

Introduction

I

An essential item on almost any tourist itinerary of contemporary South Africa is a meander along one of its many 'wine routes'. To visitors to post-apartheid South Africa, the oldest of these routes, around the settlement of Stellenbosch, offers particular delights. Here, in a fine climate and on ancient estates, within sight of seemingly endless vineyards against the backdrop of beautiful mountains, foreign visitors are free to spend their dollars, euros and pounds on some of the world's finest wines. Domestic visitors are not excluded from such pleasures. On one estate, Spier, 'a holistic, exciting and socially relevant multi-dimensional project . . . with wine-making, superb restaurants, a luxury hotel, a country club, [and] large-scale organic vegetable production',¹ local visitors of all colours are regularly entertained. On these estates, the magnificent oak-lined avenues and 'Cape Dutch' gables speak of a culture so grand that it is second to none. Even the most grudging and cynical visitors cannot fail to be seduced; they can only conclude that the people who established these estates knew how to live.

These estates, visitors are told, are steeped in history. Their origins have been meticulously documented. The oldest ones are as old as South Africa itself. The most famous can trace their lineage through well-preserved property deeds, the first of which were issued in the seventeenth century – Boschendal dates its origin to 1690, Spier to 1692, and Meerlust to 1693.² The improvements to buildings on such estates, moreover, can be dated with remarkable precision.³

Such vistas serve to convey a picture of perpetuity and timelessness – as if to say that the presence of those who occupy the land today is as

natural as the landscape itself. In some instances the material record serves this story well. The sundial at Meerlust, which dates from 1732, 'still keeps good time'.⁴ Not only have these properties stood here since the beginning of South African time, but so have their owners. Meerlust fell into the hands of Johannes Albertus Mijburg in 1757 'and has remained in the Myburg family ever since'.⁵

What visitors to these estates are asked to witness, although they might not be told as much, is a specific culture and its durability. It is a premise of this study that the material remains of this culture are those of an ancient landed ruling class that established itself at the southern tip of Africa. This class was not timeless – it was made. How it came to be and how it exercised power is the first subject of this book.

Power was exercised, first and foremost, over an imported slave labour force. It is no secret that the culture of this landed class was built on the backs of chattel slaves. The historical and archaeological evidence is in plain sight. On Spier the *jongenhuijsen* (slave quarters) have been preserved (although they now house a restaurant) and the quarters at Meerlust boast the fine decorative work of slave artisans known to have worked on farms throughout the area. 'Slave bells' are to be seen in a number of places. Not far from Boschendal is Pniel, a mission settlement established shortly after the final emancipation of slaves in 1838.⁶

Less visible to visitors, perhaps because it is so much taken for granted, is the singular fact that this culture was built on a process of colonial conquest more complete than anywhere else in South Africa. It is a second premise of this study, therefore, that the remains of the culture visible are those of a *colonial* ruling class. The members of this colonial ruling class enjoyed particular rewards and challenges. Foremost of these colonial rewards, as we have seen, was slave labour. Chattel slavery made the rapid accumulation of wealth possible and so obviated the need for noble pedigree required in European societies. One of the primary colonial challenges was an indigenous population that had to be killed, or conquered and domesticated. In time, the imported slave labour force and domesticated indigenous population ended up living and working side by side, a rare situation in the history of European expansion.

Even so, this landed class shares a history in certain fundamental ways with the great landed classes of Europe and those found in societies

born out of European overseas expansion. The landowners of this corner of South Africa have had to cope with challenges similar to those faced by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century landowning classes everywhere – demographic ones thrown up by great fecundity and specific property and inheritance regimes, the ‘bourgeois’ assault of the nineteenth century, and the legal ending of servile labour, the last of which was arguably the most profound revolution in the nineteenth-century world. The longevity of this landed class, then, cannot be taken for granted. Rather, it requires historical explanation, the second subject of this book.

