SOUTH AFRICA’S SUSPENDED REVOLUTION
HOPES AND PROSPECTS

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# Contents

Preface ix

1 Introduction 1
   The state of the nation 4
   Explaining the transition 25
   A brief outline of the book 29

2 Governance, political accountability and service delivery 35
   The construction of the post-apartheid state 37
   The erosion of political accountability 54
   Behind the service delivery crisis 60
   The challenge 70

3 The political economy of development 73
   The shift to GEAR 76
   The central contradiction 91
   Groping towards social democracy 93
   Acknowledging changes in economic policy 102
   Contradictory approaches to inequality 105
   The challenge 107

4 The viability of a sustainable social pact 111
   Social unionism and South Africa’s first social pact 113
   Understanding the emergence of social pacts 122
   The potential for a social pact in the
   post-Polokwane era 128
   The challenge 136

5 The evolution of state–civil society relations 139
   Historical context 143
   Civil society in the democratic era 147
The state, civil society and the consolidation of democracy
The challenge

6 South Africa and the world
Foreign policy and second-generation nationalism
South Africa's foreign policy, 1994–2008
Continuities and discontinuities in foreign policy since 2008
The challenge

7 What is to be done?
Reform or transformation
Reconstructing political accountability to citizens
Reconciling constitutional rights
The necessity of leadership

8 Reinterpreting democratic and development experiences
Human agency and its structural conditioning
Socio-economic justice in transitional democracies
The battle of interpretation
A progressive nationalism?

Frequently used acronyms and abbreviations

Endnotes

References

Index
Introduction

South Africa is in the midst of a high-stakes leadership drama that has been underway for some years. The stage is the South African state, including its national departments and ministries, provincial governments and local municipalities. It is a drama that has pitted comrade against comrade, and the ensuing battle has led to friends becoming enemies, and erstwhile enemies becoming friends. The ultimate prize is the presidency and the political power and spoils of patronage that go with it.

The drama’s multiple acts have so far each been marked by a symbolic high point. The opening act was the firing of then deputy president, Jacob Zuma, by then president, Thabo Mbeki, in 2005. This was followed by the fightback by Zuma and his allies, which culminated in December 2007, when Zuma was elected president of the African National Congress (ANC) at the party’s national electoral conference in Polokwane. Nine months later, in September 2008, Mbeki was unceremoniously ejected from his position as president of South Africa, and after a short caretaker presidency by then deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, Zuma ascended to the presidential throne in April 2009. Significant sections of the senior hierarchy in the political establishment and state bureaucracy were soon replaced as cadre deployment within the ruling party morphed into factional deployment.

Soon after this, however, the battle lines were redrawn and a new act in the drama began. This time Zuma, as presidential incumbent, was the focus of the attempted ejection. His nemeses were his one-time allies, Julius Malema, Fikile Mbalula, Mathews Phosa, Tokyo Sexwale, and even Kgalema Motlanthe. Malema was effectively fired
as president of the Youth League through the mechanism of the ANC’s disciplinary committee. In December 2012, Motlanthe, who was deputy president of both the ruling party and the country at the time, stood against Zuma for the presidency of the ANC at the party’s national conference in Mangaung. He lost, and having withdrawn from the candidature for the party’s deputy-presidency in favour of Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa, Motlanthe was effectively cast into the political wilderness. His role in the ANC has been confined to heading up political education within the party. Cyril Ramaphosa, billionaire, the second-richest black businessman in the country, and architect of South Africa’s much admired Constitution, was elected at Mangaung as the party’s new deputy president. However, despite the party’s overwhelmingly large endorsement of Zuma at the Mangaung conference – he received 75 per cent of the vote for the position as president – the party’s members left the conference as divided as when they had arrived.

Even though he won so many votes, Zuma cannot afford to be sanguine about his situation. The reason for this is that his opposition, although small, is mainly located in Gauteng province – the economic heartland of the country. As fourth largest contributor to Africa’s GDP, this economic hub has to be central to any economic revitalisation and transformation agenda. Its inclusion in the alliance of the ‘forces for change’ must be of concern to him. Moreover, his internal opposition involve people of means. Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa have enormous financial resources at their disposal. Paul Mashatile, chair of the ANC in Gauteng, and Fikile Mbhalula (once an ardent Zuma supporter) have enormous organisational abilities. All have liberation pedigrees within the ANC. But perhaps the biggest indication of a divided organisation is the slate system, whereby delegates vote, not on the merits of the individual candidates, but rather according to which faction’s slate they appear on. The ANC, its Youth League, its allies in the Tripartite Alliance – the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – as well as various key state departments, including intelligence and safety and security, as well as provincial governments, all remain arenas in which the leadership battle will continue to play itself out.

Throughout this period the drama has been broadcast live. The South African media has insisted on providing the nation with front-row seats to the unfolding spectacle. In the process, the ANC, the political home of Nobel laureates Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela, has been seen for what it is increasingly becoming: a grubby instrument of enrichment that speaks the language of empowerment and democracy, while its leadership and cadres plunder the nation’s resources and undermine both the judiciary and the media – the former because it may be used to hold various actors to account, and the latter for having the temerity to broadcast the drama.

Elsewhere I have described representations of this political drama as revealing a public contest ‘between different sets of heroes and villains, themselves personified in the individual personalities of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma’. The distinguishing feature of this contest, I argued, is that its heroes and villains change depending on who is telling the story (Habib, 2008a: 46). Thus reports of the story are deeply politicised and divisive, and all contending parties imagine political advance and success to be the point at which their particular hero ascends to the highest political office in the land and becomes the country’s first citizen. In other words, most accounts of the drama are deeply voluntarist; that is, leaders and other actors are treated as unfettered agents whose choices and behaviour are merely the result of their own abilities or follies. South Africa’s potential future is therefore imagined through the prism of the character of its leaders. Seen in this way, the country’s future looks fairly bleak.

In this book I aim to provide an antidote to these imaginings. I explain how South Africa has developed since the advent of democracy by locating its actors in context. I try to analyse the
institutional constraints within which they operate, how these have conditioned their choices, and what the consequences of those choices have been. I also explore the failures of political, economic, civic and other leaders, and consider what other policy options and behavioural choices may have been available to them as well as why these alternatives were forsaken. My aim is to offer a deeply historical view, in the sense of revealing why certain possibilities may have existed in one moment, but not in another. Societies evolve and the potential for political and socio-economic advances change too. I thus analyse the dynamic interplay between actors and context, how the latter can constrain and condition the former, but also how individuals and institutions can, with imagination, act against the grain of their location and historical moment, thereby transforming the range of possibilities open to them and, in the process, transforming society itself.

