

'The 1988 famine was a dress rehearsal for Darfur. Many of the same groups and persons who benefited from the famine Keen describes are benefiting from the crisis in Darfur today; many of the same constraints that prevented an effective international response then still impede action now... For these reasons *The Benefits of Famine* is as relevant to understanding the ongoing war in Darfur as it is to understanding the recently ended civil war.' – Douglas H. Johnson, author of *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, from the Foreword to this first paperback edition

Reviews

'...the most comprehensive and convincing account to date of how a famine is created and why. It sets a standard for analytical cogency and empirical investigation that has rarely been equalled in this field.' – Alex de Waal in *Development and Change*

'...the book is extremely important. It reaches conclusions that seem eminently supported by its argument and evidence and that, in many ways, run counter to the preconceptions and practices of those engaged in relief at the policy level...In addition, the book also helps to illuminate the complexity of the politics and ethnic violence of the Sudan, which is much more intricate than the simplistic media coverage in the West usually suggests...he is surely right to believe that dispassionate analysis, taking into account that there are beneficiaries as well as victims, is a step forward in our understanding of famine and, thus, in our ability to prevent it or ameliorate its effects. He deserves our thanks and admiration for having the strength to write this book.'

– James Cobbe in *Studies in Comparative International Development*

'David Keen's important book brings famine and famine relief into the forefront of concerns in international politics and contributes to the debate about humanitarian intervention. He argues that to see famine as a disaster, whether of a natural or an economic kind, is to accept an agenda set largely by those who benefit from the famine process. In a similar way, treating the 'humanitarian' sphere as separate from the political plays, unwittingly, into the hands of the exploiters...Keen's study...clearly calls into question what is taken as self-evident in famine studies and puts forward a new and challenging analysis.' – Jenny Edkins in *Political Studies*

'Keen has done a marvellous job of exposing powerful local, national, and international actors who have variously manipulated the famine tragedy in the Sudan to serve their narrow self-interests...The unusual strength of this book is the way in which the author has skilfully demonstrated how different regimes in Khartoum exploited Western security perceptions in the region for their own political and strategic ends. Amidst Cold War politics, aid donors feared that linking relief aid with progress on peace negotiations and human rights, might have produced a backlash against their vital security interests in the region. This belief encouraged Khartoum to define unilaterally the relief problem and how to solve it and, in due course, to pass judgment on its own effort.' – *Choice*

'This thoroughly researched and well-written book is essential reading not only for all who deal with famine relief and disaster management but also for students of public health, the social sciences, and rural development. The lucid and coherent discussion, free of jargon, repetition, and doom, provides interesting reading of an inherently complex subject.' – *The Lancet*

EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES

Revealing Prophets

Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON
& DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON

*East African Expressions
of Christianity*

Edited by THOMAS SPEAR
& ISARIA N. KIMAMBO

The Poor Are Not Us

Edited by DAVID M. ANDERSON
& VIGDIS BROCH-DUE

Potent Brews

JUSTIN WILLIS

Swahili Origins

JAMES DE VERE ALLEN

Being Maasai

Edited by THOMAS SPEAR
& RICHARD WALLER

Jua Kali Kenya

KENNETH KING

Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya

BRUCE BERMAN

Unhappy Valley

Book One: State & Class
Book Two: Violence
& Ethnicity
BRUCE BERMAN
& JOHN LONSDALE

Mau Mau from Below

GREET KERSHAW

The Mau Mau War

in Perspective
FRANK FUREDI

Squatters & the Roots

of Mau Mau 1905–63
TABITHA KANOGO

Economic & Social Origins

of Mau Mau 1945–53
DAVID W. THROUP

Multi-Party Politics in Kenya

DAVID W. THROUP
& CHARLES HORNSBY

Empire State-Building

JOANNA LEWIS

Decolonization & Independence

in Kenya 1940–93
Edited by B.A. OOGOT
& WILLIAM R. OCHIENG'

Eroding the Commons

DAVID ANDERSON

Penetration & Protest in Tanzania

ISARIA N. KIMAMBO

Custodians of the Land

Edited by GREGORY MADDOX, JAMES
L. GIBLIN & ISARIA N. KIMAMBO

Education in the Development

of Tanzania 1919–1990
LENE BUCHERT

The Second Economy in Tanzania

T.L. MALIYAMKONO
& M.S.D. BAGACHWA

Ecology Control & Economic Development

in East African History

HELGE KJEKSHUS

Siaya

DAVID WILLIAM COHEN
& E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO

Uganda Now • Changing Uganda

Developing Uganda • From Chaos to Order
Religion & Politics in East Africa
Edited by HOLGER BERTN HANSEN
& MICHAEL TWADDLE

Kakungulu & the Creation

of Uganda 1868–1928
MICHAEL TWADDLE

Controlling Anger

SUZETTE HEALD

Kampala Women Getting By

SANDRA WALLMAN

Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda

RICHARD J. REID

Alice Lakavena & the Holy Spirits

HEIKE BEHREND

Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar

ABDUL SHERIFF

Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule

Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF &
ED FERGUSON

The History & Conservation of Zanzibar

Stone Town
Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF

Pastimes & Politics

LAURA FAIR

Ethnicity & Conflict in

the Horn of Africa
Edited by KATSUYOSHI FUKUI
& JOHN MARKAKIS

Conflict, Age & Power in

North East Africa
Edited by EISEI KURIMOTO
& SIMON SIMONSE

Property Rights & Political

Development in Ethiopia & Eritrea
SANDRA FULLERTON JOIREMAN

Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia

OYVIND M. EIDE

Brothers at War

TEKESTE NEGASH &
KJETIL TRONVOLL

From Guerrillas to Government

DAVID POOL

Mau Mau & Nationhood

Edited by E.S. ATIENO ODHIAMBO
& JOHN LONSDALE

A History of Modern Ethiopia,

1855–1991
(2nd edn) BAHRU ZEWDE
Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia
BAHRU ZEWDE

Remapping Ethiopia

Edited by W. JAMES, D. DONHAM,
E. KURIMOTO & A. TRIULZI

Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia

Edited by DONALD L. DONHAM
& WENDY JAMES

A Modern History of the Somali

(4th edn)
I.M. LEWIS

Islands of Intensive Agriculture in

East Africa
Edited by MATS WIDGREN
& JOHN E.G. SUTTON

Leaf of Allah

EZEKIEL GEBISSA

Dhows & the Colonial Economy

of Zanzibar 1860–1970
ERIK GILBERT

African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya

TABITHA KANOGO

African Underclass

ANDREW BURTON

In Search of a Nation

Edited by GREGORY H. MADDOX
& JAMES L. GIBLIN

A History of the Excluded

JAMES L. GIBLIN

Black Poachers, White Hunters

EDWARD I. STEINHART

Ethnic Federalism

DAVID TURTON

Crisis & Decline in Bunyoro

SHANE DOYLE

Emancipation without Abolition in

German East Africa
JAN-GEORG DEUTSCH

Women, Work & Domestic

Virtue in Uganda 1900–2003
GRACE BANTEBYA KYOMUHENDO &
MARJORIE KENISTON McINTOSH