This historical explanation is of necessity rooted in the study of conflicts and contradictions generated by the twin processes outlined above – the making of a landed slave-owning class and the subjugation of an indigenous population. The interplay between the challenges faced by landed classes everywhere and those that were presented in a colonial setting produced a historically specific institution, the settler colonial state. The colonial state, the third subject and central theme of much of this book, was not an unchanging institution. Like the landed and subordinate classes to which it was related, the colonial state had to be made. It was a complex web of shifting alliances, shot through with contradictions and punctuated by crises.⁷

II

In some ways, this view of a durable and successful landowning class is reflected in recent scholarly literature on the Cape Colony. Here, from the enclave occupied by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in the middle of the seventeenth century, so the story goes, settler farming developed along a gradual, cataclysm-free road to capitalist agriculture. Despite initial setbacks, the obstacles presented by nature were soon overcome. In the southwestern Cape, a classic ‘Mediterranean’ complex of wheat and wine, was well suited to a region endowed with abundant winter rainfall. In the arid interior an extensive pastoral culture made determined progress against nature and an indigenous population. The knowledge that was acquired from the latter ironically made both processes possible. Despite heroic resistance from the indigenous Khoisan and largely uncoordinated and individualised acts of resistance

from the slave population, settler farming won the day. European settlers failed to accumulate anywhere near the wealth of their counterparts in, say, the United States, but when the eighteenth century is viewed from the perspective of both the individual farmer and the Cape economy as a whole, then it is clear that settler agriculture was far from stagnant or moribund. This was a dynamic agrarian economy, tied to world markets for agricultural commodities and capable of generating sufficient capital to sustain a lively slave trade fed from the Indian Ocean.⁸

In periodic episodes in the course of the eighteenth century, the main beneficiaries of this trajectory, the 'Cape gentry', made assaults on the power of the state, the monopolistic VOC. The Company won most of these battles, but growing weaker over time, was forced to accommodate to the power of this increasingly confident landed class. Under Dutch rule, the Cape gentry never did capture the state, but it was clear by the second half of the eighteenth century that it was they who ruled the countryside. With their retinues of slaves and dominance of the main organs of local judicial and military power they stamped their authority on those below them, black and white. At the time that they had to face their greatest crisis – the legislated ending of slavery – 'the pre-eminence of the gentry within Cape society had been established'.⁹

In this orthodoxy, the Cape gentry, unlike so many other slaveholding classes, survived the great crisis of the nineteenth century almost unscathed. They had done well under British rule, established for the first time in 1795 and more permanently in 1806. After emancipation, and from the middle of the nineteenth century with greater access to the coercive apparatus of the state, former slave-owners continued to farm their estates successfully at the expense of a divided, dependent, impoverished and alcohol-addicted labour force. Emancipation was a 'non-event' and 'class relations in the countryside remained more or less stagnant'. In short, the dominance of the gentry 'lasted, more or less, ever since'.¹⁰

Put another way, the former slave-owners were 'Junkers': an ancient landed ruling class set on the Prussian model that had successfully transformed itself into a modern agrarian bourgeoisie. Such classes are by their nature reactionary and their centrality to the making of modern political formations has long been recognised.¹¹ It was arguably their

hold over state power – the persistence of the ‘old regime’ – and their continued exercise of cultural hegemony through the nineteenth century that led Europe into the catastrophic Great War of 1914–18.¹² Even in the case of that perennial exception, England, with its supposedly ‘open elite’ and endlessly adaptable ruling class, the Victorian era ‘gave legitimacy to antimodern sentiments’.¹³ Similarly, in the plantation ‘black belt’ of the southern United States, some have argued, the continued hold over land and the machinery of the state by former slave-owners in the aftermath of the Civil War explains the racist violence and relative backwardness of the southern states. The ‘New South’ in this view was not new at all; the South, instead, had chosen the ‘Prussian road’ to modernity.¹⁴ And in South Africa, too, scholars have found a model in the ‘Prussian road’.¹⁵ In this view, agricultural and mineral capital allied to form the reactionary power bloc that came to power in 1948. The Prussian marriage of ‘iron and rye’ had ‘its South African counterpart in the uneasy union of “gold and maize”’.¹⁶ The consequence was apartheid – a downward spiral of authoritarian repression and violence coupled with extraordinary (if dysfunctional and ultimately unsustainable) economic growth.¹⁷

III

And indeed, there is much to commend this schema. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, as we have seen, the owners of the Cape’s grand estates take pride in showing off their inheritance. They are the lineal descendants of the Cape gentry. Their ancestors were active participants in the social movements of Afrikaner nationalism. The forebears of no less a figure than Jan Christiaan Smuts, white South Africa’s premier statesman in the first half of the twentieth century, lived in the Swartland region of Malmesbury district from 1786. They occupied the main family farm in 1818 and kept it for a span of six generations until 1946.¹⁸