The leadership and succession dramas have played themselves out against the backdrop of South Africa’s changing social landscape. An understanding of this landscape is necessary for developing an analytical grasp of how the country has come to be where it is, and what needs to be done to take it to where it wants to be. It is therefore prudent to begin this intellectual exploration with a brief review of the state of the nation at this historical moment.

The state of the nation

Thabo Mbeki gave his two greatest speeches prior to and at the end of his presidential tenure. The first, known as his ‘I am an African’ speech, was delivered to the Constituent Assembly in 1996 in his capacity as deputy president of the Republic. It was a speech that defined the South African nation as a product of its multiple roots – black and white, chief and layman, citizen and migrant, Afrikaner
and English, worker and peasant, and rich and poor. It was also a speech that celebrated the Afrikaner rebellion against English imperialism (the Anglo-Boer War) as much as it did tribal resistance to settler encroachment, and the more recent resistance to apartheid (Mbeki, 1996). The speech imagined a cosmopolitan, non-racial and prosperous democracy, confident of its place in the world. It spoke to the aspirations of South Africans from all walks of life, and galvanised the country’s newly ascendant black professionals in particular.

The second great speech was Mbeki’s address to the nation after he had resigned his presidency in 2008 under pressure from the ANC. It was a noble and dignified exit for a president who had lost the confidence of his party. Mbeki stressed his loyalty to the ANC and his commitment to remaining within the organisation. He spoke of the ruling party’s commitment to a prosperous non-racial nation, and underscored his administration’s great success in having achieved economic growth rates for the longest period in South Africa’s history. Yet, he also acknowledged that the dividends of this economic growth had not been equally shared, and that too many still lived in poverty and squalor. Finally, Mbeki reiterated his respect for the Constitution and the rule of law, and categorically denied having influenced the decisions of the National Prosecuting Authority, in its case against Jacob Zuma or any other individual that had appeared before the courts. He concluded his speech by reminding South Africans that the true measure of a people is how they respond to adversity, and he wished the incoming administration well in their governance of South Africa’s affairs (Mbeki, 2008).

How did this situation come to be? Mbeki was correct to note in his resignation speech that South Africa in 2008 was a fundamentally different place from what it had been in 1994. Its public institutions had largely been deracialised, and the post-apartheid government had passed multiple laws, including the
South Africa’s Suspended Revolution

Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Employment Equity Act of 1998, to address the inequities of the country’s past. The country’s Constitution codified the socio-economic and political rights of all citizens, and despite being qualified by ‘practicality’ clauses, its Bill of Rights nevertheless provides citizens with enormous leverage if they want to better their circumstances. The state had also done much to improve living conditions for the majority. The government’s review of its performance on the tenth anniversary of the democracy (PCAS, 2003) indicated that 1985 545 housing subsidies had been approved to a value of R24.22 billion; new water connections benefitted 9 million people; 70 per cent of households had electricity connections by 2001; 1.8 million hectares of land had been redistributed since 1994; and 1600 633 new jobs had been created. The review maintained that if these social provisions were taken into account, poverty rates could be considered to have declined significantly in South African society (PCAS, 2003: 17–18, 24–26, 36).

Unfortunately this is only one side of the story. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, there is a darker side to South Africa’s economic successes. The post-apartheid regime, particularly after 1996, coupled a conservative macro-economic programme – the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) – with a narrow black-empowerment agenda. The net effect was the consolidation and reinforcement of the bifurcated social structure bequeathed by apartheid, albeit with some deracialisation among its upper echelons. Thus, while water, electricity and communications infrastructure was being expanded, the introduction of a new cost-recovery model meant that millions of people were denied access to water and power because of their inability to pay for these services (McDonald and Pape, 2002). In addition, although GEAR may have facilitated economic growth and allowed some to benefit enormously, it left millions unemployed. The middle classes expanded dramatically, with the rise of black professionals and the
appointment of black civil servants. A small politically connected black business elite also emerged, largely from politically brokered and state-financed transfers of corporate ownership. The net effect was that while poverty first increased and then decreased, levels of inequality have risen consistently throughout the post-apartheid era. In my view, this particular feature of the transition contributed to Mbeki’s downfall at Polokwane.

Of course, there were other contributing factors. As Mark Gevisser (2007) convincingly argues, Mbeki’s support base was always among the intelligentsia, and the urban middle and upper-middle classes, mainly within the black community and to some extent among the white population. This grouping, especially its black component, constituted a significant proportion of the activist and leadership base of the ANC, and for years they constituted Mbeki’s primary support base. Even when they disagreed with one or other of Mbeki’s policies, he remained their philosopher president. They were proud of the fact that he could hold his own with politicians in London and New York. He represented African modernity: proud of his roots, but cosmopolitan in orientation, a national politician and a global statesman, pursuing a liberal economic agenda, with a socially responsive progressive political rhetoric. He represented an African version of the global middle-class dream.

Yet in the later years of his presidency, this stratum largely abandoned Mbeki, believing that he had betrayed their hopes and vision. For them, South Africa was meant to be a caring, modern, cosmopolitan social democracy. Of course this vision was a shallow one, and the only people who could afford to harbour it were the middle and upper-middle classes. For the vast majority, there was nothing caring or social about South Africa’s democracy. Nevertheless, despite the shallowness of this dream, it did galvanise the imagination of the privileged, or at least the relatively privileged, classes that were the mainstay of Mbeki’s support base.
Three developments shattered their vision. First, in the later years of his presidency there was a growing perception that Mbeki was incapable of empathising with ordinary citizens. For example, the reputation of the president and his minister of health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, fell to pieces as a result of their AIDS denialism. When subsequent scandals broke about the quality of care and the death of new-born babies at Mount Frere hospital in the Eastern Cape (*Daily Dispatch*, 12/07/2007), the Mbeki administration’s response was to cover things up. Witch-hunts became the order of the day, and the political leadership led by the president and the health minister went into denial. Those who broke the story, and leaders who attempted to address the problem, were reprimanded and harassed. Thus, when then deputy minister of health, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, paid an unscheduled visit to the hospital and confirmed that conditions were dire, she was first reprimanded and subsequently fired, forcing the respected medical journal, *The Lancet* (18/08/2007), to condemn the decision. Instead of empathising with the victims of the service delivery failure, and the mothers who had lost their children, Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang buried their heads in the sand, and continued to deny that there was anything wrong with the public health system.

