of policies and interests by the cultural language of religion and civilization. In short, it makes it possible for the US to wrap itself in self-righteousness and to demonize others for their wickedness. Nationalists and other militants in the Muslim world have inherited the appellation of ‘evil’ once used to describe the Soviet Union and to mobilize support against it, most importantly, and somewhat ironically, among militant Muslims themselves, and as a civilization Islam can be tarred with the atavisms of premodernity. Both discourses are based on, and seek to ignite, deep-seated anti-Islamic memories in Western culture. Religion and civilization make a potent mix in the clash of US imperialism and political Islam that the US itself turned from an ideological tendency into a political organization during the anti-Soviet crusade in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

All this serves to particularize and primordialize global terrorism, depicting it as an upsurge of religious fanaticism and civilizational envy in the Muslim world that has nothing to do with the policies of successive US governments, including those of the current Bush administration. The litany of the policy abominations as seen from the region is a long one indeed. The wide and wild application of the term ‘terrorists’, and occasionally ‘insurgents’, to apply to all opponents of US imperial policies seeks to delegitimize what is, at heart, nationalist resistance against imperialism. It is a familiar story in the annals of empire – spreading democracy and freedom as an alibi for a country – the US – that has difficulty running its own elections and has historically not respected the democratic rights and civil liberties of its own minorities.

It could be argued that the ‘war on terror’ represents an attempt by the US to recenter global hegemony around military prowess in which US power remains uncontested, although the quagmire in Iraq has dented it. It is a weapon of global domination, a declaration and demonstration of US global supremacy. The unilateralism of the ‘war on terror’ – waged illegally against all wise counsel from the United Nations and other international
organizations as well as most of the US’s European allies – reflects not only imperial hubris, the arrogance of hyperpower, but also a sense of exceptionalism, a mystical belief in the country’s manifest destiny that is so deeply rooted in its national imagination. Also, the economic prosperity enjoyed by the United States during the Second World War, which ended the Great Depression, left a deep impression regarding the positive effects of high military expenditures that has not been questioned by any administration since then.

The costs of the ‘war on terror’ have been high. As far as the US itself is concerned, the war is being fought on two fronts. First, there are the hot wars abroad, beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and followed by Iraq in 2003, and there are thinly veiled threats against other ‘rogue states’, principally Iran and North Korea. Second, there is the cold war at home enacted through the imposition of a stringent homeland security regime, which threatens the civil liberties of US citizens and the rights of immigrants in which Muslims and their institutions and people of ‘Middle Eastern’ appearance have been targeted for racist attacks. By mid-November 2006, the war had directly cost a staggering $345 billion and was still rising.

For people in the ‘war zone’ within Afghanistan and Iraq and for the surrounding countries, the war is as real as it is vicious: rampant deaths and destruction accompanied by social dislocation reflected in skyrocketing crime, rape and kidnapping, as well as economic devastation manifested in rising unemployment, destruction of the oil infrastructure, and corporate war profiteering, not to mention the social, environmental and political damage done to these countries’ health, education, environments and sovereignty. According to an article in the British medical journal, The Lancet, the Iraq war led to the deaths of an estimated 654,965 between March 2003 and July 2006 (Burnham et al. 2006). The figure included those who died from gunfire and direct combat as well as from increased lawlessness and the indiscriminate destruction of the country’s infrastructure that left behind shortages of medical facilities, clean drinking water, and adequate incomes and jobs. In the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 an estimated 25,000 perished. And we are only in the early days of the war.

For the rest of the world the US-led ‘war on terror’ undermines international law, the United Nations, and global security and disarmament by galvanizing terrorist groups, diverts much-needed resources for development, and promotes human rights abuses by providing governments throughout the world with a new licence for torture and mistreatment of prisoners and opponents. Many people around the world now regard the US, to use the words of the Council on Foreign Relations (2002), as ‘arrogant, hypocritical, self-absorbed, self-indulgent, and contemptuous of others’. In a recent report, Human Rights Watch (2005: 500) singled out the US as a major factor in eroding the global human rights system.

Africa’s geopolitical stock for Euro-America has risen in the post-2001 world, bolstered by US concerns about militant Islam, the alleged vulnerability of fragile states as sanctuaries of global terrorist networks, and the need for ‘safe’ energy resources outside the volatile Middle East. For Africa itself, this renewed attention has not brought any tangible benefits, whether
in increased investment or in support for its fundamental interests of development and democratization. On the contrary, the war threatens human rights in Africa and reinforces old conflicts and foments new ones. As several human rights organizations including Amnesty International (2001a: 5) have warned, draconian actions and the subversion of international humanitarian law undermine the counter-terrorism measures by invoking the very instrumentalities of terrorism in their disregard for human rights, in ostensibly pursuing security at the expense of respect for human dignity. The backlash against human rights in the US-led ‘war on terror’ has bred widespread resentment and even hatred that have swelled the ranks of the ‘insurgents’ fighting against the US in Afghanistan and Iraq and terrorists bent on attacking American interests elsewhere, and fuelled divisions between the US and many of its allies in Europe and across the world. It has also provided alibis for governments, including many in Africa, as well as international agencies, to violate or vitiate their human rights commitments and to tighten asylum laws and policies. In the meantime, military transfers to countries with poor human rights records have increased which portends ill for human rights.

Many African governments have rushed to pass broadly, badly or cynically worded anti-terrorism laws and other draconian procedural measures, and to set up special courts or allow special rules of evidence that violate fair trial rights, which they use to limit civil rights and freedoms, and to harass, intimidate, and imprison and crackdown on political opponents. This is helping to strengthen or restore a culture of impunity among the security services in many countries. Amnesty International (2003, 2004) has issued reports critical of new draft anti-terrorism laws in a number of countries from Kenya to Tunisia that threaten to undermine international human rights standards. African friends and foes of the United States have been basking in the new climate of intolerance and impudence. For example, Morocco, an archaic Western-friendly monarchy, used anti-terrorism laws to detain 5,000 people following the May 2003 bombings in the country. In Zimbabwe, a self-declared anti-imperialist enclave of tattered radical credentials, there was a sharp escalation of state-sponsored intimidation, torture, arbitrary arrests and political killings, and orchestrated attacks on the independence of the media and the judiciary (Amnesty International 2001b: 28–34).

In addition to the restrictions on political and civil rights and the subordination of human rights concerns to anti-terrorism priorities, the ‘war on terror’ is inflicting other collateral damage on Africa. As a report by Human Rights Watch (2003: 3) noted

pre-existing political tensions between Muslim and Christian populations in a number of African countries threatened to become inflamed, and increasingly violent. Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania all faced the possibility of worsening communal tensions. Bloody riots between Muslims and Christians in Kano, northern Nigeria, following demonstrations against the US bombing of Afghanistan, had already left a high death toll. A pro-Taliban demonstration was also reported in Kenya’s predominantly Muslim coastal city, Mombasa.

Western anti-travel advisories undermined the economies of countries
dependent on tourism, while increased security and defense expenditures threatened to reduce humanitarian and development assistance. In the Horn of Africa, the war on terror provides a new stimulus for age-old rivalries and conflicts and cover for discredited authoritarian regimes, as evident in attempts by the Ethiopian government to insinuate itself with the US and bolster its dented international reputation following the botched elections of 2005 by threatening to attack the movement – the Union of Islamic Courts – that seized control of much of Somalia from the warlords and the nominal government; the Islamists were accused of having links with al-Qaeda (BBC 2006; Clayton 2006).

The Political Economy & Cultural Ecology of War

Given the range and diversity of Africa’s wars, it stands to reason that their causes are as varied and complex as their courses and consequences. Some attribute these wars to the lingering legacies of colonialism, but for many, especially in the Western popular and academic media, singular ahistorical and internalist explanations tend to be offered, assigning the wars to either Africa’s primordial afflictions of ‘tribalism’, or the depredations of the continent’s proverbial poverty and inequalities, or authoritarianism and poor governance. The ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ thesis is sometimes overlaid by the ‘new barbarism’ thesis that depicts African wars as irrational and pathological. To be sure, these wars are often provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political instability and manipulations, but these factors, individually or collectively, have a history rooted in the political economy of colonialism, postcolonialism, and neo-liberal globalization; they are as much internal in their causation and scale as they are regional and transnational, involving national, regional and international actors and networks that are simultaneously economic, political, military and social.

Much of the current literature focuses on Africa’s intra-state wars and conflicts, and especially the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War era. It cannot be overemphasized that there is little that is new about the wars of the 1990s and early 2000s. As several critics of the so-called ‘new wars’ paradigm have pointed out, these wars are an amalgam of ‘old wars’ – the age-old inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state wars. Moreover, the ‘new wars’ can be explained using available analytical models and typologies, and there is no evidence that warfare has changed fundamentally in terms of types of participants, and patterns in the prosecution of wars, and their purposes (Henderson and Singer 2002). Analytical dichotomies tend to be drawn between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars in terms of their causes and motivations, levels of support, and violence. The ‘new wars’ are said to be driven by private greed rather than collective grievances like the ‘old wars’, and are depicted as criminal, depoliticized and predatory; they allegedly lack popular support, unlike the ‘old wars’ that enjoyed broad popular support; and they are executed through uncontrolled violence. These dichotomies are untenable on historical and empirical grounds; the
characteristics of both old and new civil wars are indistinguishable. It stands to reason that Africa’s wars and conflicts, including civil wars, are products of multiple causes and contexts, as would be evident from any study of a specific war informed by what I would call the political economy and cultural ecology of war, an approach that emphasizes and examines how political, economic, social and cultural factors cause and sustain war and conflict within and between states and societies. We need to incorporate in our analyses the interplay of historical and contemporary processes, the intersections of politics, economy and culture, the connections between local, regional and global systems, the role played by national and transnational formations, by the state, capital and civil society, and how material forces and popular discourses, institutional conditions and symbolic constructs structure and reproduce conflicts.

While this book largely focuses on intra-state or civil wars and conflicts, it examines many aspects of these wars including their political and structural dynamics, economic and social dimensions, gender inflections and implications, transnational and imperial contexts, and their costs and consequences. The collection opens with Ali Mazrui's wide-ranging paper, which offers intriguing paradoxes that characterize conflicts in Africa. He posits, controversially, that postcolonial wars have been more ruthless than anti-colonial wars; conflicts within borders more common and ferocious than across borders; ethnic conflicts tend to be preponderant in sub-Saharan Africa and religious conflicts in Arab North Africa; conflicts between blacks and whites have been more about the distribution of economic resources, while among blacks they have largely centered on the demarcation of cultural identities; conflicts have become more prevalent as African armies have become less disciplined but better equipped; and dual societies have been more prone to conflict than plural societies. The second part of Mazrui’s paper discusses conflict resolution and anticipates many of the issues taken up in Volume II of this collection. He urges the need to cultivate toleration and foster constructive pluralization by promoting the development of multiparty systems, capitalism, federalism and more women’s political representation, improving civil-military relations, and strengthening regional integration and building innovative Pan-African institutions and mechanisms of conflict prevention, intervention and resolution.

African civil wars are often characterized or dismissed simply as ‘ethnic conflicts’. In a vigorous rebuttal of this view, Errol Henderson seeks to provide a systematic analysis of the extent to which civil wars in Africa are engendered by political, economic and cultural factors. He constructs several testable propositions related to a state’s regime type, its level of economic development, and its cultural composition. With regard to the political factors, he examines the relative propensities of autocracies, democracies and semi-democracies in generating civil wars; for the economic factors, the relative contributions of levels of economic development and military expenditures to lowering or increasing the likelihood of civil war are assessed; and for the cultural factors, the presence of ‘politicized ethnic groups’ or ‘ethno-political groups’ is analyzed. Using regression analyses, the data reveal that there is little evidence that semi-democracies, which are often associated with the likelihood of civil war
because they lack the institutional channels of dispute resolution available in democracies or the repressive capacities of autocracies, have been more prone to civil war in Africa than other regimes. Also insignificant are cultural factors, specifically the role of ethnic polarization. The economic factors are more salient: increased development is associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war, while increased military spending leads to increased likelihood of civil war. The most critical predictor of the likelihood of civil war lies in the destructive political legacies of colonialism, which left Africa with very weak and underdeveloped states, and the failure of Africa’s leaders to effectively handle the dual challenges of state-building and nation-building.

The rest of the papers elaborate on more specific causes of violent conflicts in Africa. It is common to attribute civil conflicts to structural conditions, in which the social, economic and political organization of society, specifically the existence of structural inequalities and victimization among groups, is seen as the cause of conflicts. While objective realities or interests do indeed generate conflict, some writers contend that material conditions and inequalities are not sufficient by themselves to explain the intensity, ferocity and duration of conflicts; they often provide ‘proximate causes’, and psychocultural dispositions, or subjective factors, especially the psychology of victimhood and persecution, constitute the indispensable fuel. Conflicts erupt or persist when the memories of humiliation, oppression and marginalization, both real and mythologized, are triggered through new threats (Azar and Moon 1986; Deutsch 1991; Ross 1993; Brown 1993; Namwambah 2004). Clearly, wars and conflicts arise out of the combustible interplay of objective and subjective factors, the incendiary combination of material and sociocultural conditions and political and psychological dispositions.

The role of structural and subjective factors and history and mythology in generating protracted conflict can be seen in all its devastating manifestation in the Sudan. Analyses of the Sudanese conflict have tended to reproduce dichotomies, variously presenting it as a conflict between the North and the South, Muslims and Christians, Arabs and Africans, and oppressors and oppressed. Abdel Ghaffar Ahmed notes that, while there may be elements of all of these dichotomies, none of them explains the conflict. Often ignored are the rural-urban divide, and more importantly, the role of the country’s opportunistic elite in fomenting ethnic and regional divisions that are at the root of the Sudanese conundrum. Ahmed insists on the multiple complexities of the Sudanese conflict, emphasizing the historical legacies of colonialism, which left behind underdevelopment and acute socio-economic and political marginalization for groups in peripheral regions who have been fighting for inclusion since independence. He places primary responsibility on the elite, tracing the development of this class from the colonial period and the role it has played during various phases of violent conflict in postcolonial Sudan.

If the elites are critical in safeguarding a political community, citizenship is the bond that holds that community together. Rupturing the social contract of common citizenship is a certain recipe for conflict. The question of citizenship – who belongs and does not belong to the polity – remains at the heart of many conflicts in postcolonial Africa. The Ivory Coast is a
particularly tragic example of this phenomenon. This is the subject of John Akokpari’s illuminating paper. He argues that at the heart of the conflict in that country is the citizen-stranger dichotomy and its manipulation by the political elite. Thus it is not so much the artificiality of the African state, derived as it is from a colonial construct that embraced within its cartographic enclosures diverse ethnic groups, that causes conflicts per se; rather, conflicts erupt when the state fails to manage this diversity and to fulfill its social contract with citizens – to provide social services, security and equal opportunities. The denial of the badge of citizenship to certain groups, on whatever basis, almost invariably generates conflict as the aggrieved and excluded group or groups seek the redress of political inclusion or territorial secession.