It will become clear in this book, however, that this view of perpetuity does not hold up to closer scrutiny. The Cape gentry *did* survive the crisis of emancipation, but the manner in which landed classes retained title to land is at least as important as whether or not they did so. For

classes, including landed ones, rarely remain unchanged. The original Junkers were no exception. The severe agrarian crisis of the 1820s, brought on by falling grain prices following the Napoleonic Wars, led to the radical transformation in the social basis of estate agriculture. Those heavily indebted simply went bankrupt, and by 1829 only 42.6 per cent of estates in East Prussia were with the same families as held them in 1806.¹⁹ The chief beneficiaries of such transfers were non-nobles, 'less dominated by tradition, more willing to introduce new agricultural methods, and above all, equipped with fresh capital'.²⁰ By the end of the crisis, a new, reconstituted landowning class – an 'embourgeoisied' nobility – had come into existence.²¹ It was this new class that led the way in the transformation of Prussian agriculture. Most importantly, they broke down the traditional paternalistic bonds that existed between lords and peasants and paved the way for the breakthrough to capitalist agriculture.

A similar process occurred in the postbellum American South. Here the retention of title to land was no indicator of a 'Prussian path'. The inability of southern planters to command credit and capital led to an accommodation with merchants. Many were able to hold on to their land in the wake of the destruction of the Civil War only by heavily mortgaging their landed property to merchant-creditors. Those planters who survived and prospered became entrepreneurs, to whom land was just one investment in a wide-ranging portfolio. Slave-ownership, in other words, no longer formed the basis of their economic and social power.²² The old landed classes of the plantation 'black belt' had undergone a 'bourgeois metamorphosis'.²³ As a class without slaves, the old southern elite was bereft of political power at the level of the new national state.²⁴

Nor does the South African Highveld correspond to a 'Prussian' model. As Timothy Keegan has shown, landlords here were, in the wake of the mineral discoveries of the late nineteenth century, 'more likely to be victims of South Africa's industrial revolution than amongst its beneficiaries'.²⁵ The most successful and progressive farmers of the early twentieth century were for the most part 'new men' – in the case of the Highveld, new settlers of Cape or British origin, or those merchants, lawyers or businessmen who gained a stake in agriculture through the vehicle of mortgage capital.²⁶ And Helen Bradford has further shown that 'mortgage debt had a considerable impact on the

process of class formation in South Africa' by separating farmers from the land.²⁷ The coercive and brutal nature of labour relations on the Highveld was as much the result of the penetration of agriculture by external sources of capital – mineral and merchant capital – as of anything else.²⁸

Similar processes were at work in Cape Colony. It is worth drawing on one example. In 1849, little more than a decade after final emancipation in 1838, Middelkraal, a Malmesbury district farm once worked by slaves, passed into the hands of Johan Andries Heyse Wicht, parliamentarian, moneylender and slumlord of mid-nineteenth century Cape Town.²⁹ Between 1883 and 1897 Middelkraal was farmed by Hendrik Gideon Greeff, not in his own right, but as the insolvent tenant of the merchant firm of the brothers Stephan.³⁰ By 1946, Fredrik Christoffel Rust, the farm's subsequent owner, could count amongst his assets one hundred shares of the *Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy* (SANTAM), that prime vehicle for the mobilisation of Afrikaner savings to the nationalist cause. The road from slavery to *volkskapitalisme* was clearly not linear.³¹

The history of Middelkraal illuminates a number of points made in this book. There was no vector-like path from slave-owner to successful modern capitalist farmer. Viewed over time, agriculture and landed wealth were fundamentally unstable. Capital accumulation was a hard business and it was rare for families to retain and expand the capital accumulated in the years before emancipation through to the twentieth century. And most importantly, the seeds of transformation were to be found not within the agrarian economy, but with agents outside – in this particular case, English merchant capital. The nineteenth-century Cape, this study proposes, witnessed a thoroughgoing revolution in productive relations. To survive the crisis of emancipation required profound adjustments from the landowning class. These adjustments are the subject of Chapters Three and Four. More often than not, the adjustments were forced on the former slave-owners – firstly by their freed slaves and secondly by English-speaking merchants. The freed slaves of the Cape Colony, like freed slaves almost everywhere, resisted attempts to resurrect labour relations akin to slavery. They left their former owners in large numbers and cherished their new-found mobility. The outcome was a wage-labour regime that squeezed margins of profitability and encouraged a rapid turnover of landed wealth.