Similarly, when confronted with a question about crime in an interview on national television in January 2007, Mbeki remarked that the problem was being seriously overplayed. Indeed, in the same interview, he argued that one could walk freely in the Johannesburg suburb of Auckland Park, where the interview was being filmed, without fear of being mugged and attacked (*Mail & Guardian*, 2/02/2007). Not only did this betray ignorance about levels of crime in Johannesburg, and in much of the rest of the country, it also downplayed the seriousness of the problem of violent crime. Instead of sympathising with victims of murder, rape and robbery, Mbeki refused to engage with the fears of his citizens, accusing them instead of being active or unwitting agents of racial bigotry.
Again, Mbeki showed no empathy for victims, and his immediate response was to deny the social reality. This behaviour seemed to signal a leader incapable of empathy and seriously out of touch with his country’s citizens.

Second, there was a growing perception that state institutions were being manipulated for personal and political gain. Of course, Zuma levelled this charge against Mbeki. COSATU and the SACP supported Zuma, arguing that the National Prosecuting Authority and other state institutions were being deployed against Mbeki’s political opponents. Initially, this was treated, at least publicly, with a degree of scepticism. But Mbeki’s behaviour, and that of those around him, increasingly suggested that the charge may not be completely unfounded. The processes involved in appointments to the board of the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation, for instance, violated legitimate democratic protocols when MPs were instructed to appoint a set of individuals decided on by the ANC’s leadership (The Sunday Independent, 16/09/2007). Similarly, Mbeki’s suspension of Vusi Pikoli as head of South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority in 2008 created political waves and was seen as indirectly protecting then police commissioner Jackie Selebi from prosecution. Selebi has subsequently been imprisoned for corruption (Mail & Guardian, 5/10/2007). Both cases were seen as examples of Mbeki manipulating decision making within state institutions to serve his own political ends.

Third, and this is clearly related to both of the preceding points, there was a widespread perception that Mbeki’s Machiavellian behaviour – that is, his defence of those close to him, while dealing severely with opponents – contravened democratic norms. Again dramatic evidence of this emerged in the last few years of Mbeki’s reign. Mbeki dismissed Jacob Zuma but refused to fire Jackie Selebi, even though the allegations against both men were equally serious. Similarly, Mbeki went out of his way to defend an incompetent health minister who brought the ANC and the nation into disrepute,
but fired a popular deputy minister who supported the interests of the poor and the marginalised, including people living with HIV and AIDS. These incidents gave credence to the view held by many in COSATU, the SACP, and even in the ANC, that Mbeki was inconsistent in his application of the rules, and was using his position to undermine the political contestation that should have been the stuff of everyday democratic practice.

Ultimately these and similar developments exposed as a fallacy the vision of ‘the caring and socially responsive democratic society’ harboured by the middle and upper-middle classes during South Africa’s early transition. Feeling betrayed, they turned against Mbeki. He began to be seen as an autocrat, not the democrat they had supported; as a manipulator, not the politically astute entrepreneur they had endorsed; one who turned against those closest to him, not the resolute politician who stood up against the forces of populism. Indeed, the popular image of Mbeki at the end of 2007 was one of a vindictive politician who had caused his own misfortunes. As these social strata turned against him, they left him vulnerable to the growing list of political enemies that he had accumulated in his rise to power.

What took place at the ANC’s national electoral conference in Polokwane in 2007 has become the stuff of legend. The conference was preceded by a divisive election campaign led by Zuma, in which he criss-crossed the country, lobbying various ANC branches to support him. Eventually, the Mbeki and Zuma camps went to Polokwane having each secured about 40 per cent of delegates’ votes. The remaining 20 per cent of the delegates remained neutral, and were in search of an alternative candidate. It was this independent group that turned the tide in favour of Zuma. Confronted with a choice between Mbeki and Zuma, they went for the latter in the hope of bringing about change. The elections were a rout of Mbeki’s camp. Not only did Zuma win 60 per cent of the votes, he got his entire slate of candidates elected by a similar margin (Fikeni, 2009).
It is important to note that the political alliance that brought Zuma to power at Polokwane was never ideologically coherent. Zuma simply galvanised a wide range of disaffected ANC members and leaders. These included social democrats marginalised by Mbeki (including COSATU and the SACP), traditionalists alarmed by Mbeki’s modernist and internationalist desires, disaffected black business leaders looking for an opportunity at the feeding trough, and rogue intelligence officials. It is therefore not surprising that the Zuma administration represents an odd mix of contested economic radicalism and social conservatism.

As discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, the South African government’s shift to the left in terms of economic policy has been heavily contested. On the one hand, the Zuma administration has formally launched some new economic policies such as the New Growth Path (Department of Economic Development, 2010) and revitalised some older ones such as the Industrial Policy Action Plan (Department of Trade and Industry, 2010), which have the reindustrialisation of South Africa as their agenda. Both programmes focus on growing industrial and economic sectors in ways that can absorb semi-skilled and unskilled labour, broaden black economic empowerment and reduce economic inequality. At the same time rumblings about the impracticality of the New Growth Path and the need for fiscal conservatism are growing louder within the ruling party and in various state departments, including the finance ministry. Intra-party rebellions led by certain members of the ANC’s national executive committee, supported particularly by black business moguls, have criticised the extent to which COSATU and the SACP influence the Zuma administration’s economic direction (see Chapter Three for more on this).

The ANC hoped to resolve these tensions at its national elective conference held in Mangaung in December 2012, the first one to be held after the dramatic events at Polokwane. Instead, it compounded the confusion by adopting resolutions on the economy that provide
little detail or clarity, and by overturning earlier decisions, such as the one on banning labour brokers, that had been made at Polokwane five years earlier. In addition, although Zuma’s address to the Mangaung Conference expressly indicated a commitment to socio-economic equality, the conference then proceeded to appoint billionaire businessman, Cyril Ramaphosa, as deputy president. All of this suggests that the ANC is a deeply divided party still seeking its collective economic raison d’être.

The social conservatism of the Zuma administration similarly divides the ruling party. Evident in the militarist strategy that has been evoked to deal with the scourge of violent crime, this social conservatism is equally visible in incursions into civil liberties. For example, the justice system has been weakened through the appointment of dubious civil servants and conservative judges, and the passing of controversial legislation such as the Protection of State Information Bill and the Traditional Courts Bill. The former undermines public transparency and effectively enables the intelligence services to cloak their activities behind a veil of national security, while the latter empowers traditional leaders vis-à-vis rural residents and establishes what Mahmood Mamdani has referred to as a bifurcated state and mode of political rule (Mamdani, 1996).