This is what happened in the Ivory Coast as the once relatively peaceful and prosperous country was rocked by economic and political crises in the 1990s in the post-Houphouet Boigny era. Akokpari contends that under Boigny’s reign ethnic diversity was managed and harmony maintained because on citizenship rights the individual was prioritized over the group, while his successors failed to do so. In fact, they sought to entrench their power in an economy reeling from the effects of economic recession and structural adjustment programs by manipulating ethnic divisions and attempting to exclude from the rights and privileges of citizenship migrant communities, some of whom had been in the country since long before independence and had helped fuel the export-led boom of earlier years, by using the divisive concept of Ivoirite – true Ivoriness. The irony is that exclusionary notions of citizenship were being advanced in countries like the Ivory Coast at the same time as globalization and liberalization were eroding the state’s hegemony over citizenship.

In current discussions of conflicts the role of economic factors features prominently. This was not always so, and owes much to the work of the economist Paul Collier and his associates (Collier 1999, 2000; Collier and Hoefler 1998, 1999), who advanced the influential and controversial typology of ‘resource wars’ according to which ‘economic agendas’ are at the heart of violent conflicts in Africa. The argument is that the bulk of Africa’s major conflicts since the mid-1960s have been driven by economic greed rather than political grievances, whether those related to economic inequalities, ethnic and religious cleavages, or political repression. While previously emphasis was placed on economic scarcity and inequality as a cause of war, this approach stresses the role played by resource abundance, the rise of self-financing rebel movements, and the emergence of civil war economies that are parasitic, illicit, and predatory, and dependent on external criminal financial and commodity networks. Its proponents seek to analyze not only the economic conditions, opportunities for, and rationality of organized violence; some try to construct quantitative models to predict the processes that lead to civil war, its severity, duration, and the remedial actions that can be taken. Often solution is sought in sanctions against the trafficking of products from conflict zones – the infamous ‘conflict diamonds’; and vague appeals tend to be made for economic growth and diversification and political democratization (Seck 2004).

While few would dispute the fact that economic problems, struggles and
inequalities constitute ‘root causes’ of many violent conflicts across the continent, economistic explanations such as those proposed by Collier and his colleagues have been vigorously contested on methodological, theoretical and policy grounds. Some have questioned their very definitions of ‘civil war’ and the quality of their data, the dichotomized notions of grievance and greed and the validity of the proxies used for them, the exclusive focus on rebels, and the occlusion of structural adjustment and neo-liberalism as the context that creates conditions for both conflict and predation through increased poverty and inequality and by weakening state capacity and strengthening regional and global markets and networks that rebel movements can access (Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Pugh and Cooper 2004). Others have questioned the applicability of the thesis to many of Africa’s wars and conflicts. Norman Mlambo (2004) mentions the wars of liberation primarily motivated by the desire for emancipation rather than the looting of resources, and land struggles in Southern Africa that seek the redistribution of scarce resources rooted in the inequities of settler colonialism. He is adamant that there is more to African conflicts than simple economic greed and that the sharp contrast drawn between economic and political motivations is unproductive analytically and in terms of devising effective conflict resolution policies.¹⁹

Many scholars sympathetic to the economic analysis of war have pointed out that even the ‘economic agendas’ of the recent wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the proverbial ‘resource wars’, can be questioned; these wars have been driven more by the struggle for political power than for the control of resources as such, or, to use the title of Arnson and Zartman’s (2005) book, there is an intersection of ‘need, creed, and greed’. Contributors to the study by Ballentine and Sherman (2003) find the greed or grievance dichotomy too limiting and stress the inseparability of political and economic factors, the complexity, diversity, and variability of the economic conditions and opportunity structures of war, the economic behaviors of the various actors from the rebels themselves to states and transnational organizations, and the contextual specificities and fluidities of conflict, and the role played by the processes of regionalization, privatization and globalization.²⁰ Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (2004) are particularly critical of the tendency to ignore the negative impact of globalization and neo-liberal models of development sanctioned by the international financial institutions that have bankrolled many of the ‘resource wars’ studies,²¹ and their misguided policy prescriptions on proscribing ‘conflict goods’ and imposing what they call simplistic ‘liberal peace strategies’ of post-conflict reconstruction.²² They also question the ‘national’ focus of many of these studies and emphasize the regional dimensions of war economies – regional conflict complexes – noting the crucial mediations of regional economic, military, political and social networks in the global-local nexus in the geography of many so-called civil wars.²³

In this volume, Thandika Mkandawire offers a compelling critique not only of Collier’s thesis, but of much of the Africanist conflict literature. No perspective escapes his censure, not the apocalyptic view that depicts African conflicts as senseless madness, the culturalist view according to
which conflicts are culturally encoded, or the neopatrimonial perspective that attributes conflicts to the self-destructive logic of prebendalism. He reserves his most scathing attack for the rational choice paradigm of economists, many of them affiliated with the World Bank or working for donor agencies, including Collier's 'looting model of rebellion', and their faulty methodological, theoretical and empirical premises and findings. He accuses these scholars of conflating political rebels with common criminals, enabling with causal factors, and individual with collective rationality. In the rest of his paper Mkandawire offers an illuminating alternative explanation of civil wars and rebel movements, arguing that these movements, which are composed largely of roving rather than stationary rebels, are urban in their origins and agendas and are produced by Africa's urban crisis, which has been exacerbated by structural adjustment programs. It is the urban roots of the rebel movements that account for their problematic and predatory relationship with the rural peasantry. He also suggests that rentier states have been more prone to rebellion than merchant states because of the higher levels of relative deprivation among the former.24

Most conventional studies of war, including those mentioned above, tend to ignore one fundamental aspect of war: the fact that wars are gendered in their causes, courses and consequences. As Joshua Goldstein (2001:1) puts it so poignantly, 'gender shapes war and war shapes gender.' The connections between gender and war are, of course, exceedingly complex and show enormous variations across time and space – between historical periods and among different cultures and societies – but there can be little doubt that war and gender reproduce each other in so far as they embody, exhibit and engender masculinity and femininity. Until quite recently the gender dynamics of war were largely ignored by male researchers, and when gender was brought in, usually by female scholars, much of the focus was on women and war. The latter is obviously a subject that deserves serious study in its own right, but it is also important to emphasize that the relationship between men and war is also a gendered one. Wars and militaries are critical mechanisms for the production and performance of masculinities. The varied involvements and impacts of wars for men and women are products of socially and culturally constructed gender roles. To feminist scholars the gendered nature of war is self-evident, even if they might explain the relations between the two quite differently. For example, the differentiated gendering of war for men and women is explained by liberal feminists largely in terms of sexist discrimination; radical feminists emphasize patriarchy, racism and imperialism; and postmodern feminists tend to focus on the contingency and fluidity of gender roles in war and the gendered discourses and representations of war (Reardon 1985; Ruddick 1989; Lorentzen and Turpin 1998; Peterson and Runyan 1999; De Pauw 1998; Tursken 1998; Mazurana et al. 2005; Dudink et al. 2004; Afshar and Eade 2004; Skjelsbæk and Smith 2001). In short, gender analyses of war examining the intersections between war and the constructions and reconstructions of both masculinity and femininity have enriched our understanding of both war and gender immensely.

The engagements and effects of contemporary wars on women are
complex and contradictory. Women are both victims and agents, although their explicit involvement in waging war and influencing war outcomes remains relatively marginal compared to men. As the venues, actors and mechanisms of war have become more diffuse with the proliferation of intra-state wars, informal fighting forces, small arms, and terror tactics, the costs of war for women have risen. Although the number of combat deaths among men still outstrips that of women, women’s direct war mortality rates have been rising worldwide – up to a quarter in 2000 (UNRISD 2005: 214). Many more women have died from the indirect consequences of war including injuries, hunger, exhaustion, diseases, and the disruptions of flight, relocation and economic devastation. Widowhood and the growth of female-headed households impose severe strains, although they might also be empowering for some women. The physical and psychological devastation for women generated by pervasive and widely reported sexual violence including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriages that often leave behind markedly increased rates of sexually transmitted infections including HIV/AIDS, not to mention unwanted pregnancies, is truly horrific. Women fall victim not only to different combatants but sometimes to peace-keeping forces as well, and wartime conditions generate increased demand for sexual services which leads to growth in prostitution and the trafficking of women. But women have also been active agents in wars as combatants, active supporters and provocateurs. The experiences and transformations wrought by war can also lead to changes in gender relations and sometimes be empowering for women, especially in contexts where women’s groups emerge to assist those victimized by war and to fight for gendered peace and post-conflict reconstruction.

Aaronette White critically interrogates the question of the transformative impact of war, specifically Africa’s revolutionary wars of national liberation. She examines and reassesses Frantz Fanon’s theory that the revolutionary violence of liberation wars was therapeutic and emancipatory for the colonized including women, that it was a humanizing force for both the colonized and the colonizer. White notes that women have been active participants in these wars, both as victims and agents, and it is possible to identify their empowering and disempowering effects. While national liberation and women’s liberation movements are related, Fanon overstated the symbiosis between the two because he underestimated the resilience of the gendered, patriarchal underpinnings of African nationalisms, which were rooted in what White calls ‘the androcentricization of inferiority’, as contrasted with Fanon’s ‘epidermilization of inferiority’. For men, national liberation represented struggles over their own masculine identities. Thus armed struggles reinforced the masculinist propensities of nationalist movements and consciousness in so far as military forces as social institutions and military values valorize courage, virility, superiority and ideal masculinity. The intersections and interactions between militarism and masculinity that give rise to militarized patriarchal ideologies and practices are evident in the execution of the wars themselves, in the sexual division of labor between men and women in which women play largely subordinate roles often reminiscent of their domestic roles, not to mention their vulnerabilities to sexual violence and harassment, as well as in post-
war realities in which women combatants and women’s issues are often silenced and marginalized. For women, then, the psychological effects are more degenerative than regenerative. As for the empowerment effects, which are considerable, White notes that women combatants do not attribute them to the actual violence of war.

A full account of any of Africa’s wars and conflicts would show the complex interplay of national and transnational forces, and that internal and external forces are deeply implicated with each other. As dependency theory has taught us, ever since the emergence of the modern world system the external is always already implicated in the local, although many dependency writers were wont to overemphasize external forces and underestimate local agency, and to depict the structural forces largely in materialist and economistic terms at the expense of their ideational, political and cultural dimensions. This underscores the difficulties of disaggregating the global-local nexus, and capturing the exact nature of external-internal connections and how they relate to each other. Ron Kassimir (2006) puts forward the concept of transboundary formations as an analytical device to transcend the external-internal divide and capture the dynamics created by the intersection of forces emanating from various spatial, social, structural and sectoral levels. It is a framework, he argues, that can yield useful hypotheses and provide insights in analyzing concrete events and processes in which different institutions operate and intersect, where networks of people form, and through which ideas and commodities are trafficked. For example, he shows that the case of conflict diamonds bears testimony to the critical role played by the global demand and markets for commodities, cross-border smuggling of commodities and arms, and recruitment of mercenary forces in engendering and sustaining many a civil war and regional conflict in Africa (also see Callaghy et al. 2001).

There can be little doubt that external contexts and actors have had a major impact in instigating, facilitating, aggravating or prolonging conflicts in Africa from the time of the Atlantic slave trade, through the colonial period, to the postcolonial era. Sandra J. MacLean’s perceptive paper explores the intersections of local, national, regional and international factors in the political economy of conflicts. The transnational linkages and complexes that spawn, sustain or shape African conflicts are obviously multi-dimensional. Patterns of a country’s or region’s integration into the global capitalist system help structure its levels of underdevelopment, inequalities and the development of patrimonial relationships, all of which often contribute to the prevalence of civil strife and the outbreaks of violent conflict. It is certainly the case that many of Africa’s dictatorial regimes, whose very existence was a source of conflict in so far as the closure of political space tended to channel opposition into armed revolts and rebel movements, were sponsored and supported by foreign powers and interests, especially during the Cold War. Both states and non-state actors, including the notorious warlords, often use or turn transnational formations into networks of plunder that nourish civil wars. In as much as the venal global networks of corruption, crime and violence are involved in generating conflicts, conflict resolution needs the mobilization of the more progressive global networks – from knowledge and policy networks to transnational
advocacy coalitions – that can facilitate sustainable development, reconciliation and empowerment.

Since the end of the Cold War and the onset of the twenty-first century new forms of imperialism, often cloaked in the giddy rhetoric of globalization, are engendering new contexts and excuses for imperialist adventures that are stoking local and regional conflicts across the world. As noted above, the current US-led ‘war on terror’ is leaving a trail of wanton destruction, and wreaking havoc on the infrastructures of global order, development and democracy. Africa is being asked to participate in this new form of war, unleashed in the name of fighting ‘terrorism’ by an imperial power frantically seeking to maintain its eroding global hegemony, even as the continent desperately seeks to quench its old wars that continue to smolder and devastate large parts of the continent. The ‘war on terror’ has serious implications for democratization and human rights, as processes and projects, globally and for Africa. Clearly, many African countries are using the war and the language of anti-terrorism to roll back new and hard-won human rights and democratic freedoms (Mazrui 2006).

The legislative responses to terrorism are examined in considerable detail by Cephas Lumina who chronicles the anti-terrorism measures adopted post-September 11 in four selected African countries: Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Uganda. The paper places these measures in the context of the international legal framework on terrorism that includes the twelve universal conventions on specific aspects of terrorism and the regional conventions adopted by various organizations, and demonstrates, quite compellingly, that many of the new anti-terrorism laws undermine international human rights law, threaten the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, permit detention and torture, and curtail rights to a fair trial, freedom of association, expression and assembly, and privacy. The war on terror has given a new lease to racial discrimination and religious intolerance and even poses a threat to the rights of the child. The need to arrest and reverse this trend is incontrovertible if the continent is fully to achieve the historic and humanistic tasks of African nationalism – self-determination, development and democratization – and realize the age-old dreams of Pan-Africanism – regional integration and turning itself from a global pawn to a global player.

The costs and consequences of violent conflicts are immense. Except perhaps for the wars of liberation, violent conflicts have little redeeming value. They exact a heavy toll on society, the economy, and the environment, both directly and indirectly through deaths and injuries, sexual crimes and intimidation, population dislocations within and across national borders, and the damage and distortions they cause to societal networks and the fragile social capital of trust and interpersonal associations and intergroup interactions. Not to mention the devastation of the ecosystem, agricultural lands and wildlife, the destruction of society’s material and mechanical infrastructures, the outflow of resources including ‘capital flight’ and ‘brain drain’, the proliferation of pathological and self-destructive behaviors, and the deterioration in the aesthetic quality of life.