It should be clear that the processes discussed above can only be fully illuminated by detailed study of the internal dynamics of the agrarian economy. Output figures tell one story, but they do not reveal anything about how surplus was extracted, about the vicissitudes of individual establishments, and about rates of profit and loss. As Susan Newton-King has shown in her study of the Colony's north-eastern frontier, a micro-economic study from *within* a particular economy tells a story radically different from macro-economic studies based on averages and aggregates.³²

One of the largest obstacles to this approach is the absence of farm records.³³ J.S. Marais noted nearly seven decades ago that the records of bankruptcy proceedings would bring rich rewards. He was correct. Marais deserves special mention.³⁴ Virtually alone amongst modern historians of South Africa, he has hinted at the long-term negative impact of emancipation on slaveholder wealth and the radical changes initiated by emancipation. 'The brunt of the burden of emancipation was placed upon the backs of the slave-owners,' he wrote.³⁵ Marais could just as well have been writing of his successors when he wrote of those who had gone before: 'Recent South African historians have shown a tendency to believe that whatever the sufferings of individual slave-owners may have been, the community as a whole did not suffer even in the years immediately following emancipation. It cannot be said that they have established their contention.'³⁶ But Marais's suspicions were, by his own admission, based on 'scraps of evidence'.³⁷ Hence he saw the need for an 'intensive study' based on the records of bankrupt estates.³⁸

This book, then, has heeded Marais's advice. It has made extensive use of this vast body of hitherto almost unused records. As with similar records for the British Caribbean,³⁹ they have been immensely revealing. But as is the case with all historical sources, they are not without their problems. They present historians with challenges similar to those presented by the records of deceased estates (wills, household inventories, receipts of credit and debt and so forth). 'Even at its very best,' writes one historian who has employed such records in the United States, 'an inventory is but the still life of an enterprise, farm, or household stopped in time . . . frozen at the moment of death.'⁴⁰

The records of insolvent estates are similarly snapshots of one moment in time. Furthermore, they are, by definition, of a specific type of farming establishment: one that had failed. It will become clear

in the course of this book, however, that insolvency was a routine event in the history of a great many farms. It was, in other words, a typical experience. In the fieldcornetcy of Mosselbanks Rivier, a wheat-farming area studied here in great detail, virtually every farm experienced bankruptcy at some point in the course of the nineteenth century. The records of insolvent estates thus have at least as much utility as those of deceased estates, used to such great effect for earlier periods in the Colony's history.⁴¹ Far from providing static pictures, the records of insolvent estates provide glimpses into the histories of individual estates at numerous points in time. In the case of the Mosselbanks Rivier farm Middelburg, for example, we have records for every point at which the farm witnessed insolvency: 1844, 1870, 1877, 1884 and 1909.

Ideas about the continuity of landowning classes have largely been assumed. The history of landownership has hitherto not been subjected to any detailed empirical investigation, another contribution which this study seeks to make. The records of land transfer (and their associated mortgage bonds) have been essential to this enterprise. These under-utilised records are of fundamental importance to understanding of the social and economic transformations of Cape colonial society. They tell us a great deal about the 'persistence' of the former slave-owners, about the spatial dimensions of the credit market and, when married with the records of insolvent estates, about the cultural values attached to land and credit.

Such records are best used when confined to individual localities. Although this study draws on material from many regions in the Colony, it studies two fieldcornetcies, the smallest administrative units in the Colony, in some detail. These are the fieldcornetcies of Mosselbanks Rivier and Moddergat, situated in the districts of Malmesbury and Stellenbosch, and representative of wheat- and wine-farming areas respectively. At the time of emancipation both areas were regions of wealthy slave-owners, closely tied to the market in Cape Town.

IV

It is a major shortcoming of the existing literature on the Cape that it fails to situate the crisis of the nineteenth century within a longer and

broader history of the colony's landed classes.⁴² For the challenges and repeated crises of the nineteenth century were mediated through institutions created and moulded in the eighteenth century. To understand how the crises of the nineteenth century were managed requires an understanding of the cultural values of the slave-owning society of the eighteenth century. It is also to understand the nature of the Cape gentry's rule. This is in large part the subject of Chapter One.