Cultivating Success in Uganda

GRACE CARSWELL

War in Pre-Colonial

Eastern Africa
RICHARD REID

Slavery in the Great Lakes Region

of East Africa
Edited by HENRI MÉDARD &
SHANE DOYLE

THE BENEFITS OF FAMINE

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAMINE
AND RELIEF IN
SOUTHWESTERN SUDAN, 1983–1989

David Keen

*Professor of Complex Emergencies
London School of Economics
& Political Science*

JAMES CURREY PUBLISHERS
OXFORD

OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESS
ATHENS

James Currey Ltd
73 Botley Road
Oxford OX2 0BS
www.jamescurrey.co.uk

Ohio University Press
19 Circle Drive
The Ridges
Athens OH 45701-2979

© David Keen 1994 & 2008
First published by Princeton University Press 1994
First paperback edition
with new forward 2008

ISBN 978-1-84701-314-9 (James Currey paper)
ISBN 10: 0-8214-1822-x (Ohio University Press paper)
ISBN 13: 0-8214-1822-2 (Ohio University Press paper)

British Library Cataloging in Publication Data

Keen, David, 1958–

The benefits of famine : a political economy of famine and relief in southwestern Suddan, 1983-1989. - (Eastern African studies)

1. Famines - Political aspects - Sudan 2. Sudan - Politics and government - 1985-

I. Title

363.S'096294

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
available on request

Typeset in 10/12 pt Adobe Caledonia
by Long House, Cumbria
Printed and bound in Great Britain at the
University Press, Cambridge

Contents

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>List of Tables</i>	viii
<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xiii
<i>Foreword to the First Paperback Edition</i>	xv
<i>Introduction to the First Paperback Edition</i>	xvii
Chapter 1. Overview	3
<i>Conception of Famine: Its Nature and Causes</i>	3
<i>“Policy Failure”: What Does it Mean?</i>	8
<i>The Uses of Famine: An Analytic Framework</i>	11
Chapter 2. Famine and Exploitation in Historical Perspective	18
<i>From the Mid-1820s to the Mid-1920s: The Political and Economic Roots of Directly Human-Made Famine</i>	20
<i>From the Early 1920s to the Late 1950s: The Construction of Protection against Famine</i>	31
<i>From the Late 1950s to the Late 1980s: The Breakdown of Protection against Famine</i>	36
Chapter 3. Victims and Beneficiaries: A Case Study of Famine as a Combination of Exploitative Processes	76
<i>Decline in Assets and Production</i>	78
<i>Failure of Market Strategies</i>	109
<i>Failure of Nonmarket Strategies</i>	125
Chapter 4. The Inadequacy of Relief: A “Policy Success” for Powerful Groups in Sudan?	129
<i>The Inadequacy of Relief</i>	129
<i>Causes and Functions of Inadequate Relief</i>	135

vi CONTENTS

Chapter 5. The Inadequacy of Relief: The Role of International Donors	173
<i>The Strategic Context</i>	174
<i>Donors' Unwillingness to Move Beyond Government Definitions of the Relief Problem</i>	175
<i>Donors' Lack of Attention to Implementation of Relief Programs, Once Initiated</i>	187
<i>Donors' Unwillingness to Address the Conflict Underpinning the Famine</i>	196
<i>Broader Agendas and More Effective Relief in 1989</i>	
<i>Obstruction of Relief after Mid-1989</i>	204
Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions	211
<i>Reflections on the Famine</i>	211
<i>The Disintegration of Sudan?</i>	215
<i>Benefits of Famine: Beyond the Case Study</i>	224
<i>Policy Implications</i>	230
Notes	239
Bibliography	261
Primary Sources	261
Secondary Sources	267
Index	279

List of Illustrations

Maps

1	Sudan, with Area under Study	4
2	Some Tribes (Underlined) and Peoples of Southwestern Sudan	21
3	Dry Season Migration Routes of Messiriya and Dinka	61
4	Railway and Towns within the Famine Area	81
5	Normalized Vegetation Index for Sudan: Range of Variation as Percentage of Historical Average, 1981–1986	82
6	Overview of Famine Area Showing Location of Various Groups	83
7	Normalized Vegetation Index for Sudan: Percentage Increase or Decrease, 1985 to 1986	85
8	Movement of Dinka Cattle from South to North	99
9	Cattle Concentrations in Southwestern Sudan	103
10	Some Grain Prices in Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, May 1988	113

Figures

1	Forced Markets in Abyei Area Council	110
2	Impact of Restriction of Relief on Markets in Abyei Area Council	149

List of Tables

1	Relief to Bahr el Ghazal, 1986–1989	130
2	Relief by Region, 1986–1987	137
3	Relief by Region, January 1–September 9, 1988	138
4	Relief by Train to Aweil, 1987–1988	142
5	Relief and Political Representation by Region, 1986–1987	151
6	Western Relief Operation Allocations within Kordofan, Late 1987–Early 1988	156
7	Government Relief Allocations within Kordofan, 1988	157

Preface

MY FIRST field trip—to Khartoum and Darfur—was in June to August 1987. This self-funded research provided important background information on conditions in the north, and helped highlight the degree to which relief operations were vulnerable to political manipulation at the local level. I returned to Sudan in October to December 1988, close to the height of the famine. As a research consultant with Nexus Evaluations, UK, my main brief was to investigate the famine in southern Sudan, southern Darfur, and southern Kordofan and the effectiveness of international efforts to relieve it. I was also responsible for investigating the efficacy of aid to the west under the Western Relief Operation, something that yielded important insights about the relationship between the two sets of relief operations. I was able to interview a range of officials, aid staff, and “ordinary” Sudanese in southern Kordofan and southern Darfur, including many people from Bahr el Ghazal. I also conducted interviews with aid staff, government officials, and displaced people in Khartoum. I have drawn extensively on a wide range of secondary written materials available in England, as well as a range of aid agency documentation from British, Irish, and French Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in particular. My research also benefited from a visit to UN headquarters in New York in the summer of 1990.

Famines accompanying civil war present particular obstacles to research. At the time when I visited camps in southern Kordofan in late 1988, people from Bahr el Ghazal were prepared to be interviewed only inside their huts (and sometimes only at night), where security guards could not see them. The killing of five people inside the Muglad camp in April 1989 was evidence that people’s fears were justified. Those who spoke to me were nevertheless determined that their stories be heard. This book draws on their accounts and written evidence to document a human disaster that was never fully acknowledged at the time, and is already being forgotten.

Pointing out a number of specific massacres of Dinka in southwestern Sudan but downplaying the general devastation of the Dinka, a Sudan specialist at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute has written:

A cynical observer might consider this situation an acceptable level of low intensity violence because of the long-standing tradition of sporadic tribal warfare between the Dinka in southwest Sudan and the adjacent Rizeigat and Messiriyah tribes. In this context, even the occurrence of three unusually large

X PREFACE

massacres of Dinka in March, August and September [1987] was not entirely surprising, although they were dutifully deplored by both parties. The term “acceptable level of violence” could not be used to characterize another event that left deep psychological scars among many [the writer then refers to the SPLA’s shooting down of a civilian airliner at Malakal] (Bechtold 1990, 589–90).