The chapter by Fondo Sikod underscores the devastating implications of conflict for poverty and food security. His contention is that conflict is a
cause of food insecurity and exacerbates poverty in Africa because it destroys or damages the human and physical capital that undermines production, leads to economic disruption and distortion of state expenditures, and encourages capital flight and diversion. More specifically, food security – the availability, access to and affordability of food – is severely affected in so far as violent conflict affects all key aspects of food production, distribution and consumption: rural labor supplies are disrupted as peasants are conscripted into armies, farms and agriculture-related infrastructure are destroyed, land is mined, and social cohesion is weakened as families and communities not only lose members but are also turned against one another. In some cases the destruction of physical capital and the resultant food shortages or even famines are not merely unfortunate byproducts of war, but are deliberately deployed as instruments of war. Food aid provided in times of conflict often contributes to conflict when it is used as a weapon by the warring factions, and threatens local production in the long term, thereby contributing to the perpetuation of poverty.

Violent conflict tends to reinforce both the underdevelopment of, and uneven development within, a country. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Uganda, which is examined by Timothy Shaw and Pamela Mbabazi. Uganda’s postcolonial turmoil has prevented the country from achieving the rate of development and social progress that was widely expected at independence. The protracted war in northern Uganda during the past two decades between government forces and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army has worsened the marginalization of the north, which fostered the war in the first place. In effect, Uganda has become two distinct nations, one in the relatively buoyant south that has, since the early 1990s, enjoyed economic recovery and reconstruction, peace and rapid economic growth, and the other in the stagnant north that continues to suffer from the devastating effects of warfare including an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced people. It is quite evident from Shaw and Mbabazi’s paper that local, national, regional, continental and global forces are imbricated in complex and contradictory ways in Uganda’s conundrum. Of particular concern are the implications of capitalist globalization and the regime of structural adjustment in fashioning new trajectories of developmentalism based on liberalization and privatization that foreclose the possibilities of constructing a truly democratic developmental state capable of pursuing policy options that might close the widening north-south gap and resolve the insurgency in the north.

Conclusion

This volume, and the collection as a whole, provides critical glimpses into the nature and dynamics of violent conflicts in Africa. Of course it is not, nor did it seek to be, comprehensive, in covering either Africa as a whole or all aspects of conflicts that have afflicted the continent since independence, let alone since time immemorial. In spatial terms, much of the focus is on eastern and southern Africa. A comprehensive and comparative study of conflicts across the continent, covering all five regions, would yield
important lessons and is long overdue. In temporal terms, the collection concentrates on recent conflicts; analyses over a much longer period, including the colonial era and perhaps even slices of the precolonial era, would deepen our understanding of the history of conflicts in Africa. Thematically, one could point to a range of topics that have not been given the emphasis they deserve, such as the generational, religious and diasporic dimensions of violent conflicts. Also, these conflicts are differentiated in the way they involve and impact on different generations, from the young to the elderly (Kurimoto and Simonse 1998; Abbink and van Kessel 2005). The question of child soldiers, on which much has been written, is only one aspect of the generational dynamics of African conflicts that require more systematic study. Estimates indicated that the conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s involved ‘more than 120,000 children...’ For example, more than 10 percent of the fighters in the Liberian conflict are children; in Mozambique, the RENAMO rebel group had an estimated 8,000-10,000 children fighting in its force against the government; ... and in Uganda, it is estimated that around 90 percent of the soldiers in the LRA rebel force are abducted children’ (Fosu and Collier 2005: 234; also see Fleischman 1994; Rone 1995; Honwana 2006).

The role of religion as a source of conflict, in objective and subjective terms, institutionally and ideologically, and at local and transnational levels and the many points in between, cannot be overemphasized (Panitch and Leys 2002). Throughout history religion has provided a powerful vehicle for instigating war, giving meaning and legitimation to war, and in facilitating postwar reconciliation and reconstruction. Wars, in turn, transform religion, bringing innovations in ideas, rituals, and institutional practices. We need to know more not only about the role of each of Africa’s major religions – Christianity, Islam, and the ‘traditional’ religions – but also in comparative perspective. As Niels Kastfelt (2005: 1) argues forcefully and convincingly, ‘many African civil wars have religious dimensions which are sufficiently important to deserve to be studied in their own right without, of course, thereby ignoring their social, economic and political context’. Examples abound. In colonial Africa there were the religiously inspired rebellions, such as the Mahdist war in the Sudan in the 1890s, the Shona-Ndebele uprising in Zimbabwe in 1896–97, the Maji Maji revolt in Tanganyika in 1905–7, and the Mau Mau liberation struggle in Kenya in the 1950s. In the postcolonial era one can point to Uganda’s civil strife in which Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army have played a key role, not to mention the conflicts fomented among and between Christians and Muslims that are increasingly amplified by the so-called ‘war on terror’.

Some of the papers in this volume discuss the global forces and transnational networks behind violent conflicts in Africa. The tendency has been to examine the imperial and neo-colonial agendas of the major powers. More attention ought to be paid to the activities of other transnational actors including business enterprises, advocacy organizations, and even academic establishments. In this context, the role of diaspora communities, both the regional and extra-regional diasporas, needs to be accorded specific attention, as diaspora networks have become increasingly critical in
fanning, facilitating and financing conflicts. For example, in the 1998 Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the diasporas of both countries played important roles in supporting their respective homelands. In the Nordic countries the Eritrean diaspora sought to raise diplomatic support for Eritrea, while in the United States elements of the more splintered Ethiopian diaspora demonstrated in Washington, DC in support of Ethiopia. The two diasporas also provided crucial financial support, which was particularly vital for Eritrea. Similarly, Somali diasporas have been critical to supporting different factions in the ongoing Somali civil war. 

Clearly, the research agenda on the ‘root causes’ of conflicts is large and complex. As with many other areas of social inquiry, conflict studies can only benefit from interdisciplinary approaches, from the collaboration of scholars from all the major disciplinary fields – the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences – for conflicts affect all aspects of human life and the natural environment. And, of course, scholars and researchers need to engage policy-makers, national and regional security councils, social movements and rebel movements if their work is to be meaningful empirically and translate into effective policies. The challenge is to ensure that African conflicts are analyzed in their own multifaceted contexts, while avoiding seeing them as manifestations of some unique African cultural compulsion, political pathology, social sickness or moral malady. In other words, these conflicts must be understood in comparative perspective, not in isolation. Violent conflict in Africa is indeed part of the human drama, but the tendency to impose universalist models of conflict driven by stylized Western experiences or faddish theorizing must be resisted if only because, as is shown in several chapters in this volume with reference to the ‘rationalist’ models of neo-classical economists, such paradigms lead to poor analysis and bad policy. Conflict is too serious a matter, and its costs too grave, for glib modeling or lazy journalistic speculation uninformed by the histories of, and unmindful of the concrete conditions in, the societies under scrutiny. And history tells us that postcolonial African societies and states are not primordial fixtures frozen in splendid isolation, but complex constellations constructed out of their multiple engagements with the world.

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Paul Tiyambe Zeleza


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Introduction: The Causes & Costs of War in Africa


Notes


2 A common classification is to distinguish between inter-state, intra-state and extra-state wars, see Henderson and Singer (2002).

3 There is a vast literature on struggles against apartheid, some of which is reviewed in Zeleza (2004a); also see Gregory Houston (1999), Eric Louw (2004), Lindsay Eades (1999), and the remarkable autobiography and biographies of Mandela and the Sisulus (Mandela 1994; Sampson 1999; Sisulu 2002).

4 The Rwanda genocide was the product of complex colonial and postcolonial histories, as well as internal, regional and international dynamics. Of the vast literature on the subject see some of the following: Mamdani (2001), Gourevitch (1999), Prunier (1998), Melvern (2000), Semujiangia (2003), and Twagilimana (2003).

5 I discuss these developments in greater detail in Zeleza (2003, 2005).

6 All the key elements of Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption articulated in a report released in September 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States (White House 2002), are presaged in a 2000 report from a neo-conservative organization, the New American Century (2000: ii), called Rebuilding America’s Defenses, which unequivocally calls for the US to rebuild, modernize and maintain its military and nuclear strategic superiority in order to sustain a Pax Americana. It has since transpired that plans for a premeditated attack on Iraq, to secure ‘regime change’, were in place even before Bush assumed office in January 2001 and therefore had nothing to do with the attacks of September 11. Iraq’s unproven connections with Al-Qaeda, the existence of weapons of mass destruction that were never found, or the need to export democracy (Anonymous 2004; Clarke 2004).

7 Anonymous (2004: 241) tabulates them as follows: ‘U.S support for Israel that keeps
Palestinians in the Israeli’s thrall; US and other Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula; US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan; US support for Russia, India, and China against their Muslim militants; US pressure on Arab energy producers to keep oil prices low; and US support for apostate, corrupt, and tyrannical Muslim governments. That Osama bin Laden articulates and uses these grievances to mobilize his followers does not mean they are not real or shared by millions of people in the region. While some of those opposed to the US in the region are indeed terrorists, many more are ordinary nationalists fighting to liberate their countries from foreign occupation and domination.

This figure is from the National Priorities Project that monitors and tallies the costs of war on an ongoing basis; see its website at: http://nationalpriorities.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=182

Accessed 1 November 2006.

This figure was widely disputed and predictably rejected by American and British leaders, the architects of the ill-fated Iraq war. It is interesting to observe the controversy about the study’s methodology and conclusion, when casualty figures of African wars or the HIV/AIDS pandemic that are often based on far less rigorous research than the Lancet study, if not outright speculation, are largely accepted without a murmur by the so-called ‘international’ media. See the detailed report by Phyllis Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force (2004). At the time of writing (November 2006) the urgent need to change policy in Iraq is widely accepted even in American and British government circles, and most people in the two countries now regard the invasion as a failed adventure. As reported by the media, the quagmire in Iraq played a major role in the defeat of the Republican Party in the US midterm elections in November 2006. See the following news magazines, Newsweek, ‘Election 2006: The Aftershocks’, 20 November 2006 and The Economist, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Presidency’, 11–17 November 2006.

Paul Silverstein (2005) suggests, in the case of North Africa, that the ‘war on terror’ rekindles in the Western imaginary memories not only of Islamic invasions but also of Barbary piracy and terrorism. The literature on Africa and the ‘war on terror’ is growing rapidly. For a sample, see Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser (2005); Davis (2005); Runnaj et al. (2005); Kraxberger (2005); Marrouchi (2003); Silverstein (2005); Carmody (2005); Barnes (2005); Mills (2004); El-Khawas (2003).

For example, Human Rights Watch (2004) has accused the UN’s Security Council of disregarding human rights in the work of its Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, established by resolutions passed after 11 September 2001, both of which have to date shown reluctance to address the human rights implications of the anti-terrorism laws and strategies of member states.

See, for example, the reports by Amnesty International (2002, 2003).

Also see Amnesty International’s (2002a) detailed critique of the convention adopted by the League of Arab States, which Amnesty believes presents a serious threat to human rights in Arab countries, many of which are, of course, in Africa.

For recent accounts and critiques of these analyses, see Kieh (2002) and Fosu and Collier (2005).


Kalyvas (2001: 109) criticizes the Eurocentricism and culturalist thrust of the ‘new wars’ theorists and argues that ‘the end of the Cold War seems to have caused the demise of the conceptual categories used to interpret civil wars rather than a decline in the ideological motivations of civil wars at the mass level’.

A sizeable literature has grown using this paradigm. Examples include Berdal and Malone (2000); Cilliers and Dietrich (2000); and Lind and Sturman (2002).

He notes that these studies have influenced the UN Security Council and General Assembly to pass resolutions prohibiting the import of conflict diamonds, to impose sanctions on rebel movements such as UNITA, and to condemn the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Charles Cater (2003: 37) also comments on the economic predation paradigm in the UN sanctions regime, noting ‘prior to 1990, the UN had only authorized sanctions twice – for Rhodesia in 1966 and for South Africa in 1977. During the 1990s, the Security Council approved sanctions relating to conflicts in twelve different countries.’

Michael Ross (2003) offers an interesting analysis of the varied impact of resources on separatist and non-separatist conflicts, and the different impact of various resources depending on what he calls their lootability, obstructability and legality. After examining fifteen conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America he concludes, ‘unlootable resources
[e.g., oil] are more likely to produce separatist conflicts, and loottable resources [e.g., diamonds] are more likely to produce nonseparatist conflicts’ (Ross 2003: 67).

21 See Collier and Sambanis (2005a, 2005b). They indicate that some of the criticisms have registered, and the Collier-Hoeffler Model, as they call it, has been revised, but only on the margins. The first volume deals with Africa, and the second with the rest of the world, a division based on, we are told, mere convenience. To quote Collier et al. (2005: 26): ‘There is no substantive rationale behind this organization of cases – we do not think African civil wars are different. This is simply a device to present the material effectively, given the considerable length of the book.’ The other influential studies have been sponsored by the International Peace Academy through its Economic Agendas in Civil Wars program with which Collier was once affiliated; they include Berdal and Malone (2000), Ballentine and Sherman (2003), and Pugh and Cooper (2004).

22 Structural adjustment, together with the economic marginalization of border areas and the absence of regional military security mechanisms, often creates the permissive conditions for the development and sustenance of conflicts and undermines post-conflict resolution and transformation (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 35–39).

23 Regional economic networks provide channels for trade in conflict goods, smuggling and tax avoidance, and the phenomenon of displacement: military networks provide arms and mercenaries, and can create displacement effects; formal and informal political networks often reflect and reinforce regional economic and military linkages and sustain the shadow economic activities of war economies; and social networks include occupational, ethnic and diaspora affiliations that serve to underpin regional conflict complexes (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 25–35).

24 The distinction is based on the primary sources of state revenue: rentier states derive theirs from mineral rents, while merchant states derive theirs from general taxation including that of marketed peasant produce. Merchant states have to negotiate with more producers than rentier states, and therefore tend to provide more services and enjoy higher levels of social development and to boast of better human development indicators than the rentier states.

25 The UNRISD report, for which I served as one of nine members of the Advisory Group, is an invaluable source of comparative global data on ‘gender, armed conflict and the search for peace’, which constitute section 4 of the report (pp.205–59). The report as a whole is based on more than five dozen reports from different regions and countries, including several on Africa.

26 This is primarily because the papers were originally presented at a conference convened by the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern Africa whose mandate is eastern and southern Africa.