These developments have provoked opposition from civil society while dividing the ruling party and its alliance partners. The passage of the Protection of State Information Bill, for instance, has been opposed by COSATU, which is a founding member of the Right2Know campaign, a civil society alliance, which challenged the Bill in the Constitutional Court. These developments, together with COSATU’s continuous criticism of corruption in the upper echelons of the government and the ANC, paint a picture of a ruling party riddled with divisions and rivalries. The expulsion of Julius Malema and the increasingly strained relations between the ANC Youth League and its parent body have further consolidated the image of a ruling party paralysed by internal fissures.
Similar divisions have imprinted themselves on the nation as a whole. Although the Zuma administration has deepened the economic shift to the left, this has not yet translated into real gains for the poor on the ground. As shown in Chapter Three, South Africa’s economy has continued to grow, but at a slower rate than that of its competitors and neighbours. Unemployment, poverty and inequality continue to plague the nation. In Chapter Four, I review the ways in which corruption, enrichment and crass consumption distinguish the conduct of many in the political and economic elite. Strikes and service-delivery protests – numbering 12,654 and 11,033 in 2010 and 2011 respectively – continue to multiply, earning South Africa the title of ‘protest capital of the world’ (Alexander, 2012). Whereas public institutions have deracialised, public discourse regularly degenerates into racial rhetoric, often led by ruling party politicians themselves. Thus, in many ways, South Africa has hardly moved since the end of Mbeki’s presidential tenure, and the country is no closer to the prosperous cosmopolitan vision Mbeki projected in his speech to the constituent assembly in 1996.

Many attempts have been made to explain this state of affairs. Most, as indicated earlier, focus on actors, and on Thabo Mbeki in particular. See for example, Xolela Mangcu’s *To the Brink* (2008), his subsequent *The Democratic Moment* (2009), and Mark Gevisser’s biography of Mbeki, *The Dream Deferred* (2007). Mangcu (2008) explains the heightened racial discourse and South Africa’s foreign policy (particularly in relation to Zimbabwe) as flowing from Mbeki’s insecurities and fears about his own political future. Mangcu’s hopes for the Zuma presidency (2009) are similarly predicated on the individual character traits of the president. Gevisser (2007) provides a more sophisticated explanation, accounting for the centralisation of power in South Africa’s political system and its neo-liberal economics through an analysis of Mbeki’s personality which, he argues, was defined by the fact that the president grew up in a space between worlds – between rural and urban, between modernism
and traditionalism, between father and comrade, and between the international and the national. Gevisser argues that this profoundly affected Mbeki, generated the aloof personality that the world has come to know, and defined both his technocratic orientation manifested in GEAR and his centralised style of management.

However, although these views illuminate aspects of South Africa’s transition, they do not offer a comprehensive understanding of the country’s democratisation and evolution. That is, they fail to recognise that individuals, however powerful they may be, are constrained by the institutional constraints of the positions they occupy and the pressures they face. In the celebrated words of Karl Marx (1852/1972: 437), people ‘make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past’.

In a similar vein, and influenced by the methodological premise encapsulated in these words, Henrique Fernando Cardoso, one of the former presidents of Brazil, and his co-author, the late Chilean academic Enzo Faletto, explained Latin American development in the 1960s by emphasising what they called ‘the structural conditioning of social life’, and ‘the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements and class struggles’ (1979: x). Such historical-structuralist explanations dissect the dynamic interplay between actors and context, between historical conditions and present circumstances. This methodological premise facilitates a deeper and clearer understanding of the current state of affairs in South Africa.

Three influential scholarly works grounded within this methodological perspective have been published on the South African transition, each offering a distinctive explanation of how South Africa got to where it is now. Two of these, Why Race Matters in South Africa (MacDonald, 2006), and Class Race and Inequality in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006), were published soon
after South Africa’s new democracy celebrated its tenth anniversary, while the third, *Pushed to the Limit* (Marais, 2011) came out after Jacob Zuma ascended to the presidency. All three offer macro-studies of South Africa, and attempt to explain the overall dynamics and outcomes of the transition. All three critique the transition’s current trajectory and recommend or imply alternative policies and agendas.

Michael MacDonald began his study by explaining that citizenship under apartheid was defined by a group identity, which was primarily determined by the state’s actions, behaviours and policies (2006: 3–4). The apartheid state also fashioned a partnership with capital, which made special allowances for white citizens in exchange for cheap black labour. This led to an overlap between racial and class categories, with white being equated with prosperity, and black with poverty. Moreover, unlike in other societies where prosperity is arguably the product of the endowments in the private sphere—such as intelligence, skills and inheritance—in South Africa it is readily apparent to all that wealth is a direct product of political processes (2006: 49–63).

MacDonald identified this as the central conundrum confronting both capital and the ANC at the dawn of the transition. He argued that, by the 1980s, apartheid had become too expensive for capital. Apartheid not only jeopardised the entire system, it failed to create the stability required for its effective functioning. As a result, important elements within the business community recognised the necessity of arriving at a political accommodation and establishing a democracy since, as MacDonald maintains, this was perceived to be a more legitimate political host for capitalism (2006: 71–74; 88). It is important to note that those who eventually broke ranks with the apartheid regime included representatives of both English and Afrikaans sections of capital.6

Like the apartheid state, the ANC was confronted with two options: transform the socio-economic system or find a way
South Africa’s Suspended Revolution

of accommodating the interests of capital. MacDonald argues that, given the power of the corporate sector, the ANC chose the latter. But, he maintained, the ANC was then confronted with the problem of how to legitimise the system? Its answer, he argues, was to deracialise the apex of corporate power by creating a black bourgeoisie and upper-middle class (2006: 124–160). This, however, would only work if the interests of black elites could pass as being identical to those of the black population as a whole. The only way this could be done, MacDonald argues, was by advancing a culturalist conception of politics, one more typical of representatives of apartheid South Africa, where nation was conceived of as originating in culture defined, of course, in terms of race. In MacDonald’s view, this capitulation to a culturalist conception undermined the concept of nationhood that the liberation struggle was based on, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. In this intellectual tradition, he argues, both the ANC and the Black Consciousness Movement gravitated towards a politicist definition of nation; that is, nationhood was conceived as originating in a common experience of oppression. The practical consequences of the ANC’s shift away from this tradition ‘is the reifying of racial identities, its repudiation of the principles of non-racialism, and its abandonment of the construction of a non-racial people’ (2006: 174).

Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass’s (2006) Class Race and Inequality in South Africa is an altogether different book, focused more on the political economy, more engaged with the development of policy, and far more quantitatively grounded. It is one of the more important academic contributions to an understanding of South Africa’s political economy and its transition. Marshalling a wealth of evidence, Seekings and Nattrass demonstrate a strong continuity in public policy between the late-apartheid and post-apartheid periods, effectively making the case that the overall increase in inequalities in South Africa was not simply a matter of inheritance, but also the product of policy choices made by the political elites under the
new democratic dispensation. Their argument is essentially that the post-apartheid ‘distributional regime’ – their term for the mix of economic growth path and public policies on education, the labour market, and social welfare which together structure income patterns in South Africa – incorporates significant features of its late-apartheid predecessor, with similar results and consequences. The most dramatic example of this is the capital-intensive, high-wage growth strategy that typified both the late apartheid and post-apartheid periods (2006: 165–187; 340–375). The only difference being that the deracialisation of public policy has meant that the beneficiary community has broadened from capital and white workers only, to include black industrial workers. The costs of this growth strategy have been borne by the large pool of unskilled labour: the primary victims of apartheid’s distributional regime have now become the underclasses of post-apartheid South Africa (2006: 300–339).

Since Seekings and Nattrass view the post-apartheid distributional regime as representing a deal between business and organised workers, the solution they propose, and which they label as a social democratic, pro-poor outcome, involves a labour-intensive, low-wage, and less-regulated growth strategy that has the capacity to soak up the millions of unemployed. This, they argue, should be coupled with greater education opportunities for children of the unemployed, a redistribution of assets through land reform and worker ownership of firms, as well as welfare distribution targeted primarily at the unemployed. It was precisely the latter that drove them to support the recommendation for a basic-income grant, which they suggested should be funded not through a rise in income tax, but rather by indirect taxes on expenditure, the most important of which is value-added tax. It is worth noting that in their recommendations on how the state could generate the resources required to sustain a basic-income grant, Seekings and Nattrass ensured that only the unemployed underclasses would benefit, and
that the costs of the intervention would be borne not only by the rich, but also by the middle and the employed working classes (2006: 376–399).

It may be useful to indicate the fundamental difference between these two powerful narratives of the South African transition. Seekings and Nattrass see the beneficiaries of this transition – the ‘insiders’, to use their term – as capital, both black and white, and the organised working class. The victims in their view are the marginalised, defined mainly as the unemployed, who constitute the real underclass in contemporary South African society. MacDonald, by contrast, tends to construct beneficiaries and victims in more aggregated terms. He views the beneficiaries as capital and the black bourgeoisie, whereas the victims are seen as being a wider section of the black population. Although not explicitly stated, it does seem that MacDonald counted organised workers, the lower middle class and the unemployed underclasses as among the losers in this transition.

The two narratives need not be irreconcilable, however. After all, it can be argued that beneficiaries and victims need not experience gains and incur costs in equal measure. It is possible to conceive of organised workers and the lower middle class as having experienced some socio-economic benefits from the transition, while recognising that these have been far fewer than those enjoyed by the white and black bourgeoisie and the upper classes. Similarly, it can be held that while this layer is relatively more advantaged than the unemployed underclasses, they can still be conceived as being among the losers of this transition. It is certainly true that the principal institutional instruments of the organised working class, the union federations, see themselves as having been relatively disadvantaged in the post-apartheid era (COSATU, 2006: 24).

There is, however, a weakness common to both analyses, which relates to their inadequate readings of the political dynamics within the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance and the opportunities available for
constructing an alternative development trajectory. Of course, this manifests in very different ways in the two books.

MacDonald’s work presents the shift away from non-racialism and a cosmopolitan view of citizenship in too absolute a way. Although this is indeed one side (if not the dominant interpretation) of the story, competing developments point to the fact that alternative understandings, that imply more progressive futures, are also possible. And these are not reflected only in the values enshrined in the Constitution, as MacDonald rightly recognised (2006: 179–181), or in the policy options articulated by and the behaviour of the ANC alliance partners. They are also reflected in the behaviour and agendas of the state elites themselves. For example, a cosmopolitan value system permeates the commitment to the African renaissance and the particular brand of African nationalism that Mbeki espoused. Similarly, Mbeki’s commitment to non-racialism was reflected not only in the language of the redress and other legislation, but also in the make-up of his Cabinet, his inner circle and his general behaviour (Habib et al., 2003: 2–5).

This is not to suggest that my reading of state elite behaviour is necessarily more accurate than that presented by MacDonald. Rather, I am pointing to the tensions between, and conflicting elements within, the agendas of state elites. This means that given a different configuration of power, state agendas could be directed in a more non-racial and cosmopolitan direction.

My criticism of Seekings and Nattrass’s work is of a different nature. It is addressed at two levels. First, they assumed that South Africa’s corporatist traditions and institutions (such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and the willingness of various players to consult around at least some policies) had sufficient strength to implement the low-wage, labour-intensive, less-regulated economic strategy that they proposed (2006: 388–392). But were South Africa’s corporatist institutions and traditions as strong as they assumed when Seekings and Nattrass
put forward their proposals? As discussed in Chapter Four, a careful assessment of the outcomes of these institutions, and a reading of the broader literature, suggests that this was really not the case. After all, other than the Labour Relations Act (1995), all other significant legislation and documents, including the state’s economic policy as encapsulated in GEAR, bypassed the deliberations of corporatist institutions (see Adam et al., 1997; Alexander, 2002; Bond, 2000; Marais, 2001). Moreover, at the time, COSATU and other labour federations tended to view institutions such as NEDLAC as relatively toothless, and saw themselves as having, on balance, lost out in the transition (COSATU: 2006: 8–9; 24).