It should hardly need to be said that there was nothing “acceptable” about the catastrophe that befell the Dinka in 1986–1988. The misinformation surrounding the famine at the time helped to make this catastrophe possible—and it is important, after the event, to recognize the enormity of what happened, to attempt a candid analysis of how this catastrophe was generated, and to wonder how similar catastrophes might be prevented. Sudan remains subject to human-made famine. Finding ways to address this continuing human rights disaster remains an urgent task.

1993, Oxford

Acknowledgments

THE NATURE of this study is such that many, perhaps most, of those who helped me in Sudan would probably prefer not to be mentioned by name. They are warmly thanked just the same, especially those who were willing to relive their own suffering or who put themselves at risk in order to convey something of the suffering of others. Many aid agency staff in Sudan gave generously of their time.

At home, I have received funds for study from the Economic and Social Research Council, and thank them for this. I owe a big thank you to my friends at St. Antony's College, Oxford, who have sustained me with much encouragement when I was sorely in need of it: Elizabeth, Daniel W, Daniel B., Paula, Caroline, Matthew C., Matthew J., Joe, Klaus, Giti, Melissa, Melissa P. Minouche, Lucia, Fawaz, Nira, Lakshmi, Angela, Masa, Mats, and, especially, Paul and Gopal. I could not have survived without the rock-solid support of Andreas and Georgia in particular, something I will always remember. Georgia's technical help is also greatly appreciated. Neil, Hartmut and Ade helped me valiantly through my revisions. Away from St. Antony's, I owe special thanks to my friends James and Lindy, as well as to Wendy, Martina, Pedro, Astier, Amir, Haro, Talia, Clive, Anne, Sara, Kelvin, Helen, Roy, Grandma, Ann, Angela, Matthew L., Simon M., Katherine, Sam B., and Andrew for their constant encouragement. I am also indebted to Andrew for his graphic contributions. I owe a great deal, also, to Anita for encouraging me to take on this task.

I would like to thank my former teachers, David Jones, Boyd Hilton, and Geoffrey Jones. This study has been greatly influenced by Amrita Rangasami and Alexander de Waal, both of whose work has been an inspiration for me. I am also grateful for their consistent encouragement. I have benefited greatly from the ideas, energy, and support of Peter Cutler. Valuable help and advice has been received from Barbara Harriss-White, Gavin Williams, Ann Waswo, John Ryle, Tony Vaux, Roger Winter, Andy Mawson, Bona Malwal, Ken Wilson, Tim Allen, Roger Hay, and, especially, Mark Duffield. Amartya Sen's work, although I have noted criticism, was a model of clarity. I am very grateful to Douglas Johnson and Wendy James for their expert guidance on many aspects of the southern Sudan. My supervisor, Megan Vaughan, made an enormous effort in reading my work and earlier in helping to get the thesis into shape, and I am very grateful to her.

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks also to Lynn Taylor and everyone at James Currey; Douglas Johnson played a key role in making this paperback possible, and my thanks also to Princeton University Press for their initial faith in the project and for releasing the copyright.

I would like to dedicate this study to my mother, who never wavered in her support, and to my late father. This work would not have been possible without their love and inspiration.

List of Abbreviations

ABS	Agricultural Bank of Sudan	PDF	Popular Defense Forces
AICF	Action Internationale Contre la Faim	RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
CART	Combined Agencies Relief Team	RTO	Road Transport Operation
CDC	Centers for Disease Control	RTU	Road Transport Unit
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party	SAC	Sudan African Congress
EC	European Community	SCF	Save the Children Fund
EEC	European Economic Community	SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
EWSB	Early Warning System Bulletin, RRC	SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization	SRC	Sudan Railways Corporation
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System, USAID	SRRA	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association
GOS	Government of Sudan	SSPA	Southern Sudan Political Association
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	TCC	Technical Coordination Committee
ILO	International Labor Organization	TMC	Transitional Military Council
JCA	Joint Church Aid	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
LRCRC	League of Red Cross and Red Crescent	UNHCR	(Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
MALT	Management and Logistics Team, RRC	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières	UNOEA	United Nations Office for Emergencies in Africa
NANS	National Alliance for National Salvation	UNOEOS	United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Sudan
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
NIF	National Islamic Front	USAP	Union of Sudan African Parties
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	WFP	World Food Program
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (now DfID)	WRO	Western Relief Operation
OFDA	Office of Foreign and Disaster Assistance		
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan		

Foreword

to the First Paperback Edition

The Ethiopian and Sudanese famines of the 1980s inspired a global humanitarian movement in Band Aid and its successors. Responding to what they saw as a lack of political will in the governments of developed nations, Band Aid mobilised world opinion behind providing a technical solution to famine in affected countries. This solution was apolitical, and in a television programme about Band Aid's achievements, for instance, UK viewers were shown a Band Aid technician repairing broken down vehicles for the Sudanese army in Darfur, in order to get famine relief there "moving". Band Aid was not alone in seeing famine as a crisis of supply and logistics. The relief programmes of the eighties focused on reversing nutritional deficits with food aid and food-for-work projects, and the 1992 American intervention in Somalia was presented as a technical solution to open up relief corridors and distribute relief supplies.

David Keen's *The Benefits of Famine* was one of a number of academic studies emerging from research in the eighties that analysed famine in more complex terms. It describes a moment when the nutritional and technical approach came up against the hard political realities of famine in the Sudan. Here were famine victims who were not among the world's marginal poor, but were in fact a relatively prosperous people whose very prosperity made them vulnerable to attack. Famine was not just a product of climate change but could be politically manufactured. There were those who benefited from famine, as well as those who suffered, and the chain of benefits linked local militias to the elite in the nation's capital, and to international markets. There was no apolitical, neutral, solution to the Sudan's famine.

The book was well received in professional circles and had a significant impact on policy and scholarly debates, especially the contentious "greed not grievance" theory. Had a paperback edition been released soon after initial publication, even more would have benefited from *The Benefits of Famine*, and none would have benefited more than those working in the Sudan's famine relief industry. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which was set up in the wake of the 1988 famine and ran for some fifteen years, was dominated by traditional methods of predicting food deficits caused by natural disasters, but failed to address the political causes of the famines it attempted to relieve. In my experience in OLS, relief interventions into the non-government held areas were never a product of reports from the field, but

were instead the outcome of tortuous negotiations over what the government in Khartoum would allow to be delivered. Many field workers in OLS understood the political constraints imposed on them, but how much better would it have been if persons at all levels of the UN and NGO hierarchies could have had the opportunity to read this book and adjust their own strategies?