This study develops the concept of a 'moral community' to understand the nature of rule by the Cape gentry.⁴³ Few in Cape colonial society could stand outside the boundaries of such a community. Although the use of the term 'gentry' implies a society fractured along lines of class, it should be noted that these divisions were muted by ties of patronage, kinship and marriage. In the Cape, as elsewhere in the pre-capitalist rural world, community 'did not ordinarily involve or evoke harmonious or egalitarian relations; more often than not it was marked by multiple hierarchies, harsh regimens, and nasty legitimating sanctions'.⁴⁴ The moral community governed many aspects of rural life, including, as we shall see in Chapter One, the ways in which slaves and servants were treated. Community membership brought rewards, but it also imposed certain forms of behaviour. A most important aspect of community life, of course, was the circulation of land and wealth.

In this regard, Cape landlords constructed a durable political economy in which the rules governing the circulation of land and wealth were defined in community and familial terms, not dictated by an informal market over which they had little control. Although slaveholders had of necessity to participate in a market economy, it was their membership of a moral community that protected them against the sometimes detrimental consequences of participation in that economy. A sense of community bound individuals to an intricate web of obligations and expectations, of which the lending of money was perhaps the most public manifestation. To poorer members of this society, money was loaned in accordance with strict moral rules. At times of crisis, however, such community values came under immense strain.

Few crises were more severe than the emancipation of slaves and it was at precisely this time that the slaveholders' values came under determined ideological attack. Colonial merchants stood at the forefront of this assault. The penetration of the Cape countryside by merchant

capital under the banner of 'free trade' is discussed in Chapter Five. For most of the nineteenth century the Colony's merchant class attempted to free colonial agriculture from the hold of the moral economy of the former slaveholders. To a very large extent they were successful. But the Colony's landowning classes proved highly adaptable. In coming to terms with merchant capital, the Cape gentry, as a class, was reconstituted. They did so partly by taking on the values of merchant capital and partly by political mobilisation. Through their main political party, the Afrikaner *Bond*, they sought to control the state.

In some ways these adaptations to a bourgeois economy were made easier by the fact that the Cape gentry had accommodated to British rule as far back as the end of the eighteenth century. The British government found in the urban and rural Dutch elite, as Anthony Atmore and Shula Marks were first to point out, a class of willing and enthusiastic 'local collaborators'.⁴⁵ This was a mutually beneficial partnership that reached its apogee during the governorship of Lord Charles Somerset of the 1820s. The British government of occupation had little wish to commit substantial resources to staffing the colonial bureaucracy of this expanding colony. In return for acquiescence in British rule, the Dutch elite enjoyed great prosperity. At times prosperity came through simple theft from the coffers of the colonial state. More widely, however, it came through the British government's protection and support of the local wine industry. The gentry held on to their slaves and continued to rule. In remote districts the presence of the British military ensured that the frontiers of conquest would not be rolled back.

But for the Cape gentry, the fruits of British rule were bitter-sweet. The consequences, as discussed in Chapter Two, were mired in contradiction. As a result of slavery, the alliance between gentry and the British colonial government was presented with its greatest challenge. The slaves themselves forced the question of slavery into centre stage. Under pressure from radical evangelical agitation, and with clear evidence that slaves in the western hemisphere had imbibed the ideology of the 'age of revolution', the British government sought to reform slavery through its amelioration programme. Coupled with this was the fact that missionaries brought the sorry state of the indigenous population to the knowledge of metropolitan authorities.

By inserting itself into the relationship between master and slave, the colonial state irrevocably altered the institution of slavery. The slaves at the Cape responded to new legal opportunities with alacrity, as scores made their way to courts across the Colony to seek redress for a wide array of real and perceived violations of their rights in law. In 1825 the Colony was shaken to its foundation when a group of slaves in the remote district of Worcester attempted to throw off the shackles of their bondage. The alliance between the British colonial state and its collaborators verged on collapse. It was saved by the gentry's realisation that the slave economy was terminally ill.

Even in this profound crisis, one that threatened to take away the very basis of their existence, the Cape gentry accommodated to British rule. They would do so repeatedly in the course of the nineteenth century. Each accommodation required varying adaptations; each resulted in a reconstituted ruling class; and each reaffirmed and ensured the continued basis of colonial rule. But this form of colonial rule would not survive the end of the nineteenth century. It fell apart dramatically in the midst of the South African War as the descendants of slaves and Khoisan, now soldiers of the British imperial army, were able to turn on their erstwhile masters. As an imperialist war turned into a civil war, the Colony's labouring population once again placed themselves at the centre of colonial relations, a presence they had enjoyed since the birth of this colonial society.