It is true that the labour federation consistently supported the continuation and strengthening of NEDLAC and other corporatist institutions. Care must be taken, however, not to read more into this than is necessary. Despite its formal commitment to these institutions, COSATU had learnt in the course of the transition to bypass them when they failed to serve its interests. Moreover, as I argue in Chapter Four, while the structural conditions have become more facilitative of a social pact in the post-Polokwane period, this is unlikely to be realised on the one-sided terms proposed by Seekings and Nattrass. It is likely to be realised only if elite expectations – read the aspirations of politicians and corporate mandarins – are as circumscribed as those of organised workers. The essential problem with Seekings and Nattrass’s analysis is that the only way they conceptualised policy impact was through formal institutional processes. However, as is well known, extra-institutional action and mobilisation can prompt elites to undertake policy reform and behave more appropriately, if not more effectively, than institutional negotiations and corporatist pacts (Ballard et al., 2006).9

This raises the second and more serious criticism that can be levelled against Seekings and Nattrass. Their book, as does much of their earlier work (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997; Seekings and Nattrass, 2002), makes the case for how a high-wage, capital-
intensive strategy hurts the unskilled unemployed underclasses and ensures that employed workers are relatively privileged (2006: 340–375). Indeed, they go so far as to describe employed workers as a privileged group and as among the winners in the transition (2006: 46, 374). But as Franco Barchiesi (2011: 206) demonstrates, the precariousness of their jobs, the ‘uneven and fragile’ nature of the benefits that they have gained, and the fact that ‘democratisation and racial redress have largely not reversed the injuries of unilateral corporate power’, means that unionised black workers cannot be ‘conceived among the winners of the post-apartheid transition’ or as being ‘on the way to become a prosperous middle class’.

But even if one disputes Barchiesi’s conclusion, and views the beneficiaries as both employed workers and capital, why, given that the latter is more privileged than the former, should the lower middle and working classes help to pay the cost of raising the underclasses out of poverty? As COSATU argues (COSATU and NEHAWU, 2003), why should the rich not be financially responsible for the achievement of this collective social good? After all, they were one of the primary beneficiaries of apartheid.

Given their explicit commitment to social democracy (2006: 380), how do we explain Seekings and Nattrass’s moral position in this regard? The only answer that makes sense is that they believe that in the global system business is too powerful and therefore will not be persuaded to carry the costs of this initiative. If this is their position, is it a fair assumption to make? There are a number of cases across the world, such as the Scandinavian countries or western Europe more generally, and even the Asian Tigers – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – in which economic and political elites have been prompted to choose a human-oriented development trajectory. Does it not make sense, then, to establish a research agenda on the politics of policy making, with the express aim of trying to understand under what conditions elites can be made to behave in systemically beneficial ways?
South Africa’s Suspended Revolution

Such a moral charge cannot be laid against Hein Marais’s *Pushed to the Limit* (2011), which has a very different philosophical tenor. The essential thesis of this sequel to his earlier work, *Limits to Change* (2001), is that South Africa’s democratic transition is merely an attempt by the ruling class to establish a new growth path after its previous attempts in the late-apartheid period failed to address the economic crisis that overcame the country from the 1970s. His view is that the ruling class gave the ANC a mandate to deliver stable and sustainable economic growth in exchange for a limited redress project that involved the creation of a black capitalist class (2011: 389). While the ruling party hoped that this would create a level of political and social stability, thereby creating a momentum for a slow but steady project of empowerment and transformation, the economic policies of the post-apartheid era instead aggravated the social inheritance bequeathed by apartheid, provoking intense resistance from the poor.

Marais argues that the Mbeki administration responded to this with a dual agenda of pacification and fear. The former resulted in the expansion of social support grants, and the latter culminated in the centralisation of power, the marginalisation of critics, and the isolation and sometimes public humiliation of political competitors. Despite this, the resistance and protests grew louder and, in Marais’ view, Zuma’s ascendancy to the leadership was an attempt by the party to re-establish its hold over the citizenry (2011: 403). Marais is convinced that this is unlikely to work given the level of policy continuity between Zuma’s administration and that of his predecessor. Indeed, Marais notes that the ANC’s rule is less stable than it was a decade ago and anticipates the continuation of social struggles (2011: 400–403). Marais suggests, however, that these do not constitute as coherent a rebellion as many activists imagine, but remain sporadic and isolated. He concludes by arguing that progressives have to prepare for a long and arduous road of ‘experimenting, building and adapting’ (2011: 460).
Without doubt, Marais’s book is a useful one, that combines very detailed descriptions with an understanding of how political and policy choices are conditioned by the balance of power within South Africa. His analysis contains three significant weaknesses, however. First, he explicitly suggests that capital is trying to reconstruct its hegemonic project and that the ANC is a junior partner in this regard. This projects a level of coherence onto the corporate sector that is just not evident. Even a cursory engagement with the business community reveals that it is seriously divided and unlikely to reach consensus on the terms of any newly reconfigured hegemonic project. Moreover, the ANC is not a junior partner in the initiative. Indeed, it is the pre-eminent actor, even though it is constrained by the balance of power, and sometimes overestimates its abilities while underestimating the consequences of its choices. It therefore seems more appropriate to conceive of the ANC as the flawed and constrained but leading player in the drama of South Africa’s transition.

Second, Marais does not sufficiently recognise the subtle shifts in the balance of power that resulted from developments at the Polokwane conference. This may be because he seems to be seeking substantive ruptures rather than subtle shifts. Although dramatic for the key actors in the drama, Polokwane led to a relatively subtle shift in the balance of power, manifested in the enhancement in the leverage capacity of organised labour and in increased levels of uncertainty within the business community. These shifts create the potential for different outcomes, even if these may not be revolutionary in nature. In addition, Marais is not sufficiently cognisant of the differences between the Mbeki and Zuma administrations. Yet, as I indicate in Chapter Three, there are important economic programmes that the Zuma administration is either pioneering or deepening, and while some of these may have emerged since the publication of his book, Marais’s analysis clearly did not anticipate the left-leaning agenda implicit in these
South Africa's Suspended Revolution

initiatives. Of course, this is only one side of the story. There are many countervailing tendencies – including increasing corruption, the militarisation of the police services, and the social conservatism of Jacob Zuma – that point away from a deeper or more radical development trajectory. Nevertheless, some of the policies developed in the post-Polokwane period suggest that the potential for a more progressive agenda is greater than Marais anticipates.

Third, Marais’s analysis offers a powerful critique but does not consider what needs to be done except in the most general of terms. He seems to be unable to conceptualise the kind of reforms that would deepen the progressive character of the transition. Again, this may be (despite his protestations in the final paragraph of his book) because he is seeking substantive ruptures rather than the structural, snowballing reforms more compatible with the Gramscian strategy that he professes to support. These are the only kinds of changes that are feasible for the moment but they hold the potential of slowly altering South Africa’s future.