The war-induced famines described here are now history, but this book is still needed. In many ways the international community has a more sophisticated understanding of the political dimensions of famine than it had in the early 1980s. We would not now expect to see any “Live 8” money being used to repair Sudanese army vehicles in Darfur, for instance. But as Keen notes in his new introduction, there are still those (including some in the UN) who have not learned the lessons of the recent past and see Darfur primarily as an ecological, not a political, crisis, reinforcing primordial ethnic divisions. The 1988 famine was a dress rehearsal for Darfur. Many of the same groups and persons who benefited from the famine Keen describes are benefiting from the crisis in Darfur today; many of the same constraints that prevented an effective international response then still impede action now. The focus on the technicalities of relief has often diverted international attention away from a realistic strategy for ending the war. For these reasons *The Benefits of Famine* is as relevant to understanding the ongoing war in Darfur as it is to understanding the recently ended civil war. It is still, in the words of one reviewer in 1994, “essential reading”.

Douglas H. Johnson
Oxford

Introduction

to the First Paperback Edition

In the thirteen years since it was first published, this book has sadly not become irrelevant. It tells the story of a terrible famine in the late 1980s; but the links it describes between famine, exploitation and counter-insurgency have not changed significantly; nor has a shameful degree of international inattention to the violence at the root of subsequent famines and to the Khartoum government's role in this violence.

Beginning in 1983, the Sudan government tried to get control of insurrection in the south by harnessing discontent among Baggara herders from the west of Sudan and by giving some of them arms and immunity from prosecution when they were encouraged to attack people from the Dinka ethnic group in the south—the main supporters of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). These attacks led to terrible famine, which was deepened when government officials and profiteering merchants largely cut off the south from international relief. Those relief trains that did get through carried large quantities of arms and ammunition—provoking rebel attacks that were then cited as the reason why relief to the south was at such a low level. International aid donors tended to play down the blocking of relief and, more generally, the government's role in creating famine among its own people. Donors frequently emphasised the “tribal” nature of the violence.

One reason for letting Khartoum off the hook was donors' desire to play up the effectiveness of their own response. Another factor, in the twilight of the Cold War, was that Western governments were courting the Sudan government as an ostensibly friendly and democratic buffer state between Qadhafi's Libya and Communist Ethiopia. A third factor was oil, which encouraged the pursuit of good relations with Khartoum even as the Sudan government was forcibly depopulating oil-rich areas of the south.

During the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the growing worries about Islamist extremism and terrorism made for a different strategic context. The government's role in stirring up conflict in the south was increasingly highlighted, and significant famine relief to the south was institutionalised within the UN system (with the reluctant agreement of Khartoum) under Operation Lifeline Sudan. But sporadic famines still continued in the south—in part because Khartoum was extending its divide-and-rule strategy to nurturing conflicts *within* the south. Also contributing to suffering was the willingness of the UN and international donors to soft-pedal on abuses as the

price of securing “humanitarian access”—access that, crucially, did not extend to SPLA-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, which were blockaded by the government throughout the 1990s. Other problems hampering relief included underfunding, inadequate monitoring of relief and of human rights abuses, diversion of relief by the SPLA and its relief arm (the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), and government restrictions on relief flights.¹ There was an especially severe famine in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998.

Particularly in relation to southerners displaced into the north, an air of unreality continued to hang over relief operations. The aid world was buzzing with fashionable talk about a “relief to development continuum”, and this translated—in Sudan and elsewhere—into a strangely persistent belief that war and displacement might even be an opportunity for development if only the recipients of relief could be somehow “weaned” off their dependency on relief.² This discourse was all the more troubling because very often even the most basic emergency needs were not being met.³ Meanwhile, vulnerability assessments in the south tended to neglect the vulnerability arising from wealth (and dispossession), and this reflected the common view—subject to critical scrutiny in this book—that poverty lies at the root of famine.⁴

The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the rebel SPLA/SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Army Movement) represented a major breakthrough for Sudan—and a major success for international governments. But the CPA is no simple panacea.

One problem is that the implementation of this peace agreement is proving very tricky. Indeed, where violence has served important economic and political functions rather than simply being irrational (a point that comes up repeatedly in this book), implementation of a peace process can be expected to be fraught with difficulties. Members of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) recognise that elections which the CPA has scheduled for 2009 would probably oust them from power, and many in the ruling elite seem to harbour a fear that the planned self-determination referendum in the south will lead to the loss of the south (and its oil). Already in July 2005, the International Crisis Group was noting, “There are signs the NCP seeks to undercut implementation [of the CPA] through its use of the militias (the South Sudan Defence Forces, SSDF), bribery, and through the tactics of divide and rule”.⁵ The peace agreement provides in effect for the elimination of the SSDF (seen by the SPLA as having collaborated with Khartoum),⁶ but SSDF fighters have not all gone away quietly, particularly as economic opportunities continue to be scarce and Khartoum continues to show a willingness to stir up trouble.⁷ Even more sinister is the possibility that maintaining an emergency in Darfur may prove useful in delaying or distorting the 2009 national elections and in protecting the economic interests of the influential government security agencies (which include

making money from oil, construction, and the service sector).⁸

A second problem is conflict within the north—most notably in Darfur. One lesson stressed in this book, a lesson still insufficiently learned, is that analysing Sudan in terms of a series of separate regions (“the south”, “the west”, “the north”) is profoundly unhelpful. Just as grievances in the north have historically fed into war and famine in the south, today grievances in the west must be understood, in part, in relation to the north/south peace process.

A near-exclusive international focus on Khartoum and the rebel SPLA has tended to encourage a neglect of the interests of those northerners who oppose the current government in Sudan, some of whom turned to violence in an attempt to win the international recognition and place at the negotiating table that has been accorded to the SPLA, for whom violent resistance seemed at last to have paid dividends. Meanwhile, in eastern Sudan exclusion from the SPLA/Khartoum peace negotiations led the Beja Congress, a political group advocating federalism, to renew its call to arms in mid-October 2003.⁹ The opposition more generally—in the form of the National Democratic Alliance—was excluded from the north/south peace negotiations, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement allocated only 14 per cent of positions in the national and state executive and legislative branches to the northern opposition (compared to 52 per cent to the National Congress Party [NCP] and 28 per cent to the SPLM).¹⁰ With regional inequalities feeding strongly into political opposition in Sudan, opponents of the current regime have included Muslims who hoped (wrongly as it turned out) that common religion could be a basis for common citizenship, as well as northerners who fear they will now have no option but to become part of an Islamic state, particularly if the south secedes.¹¹ To a significant extent, a divide between “Arabized” groups and those still adhering to non-Arab cultures has taken precedence over any religious divisions, with the latter increasingly aware that their religion has not protected them or earned them a share in development.¹²

It is worth noting that this is not the first time that a military government in Sudan has made peace in the south and entered into a political alliance with former rebels at the expense of rival political forces within the north: General Nimeiri pursued this tactic in 1972, but the north/south Addis Ababa peace agreement of that year did not provide a lasting solution. A key reason was the continuing discontent of northern groups who had been excluded from power (and whose discontent was eventually redirected by Nimeiri and his successors against the south).¹³

Within the north, one significant grievance focuses on the years of neglect by a Central Nile ruling elite in Khartoum, whilst a second focuses more specifically on the loss of access to land (by both smallholders and

XX INTRODUCTION

pastoralists) as a result of the expansion of Sudan's large semi-mechanised farms.¹⁴ A 2006 Coalition for International Justice report referred to Sudan's long history of land-hungry and damaging mechanised farming and observed, "In agriculture, as in other aspects of its policies, the NIF [National Islamic Front, forerunner of the ruling NCP] has implemented policies that are, broadly speaking, similar to those of its predecessors, but more aggressive, more virulent and more hurtful to rural communities".¹⁵ A long-standing pattern of rewarding political supporters with mechanised farming concessions has been continued by the NIF/NCP, with Upper Nile, Blue Nile and Southern Blue Nile among the most affected areas.