27 For example, in the epic struggle against apartheid in South Africa Christian ideas inspired not only the protagonists in the conflict, but also the formation and work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

As the twentieth-first century begins, Africa consists of some fifty-four countries, depending upon how you count some islands. Since independence, about one-third of these countries have experienced large-scale political violence or war (Dunnigan and Bay 1996: 651–53). This does not include those countries that have had relatively bloodless military coups or occasional assassinations. (After all, even the United States has had presidential assassinations.) It is true that not all of Africa is afflicted to the same degree. Africa is an immense continent, richly varied in its cultures and peoples. The levels of violence differ greatly. Nor can one easily predict where violence will occur. Kenya, for example, shares borders with five other countries, four of which have experienced civil wars: Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The fifth country on its borders is Tanzania, a country that was partly born out a revolution (the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964). In comparison with its neighbors, Kenya has so far been spared large-scale civil conflict. Yet the overall pattern of violence on the African continent is disturbing and deserves analysis.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of conflict in Africa. The first part of the chapter will focus on the causes of conflict. There are no simple and easy explanations for conflicts in Africa, and the theories that have been advanced are both numerous and contradictory. Rather than attempt to catalogue these many theories, this chapter will look at some of the rather haunting paradoxes that seem to mark conflict in Africa. The second part of the chapter will suggest some possible solutions and consider how much progress has, in fact, been made in recent decades.

The Roots of Conflict

Black Violence, White Roots

While the most lethal of all wars in Africa have been those fought between blacks, the roots of these wars lie in the white legacy. On the one hand, bloody as they were, the anti-colonial wars were less bloody than
postcolonial wars. It is true that the anti-colonial wars (primarily fought between blacks and whites) did cost a lot of lives. A case in point is Algeria, where more than a million people perished at the hands of the French. However, postcolonial wars have been fought mainly between blacks, and they have been even more ruthless.¹

On the other hand, it must be recognized that the seeds of the post-colonial wars themselves lie in the sociological and political mess which ‘white’ colonialism created in Africa. The colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, and failed to create effective substitute ones in their place. In the West, effective states are widely perceived to be one of the major tools societies have invented for the preservation of internal stability and order. In Africa, the states founded by Europeans were not effective. They were developed in newly fashioned countries and built on fragile bases. The Africans who inherited these states from the Europeans had, moreover, little experience in governing themselves. Self-government is not something easily taught. Failing states have been one of the major sources of conflict in postcolonial Africa.

Are Borders to Blame?

While most African conflicts are partly caused by borders, those conflicts are not themselves about borders. Before the Western colonial powers arrived, there were virtually no boundaries in Africa. Most people lived in loose groupings. Their territories were unmarked. Empires came and went, absorbing new groups and being assimilated themselves, but possessing few, if any, rigid frontiers. But at the end of the nineteenth century the colonial West arrived. The Berlin Conference in 1885 imposed the iron grid of division upon the continent.

The political boundaries created by colonial powers in Africa enclosed groups with no traditions of shared authority or shared systems of settling disputes. These groups did not necessarily have the time to learn to become congenial.² In West Africa, for example, the large territory which the British carved out and called Nigeria enclosed three major nations and several smaller ones. Among the larger groups, the Yoruba in the west were very different from the Muslim Hausa in the north, who in turn were quite distinct from the Ibo in the east. This artificial mixture was to lead to one of Africa’s great human tragedies, the Nigerian civil war of 1967–70. Until pictures of starving Ethiopian children shocked the world in the 1980s, the most haunting images from postcolonial Africa were those of starving Biafran children, the victims of this war.

If colonialism forced into the same political entity people who would otherwise have lived apart, it also separated people who would otherwise have lived together. A country like Somalia is in effect a nation trying to become an all-inclusive state. The Somalis have scattered in four different countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Their desire for reunification has resulted in deadly conflict.

On the other hand, paradoxical as this seems, one cannot say that African conflicts are about boundaries. African governments, ironically, have tended to be possessive about these artificially created colonial borders.
They have generally resisted any challenge to them. There have been relatively few disputes about borders. The borders generate conflicts within them but have not been encouraged to generate conflict across them. The dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea is in this regard an exception rather than the rule (Tronvoll 1999).

Religion or Ethnicity?

While the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are religious, the worst conflicts in Black Africa are ethnic. The word ethnic in this case is used in the sense of the older word, tribal. By Arab Africa, we largely mean North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Egypt, for example, are Arab). Algeria is afflicted by arguably the worst conflict in Arab Africa. The conflict is between Islamicists and the military secularists, and religion, however politicized, is at its root. It is among the ugliest and most intractable armed conflicts in the world (Mortimer 1996). Religion is also at the root of the conflict in Egypt (Ansari 1984).

By contrast, the worst outbreaks of violence in Black Africa in the 1990s occurred as a result of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The genocides in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s were ethnic (Nyanzvizi 1998). The conflict in Somalia was likewise ethnic or, at any rate, sub-ethnic (between clans rather than between tribes) (Hashim 1997). The civil war between northern and southern Sudan further illustrates my point. Sudan straddles the Arab and the African worlds (Deng 1995). Is its civil war primarily ethnic or primarily religious? You may take your pick. Either interpretation is totally defensible.

Resources or Identity?

While blacks clash with whites in Africa over resources, blacks clash with blacks over their identities. White and black people, in other words, fight each other about who owns what, but blacks fight blacks about who is who. Racial conflicts between blacks and whites in Africa are ultimately economic. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, was ultimately an economic war. By contrast, when you look at configurations of violence in those parts of Africa where blacks are fighting blacks, it is difficult to show that the struggles are over resources. Often there are no resources of any significance over which to fight. Sometimes it is possible to see the struggle in terms of an effort to get a share of power. But for the most part, major clashes appear to be related to cultural demarcations. The struggle between the Hutu and Tutsi is one such example.

That it is culture rather than economics that matters in the politics of Black Africa can best be illustrated by looking at what happens when Africans who are left of center attempt to invoke class solidarity. When they fight somebody who invokes ethnic solidarity, the cards are stacked against them. Class symbols time and again prove inadequate in the face of ethnic sentiment. In Kenya, for example, the Luo politician Oginga Odinga used left-of-center rhetoric and appealed to all Kenyans to follow him. Despite the fact that his message ought to have appealed to the exploited, those who rallied to his cause were not the disadvantaged members of all Kenyan ethnic groups. Instead, Odinga found himself followed by Luo of all social
classes. Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria had a similar experience. He moved just a little to the left of the normal orientation of major Nigerian politicians. He warned Nigerians that they were being cheated. He too drew support, not from disadvantaged Nigerians of all ethnic groups, but from all the Yoruba. The Yoruba, moreover, came from all social classes, the rich and the poor. In other words, the ethnic messenger rather than the economic message has proved to be what counts in the conflicts among blacks.

**Modern Weapons and Pre-modern Armies**

At independence, weapons in Africa were in general not very advanced, but the armies were relatively disciplined and professional, in short, modern. Now the weapons have become more advanced, but the armies have become less disciplined and less professional. Both the standing army and Western weapons, it may be added, were yet another legacy of colonialism. One of the few African countries to consider, even briefly, whether to do without a standing army was Tanzania. In 1964 Julius Nyerere had the opportunity to disband his entire army and not build an alternative one. He did disband the old one, but he did not follow Costa Rica’s example and do without an army. Instead he reconstructed a national army. African countries, as a whole, entered independence with this dysfunctional twin inheritance.

This combination of modern weapons and less than modern armies has proved to be a menacing and destabilizing one. Africa’s rather fragile government institutions are all too easily destroyed by the predominant power in the country, the gun. Soldiers have proved to be the most powerful force in African politics since independence. Africa has seen over seventy coups in a quarter of a century. The susceptibility of African states to military takeovers is all the more worrisome, in that militaries have not proved capable of transforming African economies. Some soldiers, it is true, have made an effort to be constructive. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, a military pilot who seized power in Accra in the summer of 1979, sought to put his power to good use. He attempted to mobilize his people for economic development and social transformation rather than for war, and Ghana received a relatively large amount of support from the World Bank. But Rawlings’ success was limited, and Ghana to this day remains impoverished.

**Dualism and Pluralism**

Although plural societies cause us more alarm, dual societies may in fact be more dangerous. The dangers of plural societies have been much discussed. A plural society is one which has multiple groups defined ethnically, racially, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters. The United States is a plural society. Dual societies are less numerous and less discussed than plural societies in Africa. A dual society is one in which two groups (again defined ethnically, religiously, culturally, or by other parameters) account for over 80 per cent of the population. Belgium, for example, is a dual society of Flemish and Francophone identity (O’Neill 1998).

Dual societies run a number of high risks. First, they run the risk of getting trapped in a.prolonged stalemate. The stand-off between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots is a case in point (McDonald 1997). Second, a *culture of polarized ethnic distrust* may develop. The examples that come to mind here are outside Africa: Belgium, Guyana and Trinidad. Third, dual societies may endure *prolonged periods of tension and violence*. Outside of Africa the struggle in Northern Ireland provides ample warning of this. Within Africa, Berbers and Arabs in Algeria are on the verge of a similar struggle. Fourth, dual societies also run the risk of *separatism and secessionism*. Asian and European examples exist. Sri Lanka is still torn by the Tamil bid to secede from the Sinhalese-dominated polity (Senaratne 1997). Bosnia and Herzegovina today is split between the Muslim-Croat Federation in the west and the Serb Republic in the east (Holbrooke 1998). Lastly, dual societies run the risk of genocide and potential genocidal reprisal. The most telling example of this is to be found in Rwanda, where the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in bloody confrontation that destabilized the region and became a key cause of the international war that later unfolded in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. Meanwhile, Burundi faced acute danger of genocide until a delegation led by Nelson Mandela in 2001 helped ease ethnic tensions at least temporarily.5

‘*Ethnic*’ dual societies can be differentiated from ‘*regional*’ dual societies, where the division is between two regions rather than between two ethnic groups. Within Africa we may point to Sudan, Nigeria and Uganda. Northern and southern Sudan experienced civil war between 1955 and 1972 and have been engaged in civil war again since 1983 (Lesch 1998). Northern Nigeria fought southern Nigeria in a civil war (1967–70) (Cervenka 1971). While this war was not totally about divisions between north and south, it certainly included that dimension. In Uganda, there have been periodic eruptions of violence between north and south, especially since 1980. Outside of Africa, we may point to the struggle between the northern and southern US (the American Civil War) and, more recently, the tensions between North and South Korea; since their unification both Vietnam and Germany have become regional dual societies and have had to deal with the attendant problems. The evidence to date suggests that dualism may be even more dangerous than pluralism.

**War: Curse or Blessing?**

Africa should indeed *celebrate* the relative rarity of inter-state conflicts today. But should it also *lament* the relative rarity of inter-state conflicts in the past? Has the balance between external and internal conflict tilted too far towards the internal? Africa has, in fact, had more than its share of civil wars and, as human history has repeated time and again, civil wars leave deeper scars than most inter-state conflicts. They are more indiscriminate and ruthless than are most inter-state conflicts, with the obvious exception of world wars or nuclear wars. The US lost more people in its civil war in the 1860s than in all its other wars combined.

That Africa has had so many civil wars is, perhaps, not unrelated to the fact that it has had relatively few inter-state conflicts. The history of nation-states in Europe reveals a persistent tendency to externalize conflict and thus help promote greater unity at home. A sense of nationhood within each European country was partly fostered by a sense of rivalry and
occasional conflict with its neighbors. Even the consolidation of the European state as a sovereign state was forged in the fire of inter-European conflicts. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which launched the nation-state system, was signed at the end of the Thirty Years’ War.6

Africa’s relative dearth of external conflicts in the past may thus partly account for the prevalence of internal conflict in the present. In the modern world, however, external aggression is no longer a viable means of forging unity and building states. International war has become too dangerous. Africa must look to other solutions to bring an end to divisiveness.

Conflict Resolution

What will the future hold for Africa? The presence of violence and conflict on the African continent is obvious, but all is not self-evidently gloomy. In the past few decades, there have been signs of the winds of change blowing through the continent. Africans can point to examples of successful conflict resolution and reduction. The late Julius Nyerere, for example, has bequeathed young Tanzanians a greater self-confidence and national pride. In November 1985 he voluntarily stepped down as president of Tanzania and Vice-President Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over. Out of some 170 rulers Africa has had since independence, Nyerere was only the third to relinquish office of his own accord. By leaving the political scene, he gave the lie to the famous dictum that all power corrupts. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings sought to eradicate corruption, tackled the economic miseries of his people and cultivated their sense of independence and initiative. In Nigeria, the civil war (1967–70), ugly and tragic as it was, did not scar the nation as it might have done. Nigerians are not noted for their restraint and discipline. Yet, the victors of the Nigerian-Biafran war were magnanimous to their enemies. They did not gloat or focus on vengeance. Yakubu Gowon and his successor Murtala Muhammed both demonstrated a remarkable ability to bring about reconciliation and, in so doing, to help heal the wounds of war.

All these examples make it clear that Africans can bring their countries to a better future. What are some of the more concrete things that can be done to achieve this goal? By cultivating toleration, developing pluralism, improving civil-military relations, and fostering innovative Pan-African solutions, African nations can make positive and constructive moves to reduce and resolve conflicts.

Toleration

One important step towards creating greater stability on the African continent is to cultivate that very elusive trait, tolerance. Tolerance is the ability to accept difference (Mendus 1988). We need to recognize that victims of intolerance do not necessarily become paragons of toleration. History has amply illustrated this fact. Christians, who suffered dreadful tortures at the hands of the Roman government, in turn inflicted the torments of the inquisition on their enemies in later centuries. The Jews, who suffered incalculable miseries under the Nazis, themselves became
oppressors. As an occupying power in the Holy Land, they held thousands of Palestinians as political prisoners. The Muslims, whose entire calendar is a celebration of the Hegira as asylum, are today bombing each other’s mosques across the sectarian divide. The Tutsi, as victims of yesterday, became the oppressors of today and the Hutu, as victims of today, seem destined to become the oppressors of tomorrow. Toleration can work. Kenya was once such a closed and intolerant society that the notion of a Kenyan, in Kenya, daring, as the author did in 1991, to call upon the Kenyan President to resign was seen as something remarkable. By the turn of the 2000s every second or third Kenyan was calling upon President Daniel arap Moi to step down. It was no longer of any significance. There is obviously a new level of toleration of dissent in many parts of Africa, which must be actively cultivated and institutionally enforced.

Constructive Pluralization

Another avenue that needs to be explored is what some call decentralization, and others, myself included, call the pluralization of power. Recently, power has tended to shift away from the center and become institutionalized in smaller groups. This trend is, in my view, a healthy one, and should be encouraged by promoting the development of multi-party systems, capitalism, federalism, and the political representation of women.