This question is discussed further in Chapter Seven of this book. For now, it is sufficient to note that the two defining characteristics of the state of the nation at the current moment are the continued racialisation of identities, and the growing socio-economic inequality created largely by the increasing wealth of those, both black and white, at the upper end of the class hierarchy. While existing scholarship has illuminated much of the transition and its development trajectory, perhaps the primary question is why this state of affairs continues to prevail in South Africa. This question is fundamental not only for scholars, but also for the architects of the transition. Solutions will not be found until there is a comprehensive understanding of why and how South Africa has evolved in the way that it has. Moreover, a comprehensive answer to this question requires investigation beyond descriptions of institutional architecture or policy contours and their effects. It requires an explanation of why these have taken the forms that
they have; in effect, it requires an investigation of the politics of the transition.

**Explaining the transition**

Scholarly literature on the South African transition has been published in two waves. The first wave, produced and published in the years leading up to and immediately after the 1994 elections, took a programmatic and descriptive form (Adam and Moodley, 1993; Atkinson and Friedman, 1994; Friedman, 1993; Slabbert, 1992). This was partly understandable given the contemporariness of the transition and the desire among (and opportunities provided to) scholars to participate in the process of crafting a legitimate, democratic political order. Although this was useful for describing the events, and arguing for one or another ideological or programmatic solution, much of this scholarly literature was unable to provide a comprehensive analysis. In fact, it lacked analytical focus, which prevented it from explaining why particular choices had been made, what forces and factors had prompted these choices, or from outlining the likely results and limitations involved.

This then prompted a second wave of material, published around and in the years following South Africa’s second democratic election in 1999. This literature, which was ideologically more diverse, advanced two methodologically different sets of explanations. The first critiqued earlier accounts that had focused on actors such as elites, political parties, and social movements (Bond, 2000; Desai, 2002; Hirsch, 2005; Marais, 2001; Terreblanche, 2002). The second, including the work reflected upon earlier by MacDonald (2006), Seekings and Nattrass (2006) and Marais (2011), tried to integrate structural and agential variables with varying levels of success.
This methodological schism mirrors the divide in the international literature on democratic transitions and their reversals. Much of the early scholarly literature on what Samuel Huntington (1991) termed the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation, rejected the inevitability thesis of the structuralist accounts of democratisation of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, including the work of Lipset (1960), Moore Jr (1966), Schmitter (1974) and O’Donnell, (1979). Instead it focused on agential variables, and in particular on political elites (see, for example, Di Palma, 1990; Higley and Gunther, 1992; O’Donnell et al., 1986). Soon these scholars, too, came under criticism for presenting excessively voluntarist explanations (see Karl, 1990; Munck, 1994; Remmer, 1991; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992).

Then a new wave of integrative explanations emerged, focusing on both structural and agential variables. Two of the earliest examples were Huntington’s (1991) *The Third Wave* and Ruth and David Collier’s (1991) *Shaping the Political Arena*. Huntington distinguished between causes and causers of democratisation. The former refers to structural variables – the performance and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, global economic growth, changes in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies of the United States and the European Union, and the impact of the technological revolution – that define the contexts of various transitions. The latter refers to the individual actors whose strategies, decisions and behaviour promoted democratisation (Huntington, 1991).

Similarly, albeit in a very different ideological vein, Collier and Collier (1991) explained the political systems in eight Latin American countries as a product of attempts to incorporate the working class into their societies. The number of workers had grown dramatically through the first half of the twentieth century. However, the specific forms of integration attempted in each country were dependent ‘on the dynamics of intra-elite politics and choices by actors within the state’ (Collier and Collier, 1991). Both studies therefore integrated
Introduction

structural and agential variables in their analyses of regime transitions.

I attempt to locate my own analysis in the methodological tradition of these more integrative studies, and aim to understand the role of political actors within specific structural conditions. Just as significantly, I borrow heavily from the work of Huber et al., (1997) who argue that particular clusters of power – class interactions, the nature of the state, and state–society relations – are responsible for shaping the conditions of democratisation and the possibilities for consolidation. Like Hein Marais’s (2011) study, my analysis focuses on the balance of power as a variable informing the choices and decisions of actors in the South African transition. Unlike Marais, however, I conceive the balance of power as having evolved during the transition period. In my view, two distinct configurations are evident in the transition to date. The first informed the parameters of the settlement at the dawn of the transition, as well as the policies of the Mandela and the early years of the Mbeki administration. The second was an evolution that culminated in the Polokwane conference, and which has subsequently enabled certain choices and constrained other possibilities during Zuma’s presidential tenure.

The nature of South Africa’s transition was defined not only by the culmination of the resistance and reforms of the late-apartheid and early negotiations period (the transition’s liberalisation phase), but also by the transformations that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union, including globalisation and the integration of production processes around the world (Marglin and Schor, 1992; Mittelman, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002).

The configuration of power at this key moment in South Africa’s history was Janus-faced. One the one hand, there was a political stalemate between apartheid’s rulers, the National Party, and the ANC – a condition that Dankwart Rustow saw as necessary for the genesis of democracy (1970). The National Party’s leverage was, of course, the military capacity of the apartheid regime which
far exceeded that of the liberation movement. The ANC, on the other hand, had the legitimacy it derived from the fact that it had the support of the majority of the population. These competing strengths and the failure of the two organisations to neutralise one another (as they had attempted to do in the 1980s and early 1990s) effectively created a political stalemate.

On the other hand, despite the illusions of activists and union-aligned academics, the corporate sector had decidedly more economic leverage than the union movement. The collapse of the Soviet Union legitimised various market-policy prescriptions and the economic transformations that flowed from the integration of production systems around the world greatly enhanced the leverage of the corporate sector vis-à-vis unions and other social actors. The only resources available to the union movement were its capacities to strike and to influence its members’ votes, and given its historical alliance with the ANC and the lack of alternative political options, neither of these capacities could be used to effect the change they might have wanted to see. This, then, was the balance of power that defined the negotiated settlement and the policy parameters introduced during the Mandela and Mbeki eras, both of which are discussed in more detail in Chapters Two and Three.