If political divisions within the north underline the dangers of analysing conflict as "north/south" or "Muslim/Christian" (on the lines of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"), the point has been reinforced by recent violence in Darfur, where the victims as well as the perpetrators have been overwhelmingly Muslim. This book brings out, at an earlier stage in the evolving conflict, the importance of economic and political agendas and the dangers of misrepresenting the conflict as "religious". If binary and cultural frameworks continue to impede understanding of (and effective intervention in) a complex and shifting war, some of this misrepresentation remains functional. It is not just that "ethnic conflict" continues to provide an alibi for Khartoum; in addition, framing the Darfur conflict as "Arab versus African" helps Khartoum to appeal to a wider international constituency that links "Arab" with victim status.¹⁶

Meanwhile, stirring up ethnic conflict has allowed a variation of the colonial tactic of "divide-and-rule"—whether in the 1980s or today. Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi, who ruled from 1986 to 1989, did not trust the Sudanese army and built up the Arab *Murahaleen* militias as a counter-weight. President Omar el-Beshir, who took power in 1989, built up the Popular Defence Forces (successors to the Arab *Murahaleen*), again seeking a counter-weight to the army. His regime was successful in using ethnic tensions to divide the southern rebels and it has now achieved a similar feat in Darfur.¹⁷

In Darfur, the Sudan government has orchestrated and facilitated widespread atrocities, encouraging *janjaweed* militiamen to attack rebels and civilians, providing effective impunity for such attacks, and even engaging in aerial bombing to support the attacks.¹⁸ Once more, pastoral groups in the west (notably, camel-herders, some of Chadian origin) have been mobilised against ethnic groups (this time, as noted, their fellow Muslims) who have been seen as supporting rebellion.¹⁹ As in the 1980s, the famine process has served important economic functions, for example, in vacating coveted and fertile land. Again, those victimised have often been those who previously controlled fertile land (notably, in Darfur, the Fur). The

looting of livestock in Darfur seems to have been well organised and even premeditated (often with military involvement).²⁰ “Protection” payments have been extracted by militias,²¹ and relief operations have again been profitable for certain traders: purchase of grain within Sudan for shipment to Darfur has lined the pockets of Nile Valley merchants and large-scale grain farmers, with both of these groups being key constituents of the Khartoum regime.²² Even oil should not be discounted as a possible factor in the recent large-scale displacement; areas coveted by Japan, China and American-turned-British businessman Friedhelm Eronat include parts of northern, western and southern Darfur that have been devastated by Khartoum and allied *janjaweed* militias.²³ Significantly, as in the 1983-85 drought-led famine, which preceded and fed into war-driven famine further south, the humanitarian needs of Arab pastoralist groups have been relatively neglected; yet many of these people have actually suffered as a result of the current conflict and have not been involved in the attacks.²⁴ As in the 1980s, it is dangerous simply to label one group as the “baddies” without any real understanding of the process by which they came to be “bad” (or, more precisely, *violent*). Comparison with Chad underlines this point: whilst a focus on Sudan suggests that the Zaghawa are primarily victims oppressed by certain Arab groups, a focus on Chad gives a very different picture. Roland Marchal shows how many Arab groups there were driven into Sudan when dispossessed by the southern movement of Zaghawa, who have had strong ties to the Chadian government; the Zaghawa are victims of impunity in Sudan but beneficiaries of it in Chad.²⁵

Part of the point of manipulating ethnic tensions is avoiding direct blame or recrimination. In Darfur (as for almost two decades in Bahr el Ghazal), Khartoum has tended to deny that it has responsibility for, or control over, aggressive militias. One International Crisis Group report noted of Darfur:

A tribal militia can wipe out an entire village ... and the government can plead innocence, even as it creates the conditions for the militias to operate by giving impunity, supplying weapons and ammunition, deploying police who do nothing to stop attacks and co-ordinating between the militias and the state government.²⁶

Unfortunately, the renewed emphasis on “ancient ethnic hatreds” has been embraced by some international actors.²⁷ US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick told an audience at Khartoum University in November 2005: “It’s a tribal war, that has been exacerbated by other conditions, and frankly, I don’t think foreign forces ought to get themselves in the middle of a tribal war of Sudanese”.²⁸ Zoellick’s career does not seem to have suffered as a result: in June 2007, he was confirmed as the new President of the World Bank.

The room for manoeuvre towards better policy outcomes is narrowed

when lines of authority are obscured or when Sudan is misleadingly labelled as a “failed state”. As Sudan expert John Ryle noted in August 2004:

In 2002, in northern Bahr-el-Ghazal (to the south of Darfur), after years of international condemnation of the abduction and enslavement of local people by Murahaliin militia groups—and years of denial of official involvement—raids on villages ceased when the United States stepped up diplomatic pressure on the Sudanese government. Claims that the Janjawiid are beyond government control are similarly unconvincing. It is clear that, when it wants, the government can call off the dogs of war.²⁹

Given the will, the same effect could be achieved today. Indeed, the International Crisis Group has noted that ever since Bashir’s military government seized power in 1989, “when the government has been the target of serious pressure with a specific objective, it has modified its behaviour”.³⁰ One key step would be a clear and specific threat to Sudan’s oil trade and future oil investments. Another would be tough and targeted sanctions against those senior government officials who are most responsible, including sanctions against the companies owned and controlled by them.³¹ Yet the UN has held back from trade sanctions, and even targeted sanctions have been weak—sending a correspondingly weak message. The EU has resisted imposing its own oil sanctions or targeted sanctions, while US and UK foot-dragging on “smart sanctions” contrasts with attempts to stop flows of finances to al-Qaida.³² In May 2006 the UN did impose sanctions on four mid-level Sudanese actors—two rebels, one government military man and one government-aligned *janjaweed* militia leader. Yet no one senior in Khartoum was targeted, and most of the fifty-one referred to the International Criminal Court have not been targeted for sanctions. In May 2007, the US government did impose sanctions on thirty-one companies, mostly those owned or controlled by the Sudanese government. But in general the weak international response has undermined any public stance against the Darfur atrocities from the US or UK, and Khartoum, more often than not, has taken comfort in the (friendly) private contacts whilst ignoring the (critical) public statements.³³

Unfortunately, Khartoum’s gift for divide-and-rule applies externally as well as internally. A senior aid official involved in Darfur commented: “The international community has totally mishandled the Darfur situation. Its divisions have allowed the Khartoum government to play governments off against each other.”³⁴ Weak international action has not only encouraged the persistence of attacks on civilians in Darfur but has allowed Khartoum to block the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, with international peacekeeping responsibilities in effect offloaded onto an underfunded African Union.