One of the historic problems in Africa has been the existence of one-party states that have restricted the development of multiple political organizations. Multiple parties are useful to the extent that they expand choices. Fortunately, many African countries that have previously been one-party states have become multi-party states in more recent times. They have been moving towards greater toleration of opposition parties and rival political organizations. Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Kenya under Daniel arap Moi both illustrate this trend.7

So long as power is concentrated in one place, constructive pluralism cannot flourish. Constructive pluralism must be nurtured. How can this be done? One answer is to develop at least minimal degrees of capitalism. This notion is, of course, abhorrent to many African socialists. However, capitalism is the necessary ‘manure’ for liberal pluralistic democracy.8 Manure may be dirty, but it does make things grow! Capitalism creates the kind of environment in which constructive pluralism can take root. It helps ensure that power is not concentrated in one particular place. A concrete example of the kind of thing capitalism can accomplish can be seen in the resignation of Richard Nixon from the American presidency in 1974. Without the newspapers, owned by private interests, he would certainly not have been obliged to step down. This does not mean that Africa should develop the same from of capitalism that exists in contemporary America. The American system demands far too little economic accountability from its citizens. Such a system would be quite destructive on this continent. What is needed is for us to develop a type of capitalism in Africa that permits us to pluralize power but which is also responsible and does not allow the desire for profit to run amok (Hirst 1998).

The concept of federalism also deserves to be given more attention. Federalism refers to the division of power between a central authority and
its constituent political units. For the last thirty-five years or so, only Nigeria has treated federalism as a legitimate concept. The trouble is that Nigeria has been almost constantly governed by military rule and militarism does not go well with federalism. The rest of Africa has tended to regard the concept as anathema. And yet it does hold out some real possibilities.

**Representation of Women**

Another important means of creating greater stability in Africa is to give a greater voice to African women. Women need to become major voices in decisions not just about development – although that is crucial – but on other issues (including security issues). This means that women must be given power within the legislative process and in the executive branch of government, and they should be enlisted in the armed forces in increasing numbers.

African women today are, for the most part, sadly under-represented. To change the situation, some kind of direct intervention is needed. Yet this is not easy. The problem is well illustrated in India. Indians are trying to deal with the lack of female representation in their government. There is a movement afoot to have one-third of the legislative branch of government reserved for women. Despite the fact, however, that a variety of political powers claim to support such legislation, Parliament refuses to pass it. Opponents claim that the real intention of its proponents is to increase the representation of the higher caste. They point out that it would be women from the upper caste who would break into power. So, the argument goes, by increasing the representation of women you reduce the representation of the lower classes.

In Africa, too, the struggle for emancipation will doubtless encounter entrenched opposition. While there is a great deal of cultural variation in Africa, many African societies have traditionally assigned women a very subordinate place. At the same time, we need not despair. Culture is not always the insurmountable obstacle that we think it is. One of the last barriers to be broken between men and women is that of military culture. Even liberal societies have balked at the enlistment of women in the army. And yet in Somalia, women – and Muslim women at that – can at times be seen bearing arms. When the sense of urgency is great enough, traditional values are transcended.

It is clearly vital that, despite the difficulties, Africa begins to empower women. The author’s recommendation is that this be accomplished gradually in a series of measured steps. In the first phase, women voters should be given the opportunity to elect women candidates. A certain percentage of seats (about 10 per cent) should be reserved for these female candidates. In the second phase, a certain portion of seats should still be reserved for women. However, women should no longer seek votes from women alone. They should attempt to reach out to men as voters and address the concerns of males as well as females. This will help close the gender gap. In the third and final phase, when it is no longer necessary, seats should no longer be reserved for women. A parallel process in Zimbabwe suggests that this could happen. Here seats were reserved on a racial basis for a while. After a point, however, such quotas ceased to be necessary.
The greater politicization and empowerment of women has direct security consequences. If women are given a greater role to play, and as they become more influential in debating, they will certainly have an effect on the choices that are made for war or peace. If feminist theories are correct, they may swing the balance in favor of peace. Once women have been empowered within their societies, then it may be possible to move one step further and tackle the task of empowering women in security institutions.

How far from these goals are we? Africa has, in fact, been slowly responding to the idea that women should be allowed to play a greater role in public life. There are some countries that have shown great reluctance. Nigeria, a nation in which democracy has not had much overall success, is a case in point. However, elsewhere the issue is at least being debated, as in South Africa. And some countries, Uganda for example, have already taken steps to become more representative.

Civil-Military Relations

Clearly, something must be done to reduce the power of the gun in Africa. African leaders have tried a variety of measures to tackle the problem of predatory militaries. Jerry Rawlings, for example, armed the ordinary people of Ghana. He worked on the assumption that an armed people would be better able to protect itself from the depredations of the military. This is an idea with which, ironically, many Americans are quite sympathetic. Their own constitution gives them the ‘right to bear arms’. Whether arming the people will lead to stability in Ghana or elsewhere is, however, very much of a debatable point.

There is, however, a more central concern, and that is the power struggle between the military and civilians. A lot of African countries are ‘coup-prone’. There are some things that could be done to help reduce this problem. Giving the military a share in power might reduce the temptation to intervene violently and ease the transition to civilian government. Nigeria might benefit from such an experiment. A system along the following lines might be adopted. For the next thirty or forty years (or for however long is thought necessary) civilians and soldiers could share power. A two-house system resembling that of the British Houses of Parliament could be set up. One house (the equivalent of the House of Lords) could be a ‘military’ house, the other an elected house. Committees, composed of elements from both Houses, could be formed. Committee members would be entrusted with the task of examining issues that have serious implications for security. They would thrash out differences until they found a solution. In addition, a civilian and a soldier might agree to run together in a presidential campaign, the civilian seeking election as president, the soldier seeking election as his vice-president. (Of course, the constitution would have to make it clear that the vice-president would not succeed the president in the event of his death. Otherwise the temptation to assassinate the president would be too great!)

Africa entered the twenty-first century restless for changes in continental arrangements. There was widespread disenchantment with the status quo. South Africa was promoting the concept of an African
Renaissance. Nigeria had embarked on the contradictory trends of renewed democratization at the national level and the establishment of Islamic law at the level of some Northern states. Senegal was pushing for a new African agenda. East Africa was moving towards a new East African community. And Libya took the initiative of hosting a special summit of the Organization of African Unity to discuss a new agenda for Africa, and new continental institutions for such an agenda. The concept of the African Union (AU) was born.

The Union was finally consummated in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. Its ambition was much greater than the original scope of the Organization of African Unity, which the AU replaced. The Union envisaged greater economic integration, the creation of a continental banking system, the establishment of a Pan-African parliament, and eventually a monetary union with one continental currency. The concept of an African Security Council gained greater support, but its membership was still a matter of contention. If the African Security Council is to have permanent members with a veto (in the style of the United Nations) the major powers would have to include South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt.

Would such major permanent members of the African Security Council provide troops for a Pan-African interventionist force to restore order in emergencies like those of Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia in the 1990s? Such an active umbrella of Pax Africana may take time to win adequate consensus within the African Union.

The Union came into being simultaneously with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This is designed as a partnership between African countries and their major donors and trading partners to help Africa exploit its resources efficiently and realize its economic potential. One important innovation in NEPAD is the peer-review mechanism. African states are to review each other’s performance both economically and in terms of good governance, and pass judgment on each other. The quest for higher standards of state-behavior would include a greater effort to fight corruption and to punish its excesses. In due course the African Union would have to accept the need for collective sanctions against members who violate too many rules of good governance. If this agenda of the African Union and NEPAD is realized, Africans would at last have become truly each other’s keepers. There are a variety of creative pan-African solutions that need to be considered.

Intervention

First of all, Africans can intervene to try and minimize chaos when a neighboring state collapses. There are a variety of ways in which this can be done. First, there is unilateral intervention by a single neighboring power. A famous example of unilateral intervention is the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. On that occasion, Tanzanian troops marched all the way to Kampala and put Uganda virtually under military occupation for a couple of years (Avirgan and Honey 1982). Tanzania’s intervention was very similar to that of Vietnam in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot, except that the Vietnamese stayed on in Cambodia a lot longer than the Tanzanians stayed in Uganda.
Another, slightly different, kind of intervention was the 1994 invasion of Rwanda by Uganda. This type of single power intervention might perhaps be dubbed a ‘Bay of Pigs’ style intervention. Just as Eisenhower and Kennedy trained Cubans to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda trained exiled Rwandans to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. The Ugandan-based Rwandese Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda and defeated the armies of the genocidal government, the Forces Armées Rwandaises. Unlike its American counterpart, the ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation in Africa was spectacularly successful in achieving its objectives. It ended the genocide and permitted the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. It did not, however, bring about democratization or long-term stability in the country.

The second type of intervention is regionally supported single power intervention. In this case a single power intervenes with the blessing of a wider group of states. It acts under a kind of regional umbrella. Neither Tanzania nor Uganda had the backing of a regional organization when they intervened. But Nigeria’s intervention in Sierra Leone and in Liberia arguably had the blessing of ECOMOG and ECOWAS. This type of intervention likewise has counterparts outside of Africa. Here one might point to Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war; on this occasion, Syria had the support of League of Arab States (Rasler 1983).

A third type of intervention is what might be called ‘inter-African colonization and annexation’. Africans have on occasion ‘colonized’ other African countries in an effort to re-establish stability. As a solution to Africa’s ills, this type of intervention is controversial, but it has not been entirely unsuccessful. In 1964, for example, the Tanganyikan government annexed Zanzibar. It did so with the backing of the Western powers who were alarmed by the situation in Zanzibar. Lyndon Johnson, the US President, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Prime Minister, both encouraged the merger. They feared that Zanzibar, an island lying off the East African coast, was subversive and unstable. They wanted to avert the danger that it would become a kind of Cuba, threatening the mainland. The methods used by the Tanganyikans were very much like those used by the British in the colonial days. Just as the British had ‘persuaded’ African chiefs to accept treaties by which they ceased to be sovereign, the Tanganyikan ruler got the dictator of Zanzibar to agree to a treaty of Union. No referendum was held in Zanzibar to check if the people wanted to cease being an independent nation. So it is fair to see this as a colonization of sorts. But the annexation was fairly successful and did impose a kind of ‘Pax Tanganyika’. Benevolent ‘colonization’ by Africans, for all its negative connotations, is an option worth considering.

Regional Integration

Another solution to state collapse that holds some promise is regional integration. This takes place when the state as a political refugee is integrated with its host country, when, in other words, an unstable state is assimilated by a stable state. In my estimation, the best chance of a peaceful solution of the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi is to integrate them with such a stable society.
Rwanda and Burundi are dual societies and as a result they seem doomed to face an endless cycle of violence. A mere ‘tinkering’ with their internal constitutions will not solve their problems. There is every reason to fear that, while limited reforms may put a temporary halt to the violence, it will only be a matter of time before Rwanda and Burundi once again face state collapse and genocide. A more radical solution is needed. Federation could solve the problem. But federation with what state? Clearly one should not attempt to integrate Rwanda and Burundi with a ‘sick’, conflict-ridden society such as the Congo. This would merely add to the problems. One should also be careful not to integrate them with a relatively unstable state (like Uganda). This would run the risk of destabilizing the plural society rather than stabilizing the dual society. Federation with the Republic of Tanzania, in contrast, might work.

Interestingly, German colonial powers before the First World War had leaned towards treating Tanganyika and Rwanda-Urunda as one single area of jurisdiction. Tanzania is a stable and a plural society. Once part of a wider system, Hutu and Tutsi would compete for resources with fellow Tanzanians. They would have other political rivals. In that context, their differences would be less apparent and they might behave far differently from how they have done in the past. Hutu and Tutsi soldiers would be retrained as part of the federal army of the United Republic of Tanzania, and Hutus and Tutsis would stop having de facto ethnic armies of their own.

Union with Tanzania would be safer than union with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in spite of the shared Belgian connection and French language. Tanzania is a less vulnerable society and a safer haven for Hutus and Tutsis. It is indeed significant that Hutus and Tutsis on the run are more likely to flee to Tanzania than to the DRC in spite of ethnic ties across the border with the DRC. Moreover, Hutus and Tutsis are becoming partially Swahilized and should be able to get on well with ‘fellow’ Tanzanian citizens. As citizens, they would be assimilated in due course; what was a refugee state would become an integrated part of their new country.

What leads one to some optimism here is the precedent in Uganda. The Bahima, who are traditionally pastoralists, and the Bairu, who are traditionally agriculturalists, are the Hutu and Tutsi by another name. They both belong to a Bantu group known as the Banyankore. The Bahima form a dominant caste, just as was traditionally true of the Tutsi. And though the Bahima and Bairu are mutually dependent in many ways, their society reflects the traditional mistrust of pastoralists and agriculturalists. However, because they are part of Uganda, on most issues they operate as one. There are occasions, of course, when they are divided, but in the wider plural society they see themselves as Banyankore and distinct from the various other ethnic groups of Uganda. They recognize their shared interests and this is reflected in their political behavior.

Clearly there are some difficulties to be overcome before federation with Tanzania is possible. The chief obstacle is that the Rwandans and Burundis are very possessive about their independence and their separate identity. It will take some compelling and well-reasoned arguments to persuade them of the need to renounce their sovereignty. Immense resources, on the one hand, will have to be made available to all three governments. They must
be offered the means to build clinics, roads, schools, and other infrastructure of this sort to make palatable their sacrifices. At the same time, they must be reminded of the unbearable alternative to loss of sovereignty. Do they want their children to live constantly under the cloud of imminent genocide? Though a difficult idea to sell, federation is not one that should be lightly abandoned.

African Security Council

This author has often dreamed of an African Security Council composed of African military and civilian leaders who would focus on limiting, containing and ending African conflict. The structure would resemble that of the United Nations. Some of the more influential countries would be given permanent representation on the Council. These influential countries would likely include Nigeria (from the west), Egypt (from the north) and South Africa (from the south). It is much less easy to pick out the most influential country in the east. Ethiopia would, in some ways, be the logical choice as a permanent member, although this would anger the Eritreans, and quite likely the Kenyans who have become the most pan-Africanist and most interventionist of the countries of eastern Africa. The Ugandans, too, long the favorite of Western aid organizations, would no doubt vie for a permanent seat. There should be some non-permanent members, ranging from three to five. The principle of permanent members would be reviewed every thirty years. For example, it might be necessary to add the DRC as a permanent member to represent Central Africa.

A great deal of work would have to be done to settle the details, which are almost bound to create acrimony and rivalries. Many important issues would have to be addressed. For example, in times of crisis should the African Security Council meet at the level of heads of state? Should each permanent member have a veto or not? But the idea is certainly worth exploring. This is one area, too, in which Western cooperation would prove useful.