This configuration of power has evolved since, and underwent its most significant, yet subtle, change at the Polokwane conference in 2007. Here Jacob Zuma challenged Thabo Mbeki for the leadership of the ruling party and the nation. The institutional foundation for Zuma’s campaign was provided by the ANC Youth League, COSATU and the SACP. The union federation and the SACP had been marginalised by Mbeki since the adoption of GEAR in 1996. They had fought back in multiple ways, including struggles around working conditions, campaigning for the provision of antiretroviral medication to people living with HIV and AIDS, challenging South Africa’s policy on Zimbabwe, and protesting the failures of service delivery. From 2005, this struggle took the form of a succession
battle and ultimately culminated in the defeat of Mbeki at the Polokwane conference in 2007.

Zuma’s victory was therefore as much a victory for COSATU and the SACP. But while this has enhanced the leverage of these organisations within the Zuma administration, their positions are still heavily contested. The corporate sector retains enormous influence, particularly because its control over the lever of investment is seen as a precondition for growing the economy. Moreover, there are many within the ANC who resent the increased influence of the left, and prefer the more traditional, market-oriented strategy of the Mbeki era. Yet the relatively enhanced voice of COSATU and the SACP, together with global shifts towards a neo-Keynesian economic agenda as a result of interventions to address the 2008 economic recession, has created a relative parity in the balance of power between labour and the business community. This fragile and contested parity has nevertheless opened up policy options within the Zuma administration that are discussed in more detail in the chapters that follow.

**A brief outline of the book**

In the next chapter, Chapter Two, I focus on the post-apartheid state and its deficits in relation to accountability and service delivery. Beginning with an analysis of the debates that took place during the constitutional negotiations, I explain how these shaped the institutional contours of the post-apartheid state. I then attempt to explain why South Africa’s ruling political elite is so unresponsive to its citizens, focusing particularly on how the electoral system, and the fact that there is no viable opposition party, affects the dynamic of accountability within government. The post-apartheid state’s dismal record in terms of service delivery is explored with
attention being given to the powers of different tiers of government, the particular character of affirmative action, the effects of cadre and factional deployment, as well as corruption. I end the chapter by identifying the essence of the accountability and service-delivery challenges facing the post-apartheid state.

The political economy of democratic South Africa is discussed in Chapter Three. I first describe the evolution of the state’s economic policy, and analyse the political variables, including the particular configurations of power that informed its policy choices as well as their social impact throughout the democratic transition. I then analyse the economic policy debates that have occurred within the Zuma administration, identifying the contending factions, their respective leverage capacities, and the likely evolution of economic policy in the years to come. Reiterating what many have identified as South Africa’s key challenges – unemployment, inequality and poverty – I note that unless these are comprehensively addressed they herald further social polarisation and political instability.

In Chapters Four and Five, I consider dynamics pertaining to the business community and civil society. In Chapter Four, I consider the prospects for a social pact between labour, business and the state. The failure of a similar initiative in the 1990s is accounted for with reference to the balance of power in those years. Drawing on international examples, I show that social pacts have been successful only where there is parity in the leverage capacities of business and labour. While relative parity between these sectors has emerged in the post-Polokwane period, the possibility of realising such a pact is being undermined by the state’s failure to manage popular expectations, which, as a prerequisite, require the containment of the crude consumptionist practices and enrichment desires of both the political and economic elite. This is identified in the chapter’s concluding reflections as another of the serious challenges confronting contemporary South Africa.
In Chapter Five, I investigate how these dynamics play out within broader civil society. The chapter begins with an examination of the impact of democratisation and liberalisation on civil society and its attempts to address South Africa’s contemporary challenges. In particular, I note the deracialisation and pluralisation of civic activity in the post-apartheid era. I then consider the state’s responses to civic activity, and how these have led to a situation in which neither the state nor radical activists understand the need for civic plurality, and therefore continue to imagine and demand homogenous (if differing) responses from citizens. I conclude by arguing that it is precisely the plurality of civil society, and its multiple engagements with the state, that has the potential to produce the checks and balances required for the consolidation of democracy and the achievement of inclusive development.

South Africa’s engagements with the wider world are discussed in Chapter Six. I identify the source of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy as being embedded in the character of its political elite – second-generation nationalists who desire a deracialised and global order but recognise their relative powerlessness to effect this outcome. Their specific response has been to engage with the international system, aiming to subvert it from within. This has required enhancing their own leverage which they have sought to achieve by focusing on the stabilisation and economic development of Africa, establishing strategic alliances with other developing nations such as Brazil, China, India and Russia, and advocating for the reform of international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In practice, standing up for the rights of citizens has been traded off against the requirements of attempting to reform the international system or addressing historical inequities. It is in this context that the domestic and international human rights community has become increasingly outraged at South Africa’s foreign policy. The Zuma administration has attempted to address this ‘rights deficit’, most
notably via its support for UN Resolution 1973, which was meant to protect civilians in Libya. But the subsequent successful pursuit of regime change by NATO forced South Africa onto the defensive as it faced criticism from some members of the ANC, various African nations and other developing countries. This re-opened debates on South Africa’s foreign-policy direction, and revealed the divisions between the South African government and the human rights community. I conclude that, with imagination, it should be possible for South Africa to simultaneously pursue the twin agendas of human rights and historical redress in the international arena.

Two chapters bring the book to a close: Chapter Seven is aimed at activists and political leaders, detailing an alternative political agenda and programme for democracy as well as inclusive development that stems from my analysis. Each of the preceding chapters concludes with a challenge. In Chapter Seven, I reflect on how these challenges can be addressed as part of a cohesive political programme. Chapter Eight, by contrast, is directed at both the academy and the intelligentsia. In it, I consider the lessons of the South African experience for theories of democratic transition, social change and conflict resolution. In this regard it reflects critically on the analysis of scholars associated with the progressive nationalist, liberal and social justice traditions, detailing how the intellectual divide between these scholarly communities can be bridged. This, the chapter argues, is essential if the intellectual foundation for democracy and inclusive development is to be established and consolidated across the globe.

The substantive analysis offered in the pages that follow explains political developments, and the evolution of the democratic transition in South Africa as the outcome of political choices of actors conditioned by the balance of power within which they operate. This does not mean that these actors are powerless to prevail against the realities of the context and moment. Indeed they can, and I discuss examples of this, such as the ‘sunset clauses’ proposed
by Joe Slovo during the negotiations process. Thus, while I attempt to explain how South Africa reached its current suspended historical moment – which Achille Mbembe (2012) describes so well as ‘caught between an intractable present and an irrecoverable past; between things that are no longer and things that are not yet’ – I also propose an alternative political agenda for South Africa and outline what needs to be done to bring the country closer to the social democratic vision encapsulated in South Africa’s Constitution.
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