Helping to undermine the international response to Darfur has been the

“war on terror”. It seems the sins of one’s friends are quickly forgiven—whether in the Cold War context of the 1980s or in today’s “war on terror”. Although Sudan was condemned by the US in the 1990s for supporting terrorism, if anything Osama bin Laden’s period of residence in Sudan seems to have helped convince the US of the necessity of securing information and cooperation from Sudan. Cooperation between Washington and Khartoum over intelligence for the “war on terror” has been growing closer.³⁵ Sudan’s cooperation with the US increased dramatically after 9/11 and has included: giving access to banking and other details relating not only to bin Laden, who lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, but also to other al-Qaida operatives; detaining militants on their way to join the Iraqi insurgency from 2003; and acting as the “eyes and ears” of the CIA in relation to Islamist groups in Somalia. Sudan’s intelligence chief Major General Salah Gosh, accused by US Congress members of directing military attacks against civilians in Darfur, was flown to the US in an executive jet by the CIA to further what US officials have publicly hailed as increased cooperation in the “war on terror”.³⁶ Meanwhile, the US government pressed the UN not to include Gosh on the list of people who should be subject to sanctions.³⁷ In March 2006, Gosh secretly visited London to meet senior British officials.³⁸

Significantly, the “war on terror” may also have eroded the West’s ability to put moral pressure on Khartoum. Particularly in the Arab and Muslim world, Western powers lost a great deal of credibility when they bypassed the UN in launching the 2003 Iraq war. So too, as UN Special Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk observed after his expulsion by Khartoum, did the UN itself.⁴⁰ When the Sudan government has been condemned by the US and UK over human rights abuses in Darfur, the human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib have provided Khartoum with a convenient (if spurious) rebuttal.

Also undermining the international response to Darfur—as earlier during famine in Bahr el Ghazal in the south—has been oil. China has tended to oppose firm action over Darfur within the UN Security Council, and this stance cannot be understood in isolation from China’s heavy investments in Sudanese oil production, notably in the contested Western Upper Nile region. In general, China has been seeking to expand and diversify its sources of oil in line with China’s rapid domestic growth. The French/Belgian company TotalFinaElf has a large and rich oil concession in the south (block 5); operations there were suspended in 1985 and TotalFinaElf would like to resume production. This may help to explain why Paris has also tended to be rather soft on Khartoum over Darfur, notably while the north/south peace deal was being negotiated.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the US has been demonstrably concerned to diversify its oil sources,⁴¹ and the links between George W. Bush’s regime and the oil industry are famously close. Restricted by US sanctions imposed in 1997 (and by Sudan’s presence on a US list of countries

supporting terrorism), Washington has had to stand by and watch China take the lion's share of Sudanese oil, a situation that many in the US would like to reverse. The International Crisis Group noted cautiously, "The Khartoum government should be given no reason to believe that it can deflect either Europeans or Americans by holding out lures of future oil and other commercial deals."⁴²

A third factor in the weak international reaction to abuses in Darfur, already briefly alluded to, was a reluctance to criticise Khartoum during delicate negotiations over peace in the south. While these worries were understandable, the price has been very high. Khartoum was able to play on fears that it would walk away from the north/south peace process if too much pressure was applied over Darfur.⁴³

If reducing the Darfur crisis to "ethnic hatreds" has muddied the waters, so too have attempts to portray the crisis as essentially a local, ecological conflict. It is true that the expansion of farming has combined with drought and government neglect to cause discontent among many herders.⁴⁵ This has been a factor in the violence, as earlier among the Baggara. In a Guardian article on Darfur, Jonathan Steele went so far as to argue that "this was not genocide or classic ethnic cleansing", adding that "Darfur was, and is, the outgrowth of a struggle between farmers and nomads..."⁴⁵ Yet in reality the government's role in orchestrating violence and stirring up ethnic tensions remains as critical and destructive as ever.

One major *difference* between the current crisis in Darfur and the late 1980s famine should be noted: much more of the emergency relief has actually got through to needy people, and this has helped to limit mass mortality from starvation and disease among displaced people. That said, the humanitarian intervention displays harrowing continuities. For one thing, the humanitarian response was significantly delayed and impeded by Khartoum.⁴⁶ For another, humanitarianism continues to serve as cover for weak political pressures and for a failure to use the economic leverage of the international community. The International Crisis Group noted in 2004, "The U.S. is still fixated on getting humanitarian workers into Darfur, a worthy but insufficient objective."⁴⁷ In addition, the international focus on AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) peacekeeping efforts seems to have reduced political pressure on the Khartoum government.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the international humanitarian community has often claimed to be providing "protection by presence"—potentially another "false solution" to the crisis as the level of protection that aid workers' presence has provided has often been very limited. Inhibiting factors here have included a desire to keep aid workers (especially international aid workers) *away from* the most dangerous areas, the frequent use of relatively inexperienced field officers, a reluctance to work alongside government actors (with ICRC being an exception), and,

most importantly, the willingness of the Sudanese government brazenly to sponsor widespread attacks on civilians despite the large-scale presence of aid workers in the area.⁴⁹ In an interesting paper, Sara Pantuliano and Sorcha O'Callaghan have noted that in Darfur, "There is a general perception that some organisations have been re-fashioning their traditional assistance programmes in protection language because they have detected that protection is a new funding fashion."⁵⁰ As in earlier crises, the various UN agencies have lacked a common advocacy strategy while political analysis has often been weak.⁵¹ The end result, for all the talk about "a responsibility to protect", has been that aid agency workers have found themselves in a position remarkably reminiscent of the 1980s: as Gérard Prunier put it, they have been "first in the line of fire with no political back-up".⁵²

Nor should the impressive overall level of relief delivery to Darfur obscure the fact that, as in the 1980s, delivery to *rebel-held* areas has tended to be low. UN Special Envoy Tom Vraalsen acknowledged towards the end of 2003: "Delivery of humanitarian assistance is hampered by systematically denied access. Khartoum authorities claim there is unimpeded access but they greatly restrict access to the areas under their control while imposing blanket denial to all rebel-held areas."⁵³ Under these circumstances, the large-scale humanitarian aid to Internally Displaced People's (whilst necessary) risks "locking in" the forcible displacement effected by Khartoum and its *janjaweed* allies. At times, Darfur's Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebels have threatened to block relief coming into rebel-held areas from government areas, citing concerns that relief was being manipulated for military purposes. Aid workers have spoken privately of aid convoys being used as part of the military strategy of the government, and of the increased risk of rebel attack that this has implied.