The establishment of a Pan-African Emergency Force might prove useful in resolving conflict. This would act as a metaphorical fire brigade, putting out fires from one collapsed war to another. It would serve to teach Africans the art of building a Pax Africana. Exactly what shape such a force should take is not clear. Should it be independently recruited? Should it be given specialized training? Should it be drawn from units of the armed forces of member states? How should the training, maintenance and deployment of the Emergency Force be paid for? How can Western friends of Africa like the US and the European Union help? Certainly the successes and failures of ECOMOG in Liberia should be studied carefully in preparation for this new venture (Cain 2000). There are times when renegade states are basically refugee states. Brutal villains in power are also pathetic casualties of history. The emergency force should be trained to use minimum violence.

Self-help

Another concrete proposal is a High Commissioner for Refugees and Displaced Africans under the African Union. The fact is that, although we produce a disproportionate number of refugees and displaced people,
Africans play a disproportionately limited role in helping them. A continent of one-tenth of the world’s population is rapidly becoming a region of a third of the displaced people of the world. We really should organize ourselves better and tackle the refugee problem in a systematic and efficient fashion. We do not want to discourage others from helping us. But we do need to do more, and be seen to be doing more, for our own people. We need to lead.

Conclusion
As a final warning, let me stress the importance of moving with speed towards political reform in Africa. The English poet Andrew Marvell, once wrote to his mistress:

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, lady, were no crime.
But at my back I always hear
Time’s winged chariot hurrying near,
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.
The Grave’s a fine and private place,
But none, I think, do there embrace.9

Marvell’s words have relevance to our own situation. Africa is a continent of immense potential. It is our obligation to move swiftly to resolve its problems and make sure that its people are given the chance to enjoy the blessings of peace and prosperity.

References


Notes

1 Recent figures include the hundreds of thousands in Rwanda and Burundi, and the tens of thousands in Algeria and the Congo. See Dunnigan and Bay (1996: 387).

2 Note that, surprisingly, an article in *The Economist* 352 (25 January 1997): 17. argues that borders have not been the primary cause of conflict.

3 The Board of UNESCO outlawed the use of the word ‘tribe’ for being Eurocentric. Those who do not like the word ‘tribe’ are largely aping a European dislike of the term. But, to avoid giving offense, the author has used the word ethnic in this paper instead.

4 These societies may also be termed ‘ethnically bipolar’, see Mime (1981).


6 The Westphalian compact established the principle that national sovereignty was inviolable. It became customary for the international community to avoid intervention if this meant infringing state sovereignty. Internal excesses may, however, be testing this custom. See Lyons and Mastanutono (1995).

7 Robert G. Moser (1999) provides an interesting comparative analysis of how different types of electoral systems affect the number of political parties in regions once governed by a single party system.

8 The debate on the linkages between economic freedom and political freedom is historic and relevant; for a recent example, see Cammack (1997).

9 These lines are taken from Andrew Marvell’s ‘To A Coy Mistress’, in H. M. Margollouth (1971: 27–28).
When States Implode
Africa’s Civil Wars
1950–92
ERROL A. HENDERSON

Africa has been the site of some of the world’s most deadly conflicts in the last few decades, with those in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda each resulting in the deaths through battlefield casualties or war-induced famine and disease of 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons. Stedman (1996: 237) notes that ‘[i]n 1995, there were five on-going wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan), several countries that were candidates for state collapse or civil war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire), and a host of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained contained but unresolved (Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda)’.

Although African states continue to experience these horrific wars, scholars have generated relatively few systematic, large-N, data-based analyses of the correlates of African civil wars that could inform policy to prevent them. Many studies of Africa’s large-scale domestic conflicts during the Cold War era focused on their presumed ‘ethnic’ nature, or insisted that they were epiphenomena of the underlying geopolitical gamesmanship of the superpowers (i.e. proxy-wars). By contrast, I would contend that African civil wars in the post-Second World War era largely emerged from domestic political factors related to state-building and nation-building. Drawing on this theoretical argument, I derive several testable propositions on the correlates of these wars and test them against the empirical record from 1950 to 1992.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in a number of sections. Initially, I discuss how decolonization contributed to the political, economic, and cultural disparities that have given rise to African domestic conflict. Next, I provide a brief discussion of the theoretical point of departure of the study. Following that, I present several propositions on the putative correlates of Africa’s civil wars and I evaluate the propositions using logistic regression analyses. After presenting the findings, I discuss their implications for future research and policy, and conclude with a brief summary of the main points of the paper.
Decolonization led to the creation of more independent states in Africa than in any other continent during the postwar era. With independence, the leaders of African states faced the dual challenges of building the institutional apparatus of the state (state-building), while simultaneously constructing an overarching national identity among disparate cultural groups (nation-building). While most developed states had had difficulty responding to these demands separately and sequentially, the newly independent African states were required to respond to both simultaneously. However, colonialism was not aimed at creating strong, viable, autonomous states. The newly independent African states were usually left with little institutional support, wealth or university-trained specialists from the departing colonizers. Holsti (1996: 62) agrees that “[t]he colonial state’s main purposes had nothing to do with preparation for ultimate statehood, and everything to do with economic exploitation, building some infrastructure and communication, settling migrants, organizing plantation agriculture, introducing extraction of surplus through taxes, organizing some semblance of lower-level education and religious activity, and providing “law and order” so that these tasks could go on unhindered” (p. 62).

Colonial underdevelopment resulted in the political decapitation of African elites from their citizens and the coupling of African governments to the interests of the former colonial powers. An institutional vacuum was created within African states, which left them as relatively easy prey for organized insurgency. Moreover, the failure of state-building exacerbated problems of nation-building. Colonialism had arbitrarily fused dramatically disparate societies into single states that seemed doomed to fracture (although colonial boundaries were largely accepted by African elites under the principle of uti possidetis). In many of these newly independent and culturally diverse states, culture became the primary criterion for political association, and political competition took on the complexion of intercultural competition. Without the support of integrative state institutions to exert countervailing pressures, fissures in the fragile state system fractured. Many of the African states thus affected disintegrated violently into civil war.

The simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building were further complicated by the demands on African elites to provide economic development for their states. Economic development, which tends to reduce violence in the long term, can exacerbate tensions in the short term, because uneven growth in different sectors of the economy may intensify existing cleavages and lead to increasing inequality as the economy expands. The resultant asymmetrical development may engender frustration and conflict among competing groups (Gurr 1970). In addition, rivalry over economic spoils is a primary basis for ethnic mobilization (Hechter 1978), and discrimination with respect to the dispensation of goods (and ‘bads’) across different identity groups is viewed as a chief cause of ‘ethнополitical conflict’ (Gurr 1993).
Although the discussion up to this point reminds us that various political, economic, and cultural factors may each contribute to the onset of African civil wars, many of the arguments on the causes of these wars suggest that they are simply ‘ethnic conflicts’. For example, Mazrui (1986: 291) insists that ‘[a]ll civil wars in Africa have been substantially ethnic’. However, it is not clear to what extent cultural factors are more consequential than political or economic ones in generating civil wars in Africa. Before one can reliably suggest that African civil wars are simply ‘ethnic conflicts’, it is necessary to conduct a systematic examination of the role of cultural factors in these wars, controlling for political and economic factors that might also contribute to their onset. Once one controls for non-cultural factors, the impact of culture may become insignificant. On the other hand, if, after controlling for non-cultural factors, the relationship between culture and civil war is significant, then we would have empirically established the link between culture and African civil wars. This study provides such an analysis.

In addition, only by including the various political, economic and cultural factors in a single model can we usefully distinguish among them and determine their individual impact on the probability of civil war. Distinguishing the effects of each class of variables will not only allow us to better determine the processes giving rise to African civil wars, it will also provide a clear direction for policy to reduce the likelihood of them. For example, if African civil wars primarily result from political factors, then policies aimed at democratization or the removal of exploitative political linkages should be our primary concern. On the other hand, if economic factors are more critical in African civil wars, then policies that focus on economic development or changes in domestic spending priorities should be pursued initially. If cultural factors are more important, then African states should focus on policies that provide redress for the claims of aggrieved ethno-political groups.

Before conducting the empirical analysis of the relationship among political, economic and cultural factors and the onset of African civil wars, it is necessary to flesh out the linkages between each of these factors and domestic conflict. This requires an elucidation of the theoretical argument that links these various factors in a coherent explanation of civil war onset. As discussed above, I contend that African civil wars largely result from the failed policies of state leaders in response to the dual challenges of state-building and nation-building. In the next section, I flesh out this theoretical argument.

Theoretical Point of Departure

Of the very few large-N, longitudinal, data-based studies of civil wars (e.g. Hegre et al., 1997; Henderson and Singer 2000; Rummel, 1997), most do not focus on a single region. Of the few that focus on African civil wars specifically (i.e. Collier, 1998; Collier and Hoefler, 1998), they do not address the relative impact of the varied political, economic, and cultural factors that I wish to examine in this study. The focus on political,
economic and cultural factors is born of the viewpoint that all of these classes of factors are interconnected and that, without controlling for each of them, one may draw spurious inferences regarding the correlates of African civil wars. Furthermore, I maintain that African civil wars largely result from internal factors within African states; specifically, from the failure of African states to respond adequately to the simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building. Let us explore this claim more fully.

To be sure, when one considers the number of African civil wars in the postwar era, one is immediately confronted by the bloody record of Soviet and US involvement in these wars. Although foreign intrigue often played a major role in the expansion and escalation of African civil wars, international factors were rarely associated with the onset of these wars. Ayoob (1995: 189) agrees that ‘[t]he internal vulnerabilities of Third World states are primarily responsible for the high level of conflict in many parts of the Third World’, while Brown (1996: 582), Luard (1989) and Holsti (1996) make similar claims for postcolonial conflicts, in general. Focusing on African armed conflicts, in particular, Stedman (1996: 238) notes that their origins ‘lie principally’ with ‘policies pursued by elites to gain and consolidate power’.

The crux of the view that African civil wars result largely from domestic factors is the thesis that tensions related to the challenges of state-building and nation-building comprise the ‘taproot of insurgency’ (see Cohen et al., 1981; Henderson, 1999). For example, European states had many decades – for some, centuries – to develop effective institutions of governance and a domestic environment in which the central government was the primary institution to which citizens swore fealty. Moreover, among European states, state-building preceded and facilitated nation-building; European elites were therefore able to address and resolve problems associated with each sequentially. African states not only had a much shorter time horizon in which to build effective state structures and cohesive national identities, but they usually had to accomplish both simultaneously. One result was that African political elites faced a ‘state-strength dilemma’, wherein by attempting to create strong states they engendered resistance that further weakened them, due to the competition and conflict among their diverse and often disputatious groups that did not swear fealty to the central government (Holsti 1996: 128).

Further complicating this process was the perception among many African leaders that there were disincentives to the development of legitimate political institutions. Chief among these disincentives was the fear that such development might lead to the construction of rival power centers that might threaten the political elite’s incumbency. Subsequently, instead of creating strong, economically developed, democratic states, they erected weak, economically marginalized, autocratic and heavily militarized regimes that were more geared toward providing for the personal predilections of the ruling elite rather than the welfare of the vast majority of its citizens. In light of popular political mobilization from a disaffected, generally poor, and often heterogeneous citizenry, many African elites utilized repression to insure their regime’s security, while devoting resources to the military to
stave off insurgency. Ironically, the result was often the very insurgency that the governing elites’ policies were intended to deter.

In sum, African insurgency should be viewed as a result of the lingering legacy of colonialism and the failure of African elites to respond adequately to the dual and simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building. With this theoretical argument in mind, one can devolve several propositions on the correlates of African civil wars that focus on the internal characteristics of African states themselves. Moreover, we can clearly delineate the political, economic and cultural variables that are operative in these wars. In the next section, I discuss several of these prospective correlates of African civil wars before testing them against the empirical record of the postwar era.

Correlates of African Civil War

Among the political, economic and cultural factors most consistently implicated in civil wars are those related to a state’s regime type (Auvinen, 1997; Hegre et al., 1997; Henderson and Singer 2000; Rummel, 1997), its level of economic development (Collier, 1998; Collier and Hoefler, 1998; Henderson and Singer 2000), and/or its cultural composition (Auvinen, 1997; Collier, 1998; Collier and Hoefler, 1998; Rummel, 1997), respectively. Turning first to the political factors, several studies maintain that full-fledged democracies are less prone to large-scale domestic conflict due to the availability of legitimate channels for dispute resolution while autocracies are resistant to civil war because their use of repression stifles dissent. Interestingly, the relationship between regime type and war for states with an intermediate level of democracy – semi-democracies – has gained increasing attention in the literature. Semi-democracies are states that are neither fully democratic nor strongly autocratic. Previous empirical findings indicate that semi-democracies are more prone to civil war because they have neither the range of legitimate institutionalized channels found in full-fledged democracies nor the expansive repressive machinery of full-fledged autocracies to deter insurgency (Hegre et al., 1997; Henderson and Singer 2000). Therefore, dissidents in semi-democracies rarely have their demands effectively addressed through the limited (and often resource-strained) governmental channels available to them, but they also do not face an overarching repressive state apparatus; consequently, they are more apt to mobilize their dissent and pursue insurgency.

The conflict-exacerbating role of semi-democracy appears to be evident in African states (Mazrui 1986: 181–6). For example, Uganda’s nascent democracy was felled by the civil war in the summer of 1966; Nigeria’s Third Republic was overthrown by the civil conflict of 1984; Burundi’s civil war was precipitated by the assassination of its first democratically elected president; Angola’s civil war was rekindled following the refusal of the insurgent UNITA forces to accept the outcome of internationally observed elections; and the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville began in 1997 shortly after the country’s first democratically elected president took office. Therefore I posit that:
Proposition 1.1: Presence of semi-democracy increases the likelihood of civil war.

Another important political variable that has been associated with African domestic conflict is the colonial experience of the state. As noted above, colonial policies, in their entirety, often exacerbated problems related to the construction of viable African states. Stedman (1996: 236) notes that '[l]egacies from colonialism predisposed much of Africa to violent conflicts'. Holsti (1996: 62) reminds us that the ‘actual patterns of exploitation’ under colonialism varied from colony to colony, ranging from the British policy of ‘indirect rule’ to the Belgian policy in the Congo, which he characterizes as ‘little more than an organized system of theft based on forced labor to benefit the Belgian crown’ (p. 62). In the latter case, Holsti is too kind; recent research has revealed that among the horrific atrocities committed by the Belgians in the Congo there are estimates of 10 million Africans killed (see Hochschild 1998).