Notes

1. A. Mountain, *An Unsung Heritage: Perspectives on Slavery* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004), p. 181.
2. Mountain, *An Unsung Heritage*, pp. 181, 184.
3. H. Fransen (ed.), *A Cape Camera: The Architectural Beauty of the Old Cape, Photographs from the Arthur Elliot Collection in the Cape Archives* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2000), pp. 131, 135
4. Fransen, *A Cape Camera*, p. 135.
5. Mountain, *An Unsung Heritage*, p. 182.
6. Mountain, *An Unsung Heritage*, pp. 181–6.
7. Much has been written about the colonial state, but I continue to be guided by J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, 'Coping with the Contradictions: the Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1914', *Journal of African History*, 20, 1979, pp. 487–507.

8. See especially, R. Ross, *Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); 'The Rise of the Cape Gentry', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 9, 1983, pp. 193–217; '“Rather Mental than Physical”: Emancipations and the Cape Economy', in N. Worden and C. Crais (eds.), *Breaking the Chains: Slavery and its Legacy in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge, 1983); 'The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652–1835', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds.), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1840* (2nd edition, Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1989). For a view of the slaveholding economy that stresses its dynamism but is more hesitant to draw such straight lines, see N. Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 19–40, 64–85. For Susan Newton-King's appreciation of the wretched poverty of the pastoral economy of the interior, see notes 32 and 41.
9. Ross, 'Rise of the Cape Gentry', p. 194.
10. Ross, *Beyond the Pale*, pp. 44, 217; Ross, '“Rather Mental than Physical”: Emancipation and the Cape Economy', esp. pp. 161–6; Ross, 'Rise of the Cape Gentry', p. 217. Nigel Worden also stresses the continuity of dependence of labouring classes between the pre- and post-emancipation periods; 'Adjusting to Emancipation: Freed Slaves and Farmers in mid-nineteenth-century South-Western Cape', in W.G. James and M. Simons (eds.), *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989). Although J.N.C. Marincowitz has demonstrated the scale of movement of freed slaves to mission stations, he too has emphasised the continued dependence of many freed slaves and the continued labour-intensive nature of the wheat economy; 'Rural Production and Labour in the Western Cape, 1838–1888, with Special Reference to the Wheat Growing Districts', Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1985.
11. B. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
12. The most extreme statement of this view is in A.J. Mayer's *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Croom Helm, 1981).
13. M.J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1890* (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 7.
14. Contrast C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951) with J. Wiener, 'Planter-Merchant Conflict in Reconstruction Alabama', *Past and Present*, 68, 1975, 73–92; 'Class Structure and Economic Development in the American South, 1865–1955', *American Historical Review*, 84, 1979, 970–92; *Social Origins of the New South: Alabama, 1865–1885* (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1978). See also C.A. Shifflett, *Patronage and Poverty in the Tobacco South: Louisa County, Virginia, 1860–1900* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982).
15. M.L. Morris, 'The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture: Class Struggle in the Countryside', *Economy and Society*, 5, 1976, esp. pp. 309–10.
16. S. Trapido, 'South Africa in a Comparative Study of Industrialization', *Journal of Development Studies*, 7, 1971, pp. 309–20.
17. Robert Shell has gone so far as to seek in South African slavery the origins of apartheid. He points to the 'striking similarities' between the economic and demographic structures of Cape slavery and apartheid and is concerned to find out