During the 1990s, a reluctance to intervene in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to great caution in the use of the word "genocide", a label that brings with it an obligation to intervene under the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Yet the US government happily declared "genocide" in Darfur in the summer of 2004, and then did almost nothing about it; following the US-led invasion of Iraq, this reinforces the impression that the George W. Bush regime does not regard international law as binding.

This book's emphasis on the economic functions of war and famine fed into a growing body of literature that emphasised the importance of economic agendas in civil wars—a literature that has encouraged a trend towards restricting wartime trade in "rogue commodities" by "rogue groups", whether in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC or Angola. Perhaps the best known author in this field has been Paul Collier, who drew on *The Benefits of Famine* in an early publication on the topic⁵⁴ and who subsequently took the

statistically derived emphasis on “greed” to what many have seen as an unhelpful extreme.⁵⁵ Stimulated in part by Collier’s work, the relative importance of “greed” and “grievance” in civil wars has been hotly contested. In the context of this debate, *The Benefits of Famine* can be seen as a relatively early exploration of the *interaction* of greed and grievance, showing, for example, how greed (or, more accurately, the violent pursuit of economic agendas) may be fuelled by grievances (including those arising from an uneven and discriminatory development process) and how greed may flourish in a war originally driven, in large part, by grievances.

More generally, this book emphasises the complexity of civil wars and the importance of not taking expressed aims (among local actors or outside interveners) at face value. It underlines the dangers of assuming that the aim in a war is to win. Perhaps most striking in this connection was the prevalence of militia attacks on civilians that predictably radicalised them, attracting support for the rebel SPLA even from groups that had previously stood aloof. (Today in Darfur, government-supported militias have increasingly preferred to attack civilians rather than attacking armed rebels, again predictably radicalising civilians.)⁵⁶

I have further explored the idea that that war is not necessarily about winning in subsequent books, namely *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (James Currey/ Palgrave, 2005), *Endless War? Hidden Functions of the “War on Terror”* (Pluto, 2006), and *Complex Emergencies* (Polity, 2007).

The Benefits of Famine expresses a good deal of scepticism about the motives of diverse actors engaged in “famine relief”. Some of these arguments can prove dangerous in the wrong hands. Indeed, critiques of international aid may at times have offered a convenient excuse for not providing international relief at all; in the late-1990s, the British government justified low levels of relief to southern Sudan on the grounds that it was “fuelling the war”—certainly, a rather simplistic hijacking of academic work on the subject.⁵⁷ Despite such dangers, it is hoped that mapping the actions of diverse actors contributing to famine, and to flawed relief operations, provides some lasting instruction for students, for the general public, and for those involved in humanitarian interventions. Certainly, the need for attention to Sudan remains urgent: in June 2005, the combined networks of CNN, Fox News, NBC, MSNBC, ABC and CBS ran 55 times as many stories about the trial of Michael Jackson as they did about the genocide in Darfur.⁵⁸ Equally striking is the continued danger of assuming that the presence of a (manipulated) relief operation somehow makes up for the underlying (and largely unaddressed) political violence.

NOTES

- 1 Human Rights Watch. 1998. *Famine in Sudan*, 1998; Marc Lavergne and Fabrice Weissman. 2004. "Sudan: Who Benefits from Humanitarian Aid", in *In the Shadow of "Just Wars": Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action*. London: C. Hurst and Co.
- 2 See, notably, Joanna Macrae, Mark Bradbury, Susanne Jaspars, Mark Duffield, and Douglas Johnson. 1997. "Conflict, the Continuum and Chronic Emergencies: a Critical Analysis of the Scope for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Planning in Sudan", *Disasters*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 223-43; Zoe Marriage. 2006. *Not Breaking the Rules, Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War*. London: C. Hurst and Co./Palgrave Macmillan.
- 3 Mark Duffield. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books; Mark Bradbury. 1998. "Normalising the Crisis in Africa". *Disasters*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 328-38.
- 4 In his research, Luka Biong Deng, a Dinka himself, found that particularly among those Dinka living adjacent to the north and well-known to their Arab militia attackers, the more wealthy were just as vulnerable to famine. They were targeted in attacks (because of their wealth), and may have suffered greater trauma and have been less well adapted to survival techniques such as consuming wild foods (Luka Biong Deng. 2003. *Confronting Civil War: A Comparative Study of Household Livelihood Strategies in Southern Sudan During 1990s*. PhD dissertation, Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies.
- 5 International Crisis Group. 2005. *The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace*. ICG Africa Report no. 96. July 25, p. i.
- 6 International Crisis Group. 2005. *The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement*.
- 7 Some SSDF groups might qualify for integration into security structures and or civil institutions (International Crisis Group. 2005. *The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement*). Most have chosen to join the SPLA, but a significant number have refused integration into either the SPLA or the Sudan Armed Forces.
- 8 Insofar as a peace agreement implies democracy is coming, this may itself be an incentive for kicking out and intimidating populations that are likely to support the opposition. Darfur is a stronghold for the Umma party, rival to the National Islamic Front, which has dominated politics in different guises for a decade and a half. The danger that democracy can be a spur for ethnic cleansing has been underlined by renewed attempts aggressively to populate the contested Abyei area (oil rich and set for a referendum on inclusion in north or south) with northern Arab Misseriya, combined with a longstanding policy of attempting to depopulate it of Ngok Dinka (International Crisis Group. 2003. *Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace*. ICG Africa Report 73. Nairobi/Brussels. December 11).
- 9 International Crisis Group. 2003. *Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace*, p. 2.
- 10 International Crisis Group. 2006. *Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement*. Africa Briefing no. 39, June 20.
- 11 Douglas H. Johnson. 2003. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Oxford: James Currey, chapter 9.
- 12 See, notably, Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*; Jok Madut Jok.