The practices of European and American colonizers left a destructive legacy that had a deleterious impact on African state-building and nation-building initiatives. Among imperialist states, Britain is often credited with promoting a highly rational colonial policy focusing on indirect rule; however, Mazrui and Tidy (1986: 84) maintain that, although the British often supported federations, they also used their tactic of ‘divide and rule’ within African states and they supported ‘ethnically based political parties as a tactic to weaken and divide nationalist opposition to colonial rule’, most notably in English-speaking West Africa, but also in Uganda, Kenya and Zambia. The horrific Biafran civil war and the enduring domestic conflicts in Uganda are associated with British colonial policy with respect to Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria and the relationship between Baganda and Nilotics in Uganda, respectively.

Most imperialist states maintained informal or neo-colonial relationships with their former colonial subjects. While independence for Africans in the Belgian Congo brought invasion by Belgian (and US) troops, and Africans in each of the Portuguese colonies had to fight prolonged and bloody wars to end their colonial domination, colonial powers often used economic measures to maintain their dominance in their former colonies. For example, the French tied their former colonies to the CFA franc and also bound their politico-economies to the Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO). Similarly, the political economy of Liberia was tied so tightly to the US through Firestone Rubber Company that the African state was ‘subject to a mightier economic imperialism than could be imposed in Africa by European colonial powers’ (ibid.: 29). In addition, colonial legacies often had an even more direct military impact on the likelihood of civil war. For example, British troops disarmed East African mutineers in 1964 and France used force liberally in its former sub-Saharan colonies, most notably in Cameroon, Niger, Gabon, Chad, and the interlacustrine states where it assumed the former role of Belgium.

To my mind, the relative impact of the distinct colonial legacies of African states is more likely a function of the extent to which the colonial power either facilitated or circumscribed the state-building and nation-building processes in its former colonies. Although the data analysis (see
below) will allow us to determine the relative impact of different colonial experiences on the likelihood of civil war, what is of primary importance is to determine the extent to which colonialism evinced an enduring impact on the conflict-proneness of African states at all. While it is often assumed to be the case, this assumption has not been tested across the range of African civil wars. Therefore, I test the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.2:** Colonial legacy is associated with the likelihood of civil war.

Collier and Hoeffler’s (1999) analysis clearly implicates economic factors in African civil wars, while Mullins (1987) concludes that in many African and Third World states, in general, internal conflicts result largely from the uncoupling of economic development from military capability. Following Tilly (1975), he argues that during state formation in Europe leaders were compelled to provide some measure of economic development so that taxes could be raised from the citizenry in order to provide for the state’s professional military forces. This security function encouraged development, since resources to pay professional militaries could be more readily secured through domestic taxation rather than from foreign adventure. In this way, economic development became tied to the state’s military capability; however, in African states, political elites are often unable to extract sufficient resources from their poor societies to support their bloated militaries. Furthermore, leaders of postcolonial African states rarely fear external aggression since major power (or regional) patronage – as well as international law – protects their sovereignty. This is reflected in the fact that African states have experienced fewer than 2 per cent of all inter-state wars from 1946 to 1992, while experiencing almost 30 per cent of all civil wars during that era. Since African elites have few worries that their regimes will be brought down by external aggression, their policies are not informed by the security-development nexus; they can therefore pursue their own myopic interest of protecting their regime from insurgency, with little regard for larger development issues. This relationship inverts Eurocentric security/development strategies in Africa and results in both greater insecurity for the vast majority of African citizens and the underdevelopment of the economies of African states. Both of these factors increase the likelihood of insurgency in African states.

The significance of economic factors as precipitants of civil war also derives from the view that the economic health of the state is the chief responsibility of the political leadership. Citizens facing economic privation are likely to hold the incumbent political regime responsible for their hardship. Moreover, economically marginalized citizens often provide fodder for insurgency. Unlike more developed states that have resources that can be redistributed to marginalized or disaffected groups to maintain their support of the status quo, African states are generally resource-constrained and, therefore, have few resources to utilize in this way. Further complicating this process, African regimes often divert their limited revenue to military spending, which both truncates economic development and provides resources to the armed elements of the society that are often eager to usurp political authority. Nevertheless, the conflict-dampening impact of economic development is evident among African states such as
Botswana where it has contributed to that state’s greater stability. Empirical studies largely support the view that economic development reduces the likelihood of insurgency (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Therefore I posit that:

**Proposition 2.1:** The greater a state’s level of economic development, the lower its likelihood of civil war.

The level of military spending in African states is an additional economic factor that is associated with African civil wars. As suggested above, military spending in African states is usually not aimed at external enemies but at internal ones. Furthermore, African political elites often privilege their militaries in their budgeting decisions (Gyimah-Brempong, 1992); however, this may often have a negative impact on investment and growth (Deger, 1986; Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987). In addition, increased military spending often crowds out social welfare, health and education expenditures. Heo’s (1998) and Frederickson and Looney’s (1983: 637) findings indicate that the opportunity costs of military spending are most evident in resource-constrained countries such as those found throughout Africa. I maintain that the socio-economic dislocations wrought from increased military spending are likely to heighten the probability of insurgency. Therefore, I posit that:

**Proposition 2.2:** The greater a state’s level of military spending, the greater its likelihood of civil war.

Turning to the role of cultural factors in African civil wars, although Africa’s domestic conflicts are often assumed to be largely ethnic in nature, there are competing findings on the relationship between cultural factors and civil wars in the region. For example, Barrows (1976: 165–6) found that neither linguistic nor ethnic fractionalization had a consistent significant impact on domestic violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Later, Collier (1998) and Collier & Hoeffler (1998: 570–71) suggested an inverted U relationship between ethno-linguistic homogeneity and civil war in sub-Saharan Africa, but added that the war proneness of these regimes was more a function of their poverty than of ethnic factors. On the other hand, Schlichte’s (1994) case studies of conflicts in Africa suggest that ethnicity was not a salient factor in several ostensibly ‘ethnic’ conflicts, while Fearon and Laitin’s (1996) analysis revealed that interethnic cooperation in Africa is much more prevalent than interethnic conflict.²

Of the different explanations for the conflict-exacerbating role of cultural factors in Africa’s civil wars, the rationale provided by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) is the most theoretically compelling. They suggest that the most likely candidates for civil war in Africa are those states that are ethnically polarized with two relatively equal but distinct cultural groups accounting for most of the state’s population. Their basic contention is that coordinating insurgency is facilitated where rebels are bound by a common identity distinct from that of their adversaries, and common culture – especially common language – is assumed to provide a basis for such self-identification. Since heterogeneous societies are more likely to be fractionalized, they offer little prospect for successful insurgency, and culturally homogeneous states lack cultural fissures and thus face few if any cultural challengers. Therefore, one would expect that:
Proposition 3.1: The greater the cultural polarization in a state, the greater the likelihood of civil war.

In addition, since Gurr (1994) suggests that the presence of certain types of ‘politicized ethnic groups’ or ‘ethno-political groups’ is associated with domestic conflict, a useful measure of the extent to which cultural factors are associated with civil wars should focus on the impact of these groups on the likelihood of insurgency. Gurr (1993, 24) notes that in the early 1990s there were 74 politicized communal groups in the region (comprising more than 40 per cent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa) involved in various types of ‘ethnopolitical conflict’. Scarritt (1993: 254) maintains that the prevalence of minorities at risk is greater in Africa than in most other regions of the world, and points out that in three African countries all of the population is at risk, in eight over half, and in four over 40 per cent. Twenty-nine of the thirty-six countries in the region have ‘at risk’ populations of more than one million, the second highest percentage among world regions (p. 255). One may assume that the prevalence of ethnopolitical groups within African states increases the probability of large-scale conflict (i.e. civil war), especially since African conflicts are widely assumed to derive from ethnopolitical factors. Therefore, one would expect that:

Proposition 3.2: The presence of ethno-political groups increases the likelihood of civil war.

Having derived propositions on several ostensible correlates of African civil war, what is left is to evaluate systematically the extent to which these propositions are borne out empirically. In the next section, I outline the research design that is utilized to determine the significance of the political, economic and cultural factors in African civil wars.

**Research Design**

**Definition of Civil War**

The Correlates of War (COW) project provides an operational definition of civil war as sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter’s ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5 per cent of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain (Small and Singer 1982: 210–20). The COW definition has been utilized in quantitative as well as case-study analyses of civil war (e.g. Collier and Hoeftler 1998; Henderson and Singer 2000; Licklider 1993; Regan 1996).

**Outcome Variable**

This study examines cases of African civil wars from 1950 to 1992, beginning with the civil war of 1960 and ending with the Congolese (DRC) war in Angola in 1992. The unit of analysis is the state-year, which is the annual observation for each of the 46 independent African states in the
data set. There are a total of 963 state-years for which we have complete
data, and our analysis is conducted on this population. The outcome
variable is the onset of civil war (Civil War) and is coded as ‘1’ if a civil war
began during the year and ‘0’ if it did not; war data are from Singer and
Small (1994).

Predictor Variables

The first political variable, Semidemocracy, is constructed in several steps.
The extent of democracy is measured as the difference between the state’s
11-point democracy and autocracy scores (both range from 0 to 10) using
the codings from the Polity III data set (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). This
difference is called the ‘regime score’ and it is measured on a 21-point scale,
which assumes values from –10 (the highest level of autocracy) to +10 (the
highest level of democracy). From there, I construct a dichotomous variable
which equals ‘1’ for those cases where the regime score ranges from 0 to
+5, and otherwise equals ‘0’. That is, the range of Semidemocracy includes
regime scores of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 on the Polity III scale. Using this coding,
I capture the intuitive notion that semi-democracies are neither full-fledged
democracies (conventionally, a ‘coherent democracy’ requires a regime
score of at least +7 on the Polity III scale) nor are they strongly autocratic
(by virtue of their non-negative regime scores). For the other political
variable(s) in the model, I construct five dummy variables (Belgian, British,
French, Portuguese, US) to designate the former colonizer of each post-
colonial African state. Where there was more than one colonizer, such as
in the case of the former German and Italian colonies, the more recent
colonial power was used.

A state’s level of economic development, Development, is measured as the
log of the ratio of the state’s energy consumption as a proportion of its total
population. The military spending variable, Milspending, is measured as the
log of the ratio of a state’s military expenditures (in constant, 1990 US
dollars) to its total population. Data for these two variables are from the
COW Material Capabilities data set (Singer and Small, 1995).

Cultural polarization, Polar, is a dummy variable that reflects the extent
that the distribution of a state’s culture groups approximates a 50-50 split.
Specifically, polarized states are those in which the sum of the squared
percentage shares of the two largest cultural groups is at least 50 per cent
of the total population, with group B (the second largest group) having no
less than half the population of group A (the largest group) and group C
(the third largest group) having no more than half the population share of
group B. Following these coding rules, states with distributions such as 50-
50, 40-40-20, or 45-45-10 are polarized, while states with distributions
such as 70-30, 40-35-25-5 are not. Polarized states are coded ‘1’ and those
that are not polarized are coded ‘0’. The polarization measures are
estimated using data for each state’s language groups and come from the
COW cultural composition data set (Singer, 1996).

An additional cultural variable is the presence/absence of an ‘ethno-
political group’ in the state. Gurr and Harff (1994: 190) define ethno-political
groups as ‘ethnic groups that have organized to promote their common
interests’, and it is these groups that engage in ‘ethno-political conflict.’
There are four types of ethno-political groups; among them, ethno-nationalists and communal contenders are most often associated with conflict. Gurr (1994: 355, 360) contends that ‘[o]f the 233 politicized communal groups included in the Minorities at Risk study, eighty-one pursued ethno-national objectives; their conflicts were on average more intense than those in which other issues were manifest and increased markedly in numbers and magnitude from the 1950s to the 1980s.’ Communal contenders were also involved in a high degree of ethno-political conflict, according to Gurr (1994: 354–55). Therefore, the second cultural variable, Ethnopolitical Group, is a dummy variable that is coded ‘1’ for those postcolonial states that contained either ethno-nationalists or communal contenders in the 1990s as reflected in the Minorities at Risk data set and coded ‘0’ for states that do not.

Data Analysis
A multivariate logistic regression model is estimated to evaluate the propositions. The logistic regression model takes the following form: Pr(Civil War) = 1/(1 + e^{-Z}) where Pr(Civil War) is the probability that the outcome variable (the onset of civil war) equals 1; and Z is the sum of the product of the coefficient values (bi) across all observations of the predictor variables (Xi), that is: \( \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Semidemocracy} + \beta_2 \text{Belgian} + \beta_3 \text{British} + \beta_4 \text{Portuguese} + \beta_5 \text{US} + \beta_6 \text{Development} + \beta_7 \text{Milspending} + \beta_8 \text{Polar} + \beta_9 \text{Ethnopolitical Group}. \)

Findings
The findings from the logistic regression model are reported in Table 1.1. The model performs well with respect to its log likelihood score and X² significance level and all but three of the variables are significantly associated with the probability of civil war. Taking each in turn, I find that Semidemocracy is not significantly associated with the likelihood of civil war, and this is inconsistent with Proposition 1.1. This finding is surprising, given both the previous research on the relationship between semidemocracy and civil war (i.e. Hegre et al. 1997; Henderson and Singer 2000) and the apparent relationship revealed by comparing the distribution of regime types in African states to the incidence of civil war on the continent.

For example, autocracies are the most prevalent regime type in Africa in our temporal domain, with 78 per cent of African state years coded as autocratic. By contrast 13 per cent of African state years are coded as semidemocratic and 9 per cent are coded as democratic. When we compare the distribution of regime types to the distribution of war onsets, we find that 67 per cent of the state years marked by war onsets are coded as autocratic, 29 per cent are coded as semidemocratic, and the remaining 4 per cent are coded as democratic. Starting with the democracies, these data reveal that war onsets occur in only 4 per cent of those state years marked by a democratic regime, which represents less than half of the total number of state years during which there is a democratic regime (9 per cent). This suggests that democratic regimes have a reduced incidence of war onsets. Autocracies likewise experience a reduced incidence of war onsets, since
they comprise 78 per cent of the total number of state-years in sub-Saharan Africa but experience only 67 per cent of the state years of civil war. On the other hand, it is clear that semidemocracies are much more prone to civil war. In fact, although semidemocratic regimes comprise 13 per cent of the total number of the state years in Africa, they experience more than twice as many state years of civil war (i.e. 29 per cent).10

In light of the apparent relationship between semidemocracy and civil war, I estimated a revised model that included separate democracy and autocracy variables. The findings revealed that, although the general direction of the relationship between regime type and civil war follows the broad outline suggested by the semidemocracy-civil war thesis (i.e. that both democracies and autocracies are less war-prone than semidemocracies), this relationship was clearly not significant for African states. Therefore, although the comparison of regime type and civil war onset seems to provide a modicum of support for the view that semidemocracies are more war-prone, it is nevertheless clear that the relationship is not statistically significant once one controls for the range of factors included in our analysis. The results reported in Table 1.1 provide another example that relationships evident in other regions of the world are often not borne out in Africa.