- how the 'demographic structures [of slavery] endure[d] so stubbornly.' See R.C.H. Shell, *Children of Bondage: A Social History of the Slave Society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652–1838* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), pp. xix–xx. For an effective critique of this view, see T. Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1996), p. 297 (note 30).
18. W.K. Hancock, *Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 4, 562 (notes 2 and 4).
 19. R.M. Berdahl, *The Politics of the Prussian Nobility: The Development of a Conservative Ideology 1770–1848* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 275.
 20. Berdahl, *The Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, p. 282.
 21. Berdahl, *The Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, pp. 279–86; see also H. Schissler, 'The Junkers: Notes on the Social Significance of the Agrarian Elite in Prussia', in R.G. Moëller (ed.), *Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany: Recent Studies in Agricultural History* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
 22. B.J. Fields, 'The Advent of Capitalist Agriculture: the New South in a Bourgeois World' in T. Glymph and J.J. Kushma (eds.), *Essays on the Postbellum Southern Economy* (Arlington, Texas: A & M University Press, 1985), p. 81; H.D. Woodman, 'The Reconstruction of the Cotton Plantation in the New South', in Glymph and Kushma (eds.), *Essays*, p. 111.
 23. S. Hahn, 'Class and State in Post-emancipation Societies: Southern Planters in Comparative Perspective', *American Historical Review*, 95, 1990, p. 85.
 24. Hahn, 'Class and State', p. 92.
 25. T.J. Keegan, *Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986), p. 196.
 26. Keegan, *Rural Transformations*, p. 197; H. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa 1924–1930* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987), pp. 29–31; J. Krikler, *Revolution from Above, Rebellion from Below: The Agrarian Transvaal at the Turn of the Century* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 90.
 27. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom*, p. 27.
 28. H. Bradford, 'Highways, Byways, and Culs-de-Sacs: the Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in Revisionist South African History', *Radical History Review*, 46/7, 1990, pp. 59–88, esp. p. 84.
 29. DO, Transfer Deed no. 1583, 1 November 1849. On Wicht, see Ross, *Beyond the Pale*, p. 53.
 30. DO, Transfer Deed no. 863, 18 April 1853; Transfer Deed no. 345, 21 December 1883; Transfer Deed no. 2033, 18 March 1897.
 31. DO, Transfer Deed no. 6423, filed 10 May 1950. Rust's will of 1946 is attached. On *volkskapitalisme* and SANTAM see D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934–48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 98–101.
 32. S. Newton-King, *Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760–1803* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 152.
 33. Detailed records of only one farm are known to be extant, and a study of those records has shown how atypical that farm was; E.A. Host, 'Capitalisation and Proletarianization on a Western Cape Farm: Klaver Valley, 1812–1898', M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992.
 34. J.S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652–1937* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand

University Press, 1968; first published 1939), esp. pp. 188–215. This great book has been much underappreciated, probably because of Marais's 'liberal' credentials. Marais described himself as an 'Afrikaner nurtured in the tradition of a western-Cape farm'. *Cape Coloured People*, p. viii. *The Cape Coloured People*, as Christopher Saunders has noted, was a pioneering account of previously neglected subjects in the history of the Cape Colony but 'it was mainly a study of white policy towards people of colour, not of their history from within'. C. Saunders, *The Making of the South African Past: Major Historians on Race and Class* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988), pp. 116–17. True as this may be, Marais's genius was not merely to bring neglected subjects to the foreground, but to show, through a study grounded in detailed empirical investigation and freed from an agenda set by English-speaking missionaries, that the main themes and processes of early South African history could not be understood without allowing slaves and indigenous peoples to occupy centre stage. *The Cape Coloured People*, then, is not a history of 'Cape Coloured people', but quite simply a history of the Cape Colony. For an appreciation of another of Marais's studies, see Newton-King, *Masters and Servants*, p. 9.

35. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, p. 188.
36. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, p. 190.
37. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, p. 189.
38. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, p. 188.
39. See K.M. Butler, *The Economics of Emancipation: Jamaica and Barbados, 1823–1843* (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
40. W. Rothenberg, 'Farm Account Books: Problems and Possibilities', *Agricultural History*, 58, 1984, p. 106.
41. See Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa*, esp. pp. 64–84; Guelke, 'Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1652–1780', in Elphick and Giliomee (eds.), *Shaping; Shell, Children of Bondage*, esp. pp. 85–134; and especially Newton-King, *Masters and Servants*, pp. 150–209.
42. John Edwin Mason's understanding of emancipation, for example, is rooted in an analysis of the preceding two decades; *Social Death and Resurrection: Slavery and Emancipation in South Africa* (London: University of Virginia Press, 2003).
43. For my earlier use of this concept, see W. Dooling, *Law and Community in a Slave Society: Stellenbosch District, South Africa c.1760–1820* (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1992), esp. pp. 22–3.
44. S. Hahn, *A Nation under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (London: Belknap, 2003), p. 33.
45. A. Atmore and S. Marks, 'The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 3, 1974, esp. pp. 110–11.