2007. *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*. Oxford: OneWorld, Chapter 3.
- 13 The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement is also problematic. Two of the three rebel delegations did not accept this agreement, and the Khartoum government then set about attacking and intimidating the non-signatories, in alliance with the one faction (under Minni Minawi) that had signed the agreement.
- 14 See discussion in Johnson. 2003. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, pp. 144–6; also the current volume, pp. 53–63.
- 15 Coalition for International Justice, 2006, *Soil and Oil: Dirty Business in Sudan*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 47.
- 16 Alex de Waal. 2005. “Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement”. *African Affairs*, vol. 104, no. 415, pp. 181–205.
- 17 In Darfur, the GOS has been successful in driving a wedge between the SLA/M-Abdel Wahid (Sudan Liberation Army/Movement-Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour) (mostly Fur) and the SLA/M-Minni (Minawi) (mostly Zaghawa)—in part by playing on fears that the Fur are being used as cannon fodder for the project of a Greater Zaghawa State in Sudan and Chad (International Crisis Group. 2006. *To Save Darfur*, p. 3).
- 18 Human Rights Watch. 2005. *Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur*. New York: Human Rights Watch, December; International Crisis Group. 2004. *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*. ICG Africa Report no. 76, Nairobi/Brussels, 23 May; International Crisis Group. 2004. *Now or Never in Darfur*. ICG Africa Report no. 80. Nairobi/Brussels, May 23.
- 19 The “Arab/African” dichotomy in the media is an oversimplification obscuring that the victims are Muslim and dark-skinned (Mahmood Mamdani, “Darfur Crisis”, *Black Commentator*, 28 October 2004, (http://www.blackcommentator.com/109/109_darfur.html).
- 20 Human Rights Watch. 2005. *Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur*. New York: Human Rights Watch, December.
- 21 Sara Pantuliano and Sorcha O’Callaghan. 2006. *The “Protection Crisis”: A Review of Field-based Strategies for Humanitarian Protection in Darfur*. HPG Discussion paper, ODI, London, December.
- 22 Coalition for International Justice, 2006, *Soil and Oil: Dirty Business in Sudan*.
- 23 On Eronat, see David Leigh and Adrian Gattton, “Briton named as buyer of Darfur oil rights”, *Guardian*, 10 June 2005, (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,14658,1503470,00.html>).
- 24 Pantuliano and O’Callaghan. 2006. *The “Protection Crisis”*.
- 25 See, notably, Roland Marchal. 2006. “Chad/Darfur: How Two Crises Merge”, *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 109, pp. 467–82.
- 26 International Crisis Group. 2006. *To Save Darfur*, p. 3.
- 27 See, for example, the discussion in Gerard Prunier. 2005. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. London: C. Hurst and Co, pp. 124–58.
- 28 International Crisis Group. 2006. *To Save Darfur*, p. 4.
- 29 John Ryle, “Disaster in Darfur”, *New York Review of Books*, vol. 51, no. 13, 12 August 2004.
- 30 International Crisis Group. 2004. Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD, October 5, p. 1. The International Crisis Group noted in October 2004 that ever since 1989 the Khartoum government has “encourage[d] the perception that if

- serious pressure is applied, it would be counter-productive, giving advantages to putative ‘hardliners’ or even causing the regime to crack, leaving a failed state in its wake” (International Crisis Group. 2004. *Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD*. October 5, p. 1). This echoes patterns in Sierra Leone, for example, where some donors feared pressuring the government to rein in abuses could lead to a “failed state” (David Keen. 2005. *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: James Currey). In the post-9/11 world, the prospect of “failed states” seems to fill US officials with a deep foreboding.
- 31 See, for example, International Crisis Group. 2004. *Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis*. ICG Africa Report 76. Nairobi/Brussels, March 25.
 - 32 Julie Flint and Alex de Waal. 2005. *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books, p. 127.
 - 33 I am particularly grateful to Douglas Johnson for conversations in this area and many others.
 - 34 International Crisis Group. 2004. *Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur*. ICG Africa Report 80. Nairobi/Brussels, May 23, p. 4.
 - 35 Caroline Moorehead. 2005. “Letter from Darfur”, *New York Review of Books*, vol. 52, no. 13, August 11; Marc Lavergne and Fabrice Weissman, “Sudan: Who Benefits from Humanitarian Aid?”, in *In the Shadow of “Just Wars”: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action*, London: C. Hurst and Co.
 - 36 See, notably, Ken Silverstein, “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s war on terrorism”, *Los Angeles Times*, 29 April 2005 (accessed at globalpolicy.org).
 - 37 John Prendergast and Don Cheadle “Our friend, an architect of the genocide in Darfur. The U.S. sacrifices moral leadership when it cozies up to killers for snippets of counterterrorism information”, *Los Angeles Times*, 14 February 2006 (<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-chedle14feb14,0,5547915.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions>).
 - 38 Peter Beaumont, “Darfur terror chief slips into Britain”, *Observer*, 12 March 2006, (<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1728995,00.html>).
 - 39 Jan Pronk, interviewed on BBC World, 21 December 2006.
 - 40 “Cynical in Sudan”, *Wall Street Journal*, editorial, 28 July 2004, (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0728croil.htm>).
 - 41 This is evidenced, for example, by the so-called “Cheney report” of the National Energy Policy Development Group (May 2001).
 - 42 International Crisis Group. 2004. *Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur*, p.13; see also Lavergne and Weissman, “Sudan: Who Benefits from Humanitarian Aid?”
 - 43 International Crisis Group. 2004. *Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD*. October 5.
 - 44 Alex de Waal. 2004. “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap”, *London Review of Books*, vol. 26, no. 15, August 5 (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html); *Report of the International Commission of Enquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General*, 2005, Geneva, January 25.
 - 45 Jonathan Steele, “Darfur wasn’t genocide and Sudan is not a terrorist state”, *Guardian*, 7 October 2005, (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,1586994,00.html>).
 - 46 See, for example, Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence*, p.148.
 - 47 International Crisis Group. 2004. *Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur*, p.13.
 - 48 Pantuliano and O’Callaghan. 2006. *The “Protection Crisis”*, p.16.

xxx INTRODUCTION

- 49 Pantuliano and O'Callaghan. 2006. *The "Protection Crisis"*; see also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2006, *Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis*, January.
- 50 Pantuliano and O'Callaghan. 2006. *The "Protection Crisis"*, p. 18.
- 51 OCHA. 2006. *Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis*, January.
- 52 Gérard Prunier. 2005. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. London: C. Hurst and Co., p. 136.
- 53 Prunier. 2005. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, pp. 131-2.
- 54 Collier, Paul. 1995, "Civil war and the economies of the peace dividend", Centre for the Study of African Economies, working paper series, no. 26.
- 55 See, for example, Paul Collier. 2000. "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective", in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds) *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- 56 The International Crisis Group noted in December 2003 "The latest attacks occurred deep inside the Fur tribal domain, against unprotected villages with no apparent link to the rebels other than their ethnic profile" (International Crisis Group. 2003. *Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace*. ICG Africa Report 73. Nairobi/Brussels, December 11, p. 19). As earlier during counter-insurgency operations in Bahr el Ghazal (and it is tempting to put counter-insurgency into inverted commas), this pattern of attacks has helped spread rebellion to new groups: "The government's heavy-handed counter-insurgency campaign has facilitated a major recruiting drive for the rebels, as suggested by the scarcity of young men in the refugee and IDP camps." (ICG, 2004a, *Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur*, ICG Africa Report 80, Nairobi/Brussels, May 23, p.9). There is a widespread belief that the Zaghawa provided the bulk of SLA military strength, but the risks of attacking well-armed and mobile Zaghawa encouraged a "counter-insurgency" focus on attacking Fur and Massalit civilians (International Crisis Group. 2005. *Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace*. Africa Briefing no. 32, Oct. 6, p.3).
- 57 Nick Stockton. 1998. "In Defence of Humanitarianism", *Disasters*, 22, 4, pp. 352-60.
- 58 Nicholas Kristof, "All Ears for Tom Cruise, All Eyes on Brad Pitt", *New York Times*, 26 July 2005, (<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/26/opinion/26kristof.html?ex=1280030400&en=03264b151c2a6f3d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss>).