Moving to the other predictor variables in the model, the results reveal that each of the colonizer state variables is significantly associated with the likelihood of civil war and since each of the coefficients is estimated using French colonies as the baseline, then their positive relationships should be considered relative to the experience of French colonies.11 These findings provide strong support for Proposition 1.2 in that colonial legacy is strongly associated with the probability of civil war, and they also indicate that the non-French colonies were more likely to experience civil war. The latter conclusion should not be construed as support for the view that French colonies are peaceful, in general. One is reminded that France was heavily involved in the civil war in Chad, and a civil war raged in the former French colony of Congo-Brazzaville. The findings probably reflect the greater deterrent value of France’s military presence in its former colonies, including the secondment of French troops, which may have contributed to the lower incidence of full-scale civil war in the Francophone states as compared with the Anglophone or Lusophone states.12 In addition, it should be remembered that most of the French colonies on the continent were in West Africa where there was a historical Islamic politico-religious influence. French colonial policies often allowed them to overlay their administration on an extant Islamic one that persisted into the independence era. In this way, the presence of indigenous politico-religious structures may have alleviated some of the problems associated with the lack of institutional development and comprehensive cultural identity that exacerbates state-building and nation-building initiatives – which my theoretical argument suggests leads to civil war.

The findings also indicate that increased development is associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war, which is consistent with Proposition 2.1. I re-estimated the original model to include the annual percentage rate of change of Development in order to determine whether ‘growth’ rather than...
‘development’ had the strongest conflict dampening impact on African civil war. I find that, controlling for the factors listed in Table 1.1, growth is not significantly associated with the likelihood of African civil war, while Development remains negative and highly significant. It appears that development more than growth reduces the probability of the onset of civil war in Africa.

I also find that Milspending is significantly associated with an increased likelihood of civil war, which is consistent with Proposition 2.2. The latter finding challenges the view that by privileging the military in their budgetary decisions, political elites stave off potential insurgency (e.g. Gyimah-Brempong, 1992). In fact, hyper-spending on the military probably increases the likelihood that the military itself, fat on the largesse provided by the political leadership, will eventually move on its patrons.

Considering the prevalent view that assumes the salience of cultural
variables in African domestic conflicts, it is interesting that neither cultural variable is significantly associated with the probability of civil war (these findings refute Propositions 3.1 and 3.2). In the case of polarization, the findings suggest that civil wars may emerge within polarized or non-polarized states, or in those characterized by a wide range of cultural distributions (see Horowitz, 1985). The absence of a significant relationship between Ethnopolitical Group and Civil War is particularly interesting since Scarritt (1993: 254) maintains that the prevalence of minorities at risk is greater in Africa than in most other regions of the world. Since the coefficient for Ethnopolitical Group is just barely insignificant with a p value of .10, I conducted sensitivity tests to attempt to determine the robustness of this nonsignificant finding. I disaggregated the temporal domain and examined the relationship between Ethnopolitical Group and Civil War for the periods from 1960 to the present, 1970 to the present, 1980 to the present, and 1990 to the present; yet, there was no significant relationship between Ethnopolitical Group and Civil War for any of these time periods (p. values were consistently greater than .30 across each of the time periods). I conclude that the findings reported in Table 1.1 are robust and that there is no significant relationship between the presence of a mobilized ethno-political group and the probability of civil war in African states.

To my mind, the latter findings suggest that cultural factors are only likely to be associated with civil war when fused with political and economic factors. Therefore, when one controls for political and economic factors, as is done in this study, the impact of cultural factors is insignificant. Nevertheless, one should not infer from these findings that a policy aimed at reducing the likelihood of African civil war should not focus on the protection of the rights of ethno-political groups (see Gurr and Harff 1994; Henderson, 1999): one should simply not assume that the distribution of culture groups or the presence of ‘ politicized ethnic groups’, in and of themselves, are portents of civil war. Moreover, one should not assume that African civil wars are simply ‘ethnic conflicts’.

Beyond the significance of the predictor variables, it is also important to determine their relative impact on the likelihood of civil war. Although the beta coefficients from logistic regression are not directly interpretable, techniques are available that allow us to determine the independent impact of each predictor variable on the probability of the outcome, holding the other variables constant at their mean or modal values (Menard, 1995). Table 1.2 lists the marginal impact of each significant predictor variable in our model, ceteris paribus, on the probability of civil war.

The results indicate the greater role of political – more than economic or cultural – variables on the likelihood of civil war. Specifically, the four colonizer state variables have the greatest marginal effects on the likelihood of civil war when holding other variables constant at their mean or modal values. For example, a unit change in the value of US (i.e. a change from the absence of US colonization ‘0’, to the presence of US colonization ‘1’) is associated with a 9 per cent probability of civil war when the other variables are held at their mean or modal values. This represents more than a sixty-fold increase in the likelihood of civil war as compared with the baseline probability of civil war (which is .14 per cent). Belgian has the
second highest marginal impact on the likelihood of civil war, followed by Portuguese and British. Among the remaining variables, Milspending is associated with a .3 per cent likelihood of civil war while Development is associated with a .06 per cent likelihood of civil war, which represents a .08 per cent decrease in the probability of civil war as compared with the baseline probability. All told, the findings indicate that the less developed, militarized states that were not colonized by the French have been the most likely candidates for civil war in Africa.

### Discussion

Of the political, economic and cultural factors widely assumed to be associated with the onset of civil war in Africa, the results indicate that the lingering impact of colonialism was the most powerful precipitant of civil war. The findings clearly implicate the disparate colonial legacies of African states as significant precipitants of African civil wars. To my mind, one of the most significant aspects of the colonial legacy was that it saddled African states with the burden of simultaneously erecting legitimate political institutions of governance, while incorporating diverse peoples into a single political entity to which they would swear fealty. The strongest European states had centuries to respond to the dual demands of state-building and nation-building; however, African states have had only a few decades. The fact that the colonial powers left Africa with a plethora of very weak states (Holsti 1996: 99–100) only exacerbated these difficulties. The findings suggest that much of the armed conflict that we are viewing in Africa today is the result of this historic and ongoing political underdevelopment (also see Nkrumah 1965; Rodney 1980).

The problems associated with the simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building continue to confront African states with enormous demands on their brittle polities and often lead their elites to eschew democracy and to ignore the popular demands of their disaffected

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<tr>
<th>Marginal Probability of War</th>
<th>Difference in Marginal Probability as Compared with the Baseline Probability of War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US 9.00%</td>
<td>+8.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian 3.20%</td>
<td>+3.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese 1.30%</td>
<td>+1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British .90%</td>
<td>+.76%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milspending .30%</td>
<td>+.16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baseline Probability of War</td>
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<td>Development .14%</td>
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<td>Development .06%</td>
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citizenship. Nevertheless, African elites also have themselves to blame for some very poor choices and policies, including the militarization of their societies and the failure to expand their economies — both conditions which increase the likelihood of civil war. The militarization of African societies — especially during the Cold War — did not provide greater security for the citizens of African states but primarily facilitated the longevity of corrupt leaders. Many African citizens were held hostage by political elites — who were often supported by the West — including some of the postwar era’s worst dictators, murderers and kleptocrats. Their bloated militaries gave them an awesome capacity for domestic destructiveness and they fought (and in several cases continue to fight) some of the most brutal and protracted wars against their own citizens. As was so often the case, the former colonial powers and their allies threw gasoline on the smoldering conflicts in African states. During the Cold War era the superpower rivalry and the proxy-wars carried out in African states gave truth to the African saying, ‘when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’.

Ironically, the end of the Cold War and the rapprochement between the superpowers did not bode well for African development either, which supports the corollary to the maxim stated above: ‘when two elephants make love, it’s also the grass that suffers.’ African states continue to be hamstrung by huge debts and poor economies while development aid floods into Eastern Europe and away from the South (Ihonvbere, 1998: 11–12). One result is the further widening of the gap between North and South, and the further immiseration of Africa, in particular. For example, Broad and Cavanagh (1998: 19) point out that ‘in 1960 developing countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was 18 per cent of the industrial nations; in 1990, at 17 per cent, the gap was almost unchanged’. More telling was Broad and Landi’s (1996: 8) finding that, from 1980 to 1991, per capita GNP in the North increased at an average rate of 2.3 per cent. Over the same period, per capita GNP in the South had an average rate of increase of only 1 per cent; however, African states did not even realize that miniscule level of growth as their per capita GNP actually declined by 1.2 per cent.

The findings remind us that African states require a multifaceted strategy for development and demilitarization in order to reduce their likelihood of experiencing civil war. Such an approach is further necessitated because ‘remedies’ intended to alleviate a problem related to one class of factors (e.g. economic development) too often exacerbate difficulties related to other factors (e.g. political stability). For example, states that attempt to develop economically are often compelled to appeal to international organizations for assistance; however, Auvinen’s (1996: 395) analysis of 70 less developed states from 1981 to 1989 implicated the IMF’s high-conditionality structural adjustment programs in generating political protest even in more developed and democratic Third World states. It is these types of linkages that keep many African states severely hampered from ending their immiseration and the domestic conflict that it often generates. These linkages, which are largely colonial and neocolonial in origin, also make it quite difficult to develop local initiatives that can provide for demilitarization and development, which are both important deterrents to
In my view, Africans will have to rely on their indigenous resources and mechanisms in place in the region to insure against another half-century of civil wars, because, as Stedman (1996: 264) notes, the resolution of Africa’s problems will ultimately depend on the development of regimes ‘that have the capabilities to carry out the tasks that modern states are expected to perform’. Nevertheless, the lingering impact of colonialism on the prospect of African civil wars makes it imperative that Africans carve from their own experience a path to peace that privileges and strengthens their viable indigenous institutions because, as Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni correctly pointed out: ‘[in Africa] We are building Afrocentric, not Eurocentric countries’ (quoted in McGeary 1997).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have systematically examined the extent to which political, economic and cultural factors are associated with civil wars in sub-Saharan African states. Drawing on a theoretical argument that associates the likelihood of civil war with the tumult that arises from the simultaneous challenges of state-building and nation-building, I derived several testable propositions on the correlates of African civil wars. Results of logistic regression analyses indicated that previous colonial experience is a significant predictor of the likelihood of civil wars. I also found that economic development reduces the probability of civil war, while militarization increases it. Interestingly, neither regime type nor cultural factors played a significant role in African civil wars.

All told, the findings lend greater support to those who emphasize the centrality of political and economic factors over cultural ones in explaining the incidence of African civil wars. In fact, the major contribution of this study is that it challenges the view that African civil wars are fueled by ‘ethnic tensions’, belying the notion that Africa’s wars are simply ‘ethnic conflicts’. Most importantly, the findings reinforce the view that African political elites must devise and implement more effective strategies to respond to the challenges of state-building and nation-building or face many more decades of civil wars on that battered and conflict-torn continent.

References

Broad, Robin and Christina Landi, 1996. ‘Whither the North-South Gap’, Third World Quarterly

Notes

1 The ambivalence regarding the extent of the impact of colonialism on independent African states is captured by Mazrui (1986: 14) in his discussion of whether the colonial period is best depicted as an ‘epic’ or an ‘episode’. In the former case, colonialism represented a revolutionary period for Africa by incorporating the continent into the global political economy through the Atlantic Slave System and, later, formal colonialism. In the latter case, its impact is assumed to have been disruptive but more tenuous. For example, Mazrui (p. 14) reminds us that the colonial period was so brief that ‘[w]hen Jomo Kenyatta was born, Kenya was not yet a crown colony. Kenyatta lived right through the period of British rule and outlasted British rule by fifteen years’. He adds, ‘’[I]f the entire period of colonialism could be compressed into the life span of a single individual, how deep was the impact?’

2 These inconsistent findings are not surprising in light of the disagreement on the role of cultural factors in other forms of African conflict such as coups d’état (see Henderson 1998).

3 In this study, I focus on civil wars as a distinct form of domestic armed conflict in accordance with Gurr’s (1970: 334) and Morrison and Stevenson’s (1971) admonition that scholars distinguish among different forms of domestic violence because their correlates vary. For example, democracy increases the probability of protests but decreases the probability of rebellions (Gurr and Lichbach, 1979); economic development reduces the likelihood of internal wars but increases the likelihood of protests, demonstrations, and strikes (Eichenberg et al., 1984).
The findings reported in Table 1.1 are consistent when using either 1950 or 1960 as the initial year of the analysis; however, by beginning with 1950 data, we do not arbitrarily exclude observations for several African states that were already independent (i.e., Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan).

All states that were colonies in 1950 enter the data set at independence. The spatial domain includes the following states: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.


Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa are coded as former Italian, US and British colonies, respectively (I also alternated codings with South Africa as a Dutch colony but the findings were consistent with those in Table 1.1). Although these states were not colonized in the traditional sense, nevertheless a case can be made that their autonomy, development and civil-military relations were constrained by processes quite similar to those of more traditionally colonized states. If Liberia is not included as a US colony, then the findings with regard to the US are moot; otherwise the exclusion of the Liberia/US case does not affect the direction or significance of the other variables in the model with the exception of the Portuguese, which remains positive but is not significant.

I do not include all of the colonizer state variables in the same equation because that would create a perfect linear combination and preclude estimation; I therefore exclude French from the regression equation, so that it can be used as the baseline with which we can determine the impact of the other regional variables.

I examine the tolerance levels among the predictor variables in order to gauge the extent of multicollinearity (see Menard, 1995: 66) and they are consistently above .30; thus, the findings appear to be robust with respect to potential problems of multicollinearity. I also apply Beck et al’s (1998) diagnostic for autocorrelation and I find that the direction and significance of the coefficients of the variables in the original model are consistent with those that include the diagnostic. Including a lagged dependent variable in the original model reported in Table 1.1 (the lagged dependent variable is insignificant, as well). I therefore conclude that the findings are also robust with respect to problems of autocorrelation. In addition, the original model is robust with respect to the inclusion of annual lags on the predictors; one may therefore conclude that the impact of the predictors appears to be temporally prior to the onset of the outcome.


O’Kane (1993) suggests that such deployments reduced the probability of coups d’état.

In addition, the insignificance of either cultural variable is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of either variable in the same regression equation.

With respect to international assistance, if the experience of the last half-century is any indication, then Africans will have to devise new strategies to confront a largely indifferent – if not hostile – international environment. Nevertheless, many Africans have begun to increase their appeal to their diaspora – especially in the US – both to provide support for indigenous African initiatives and to lobby their governments for African development programs – most importantly, debt forgiveness on the part of European and American governments, which, in this time of controversy over debt repayment, have yet to repay the awesome debt owed to Africa for the holocaust of enslavement and colonization.