Introduction

Between a Moment and an Era:  
The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung

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At the Rendezvous of Decolonization

No race possesses the monopoly of beauty, intelligence, force and there is room for all of us at the rendezvous of victory.

—Aimé Césaire, Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (1939)

In November 2006, China hosted a summit of forty-eight political leaders from countries across Africa, the third in a series sponsored by the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since 2000. Widely covered in the international media, this three-day event in Beijing aimed to crystallize a common agenda between China, with its burgeoning global role in the post-cold war world, and Africa, a continent described on posters in Beijing as “the land of myth and miracles.” Publicized as a benevolent occasion with promises of aid and trade agreements reflective of a novel global partnership outside the West, this meeting equally marked a new and ambivalent turn for many observers in Europe and North America concerned with China’s increasing influence on a continent that has been perceived by Chinese leaders as “up for grabs.” That China’s intentions are unsurprising and historically familiar—many have cited its aggressiveness
as reminiscent of European colonialism—has not mitigated these anxieties. Consumer markets and resources such as oil have been key incentives for recent Chinese attention. In particular, international criticism following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the rise of US hegemony after the cold war, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis have forced China to reconsider its foreign policy, with Sino-African relations forming a central component of this shift toward restoring its global presence and power. Unrestricted foreign aid from China has in turn been attractive for a number of African nation-states, especially governments such as Zimbabwe’s and Sudan’s that have fallen into disfavor with the IMF, the World Bank, and Western governments generally. China’s respect for sovereignty and noninterference has characterized this approach. Since 2005, China has consequently become Africa’s most important trading partner, quickly superseding the United States, France, and Great Britain. The Forum’s slogan of “Peace, Friendship, Cooperation, Development” therefore sums up the working sensibility found between both sides, though it also conceals a complex set of unsteady power relations that currently undergird this alignment.

The rhetoric of newness surrounding the Forum also obscures an equally complicated past, not only between China and Africa but between Asia and Africa generally. The present collection seeks to amend this empirical and conceptual gap, to restore a chronology and trajectory of historical experience that have been marginalized by conventional area-studies analysis. Like many projects preceding it, this volume is concerned with the complex foundations, experiences, and aftereffects of the modern history of colonization and decolonization during the 20th century. As such, it builds upon work published over the past thirty years that has sought to respond to and redress the frameworks of political economy and social knowledge produced by global imperialism. Unlike many of its predecessors, however, this volume departs from a metropole-colony focus, asserting the impact and consequent importance of connections within the global South in the making of this history. It specifically uses the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, as a central point of orientation, being an occasion—diplomatic and symbolic—
when twenty-nine African and Asian countries met to discuss the possible futures of the postcolonial world. Indeed, a recent resurgence of interest in Afro-Asian relations and the fiftieth anniversary of the conference—which established the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), whose official declaration reinstated the Ten Principles of the Bandung Communiqué—have revived focus on the meeting. This restoration, however, has also risked simplifying the complexities of 1955. From one point of view, the conference constituted a foundational moment of the early postcolonial era, manifesting the rendezvous of victory presaged metaphorically by Aimé Césaire. But from another vantage point, it equally contained the existential predicaments of newfound sovereignty and the internal and external political claims and responsibilities that would soon challenge it, particularly those generated by the cold war. In sum, Bandung comprised a complex intersection of “imagined communities”—in the influential nation-making sense as defined by Benedict Anderson—but also a set of politically constrained “represented communities” as described more recently by John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, being constituted and limited by institutionalized acts of law, diplomacy, and the structural legacies of colonial rule. Bandung contained both the residual romance of revolution, as well as the realpolitik of a new world order in the making.

This volume is therefore poised between several interrelated but often disparate fields: cold war history and postcolonial studies, global history and area studies, diplomatic history and sociocultural history. The attraction of Bandung as an event is its capacity to bring these subjects into conversation with one another, presenting a historical moment and site generative of intersecting vantage points and their storied outcomes. Indeed, the contributions to this volume speak from and to these different academic audiences through a variety of social themes—gender, law, technology, labor, ideologies of development, foreign aid, and religion among them. Yet they are unified by a concern for community formation—or, more specifically, a geopolitical communitas, as discussed later—beyond the reaches of political, geographic, and historical convention. The case studies on offer here do not seek to reconstitute a triumphant narrative of postcolonial

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autonomy and assertion—a tact that has animated many recent discussions of Afro-Asian relations thus far—but instead recuperate a more usable past by identifying the varied locations and complex, situated meanings of “Afro-Asianism,” an ill-defined term that has signaled both a cold war-era ideology of diplomatic solidarity as well as a more general phenomenon of intercontinental exchange and inter-racial connection. This volume does not pretend to cover every aspect of this history, nor does it emphasize one meaning of this expression over another. Given the still-early stage of this research field at present, we are more focused on identifying the occasions, archives, thematic realms, and analytic techniques for addressing this history. If Bandung in retrospect offered a “diplomatic revolution” for the postcolonial world, a subsequent question emerges as to how a sociocultural turn can be applied to this diplomatic history, to connect this event to preexisting area-studies agendas that have privileged the agency of local people and communities.

The essays that follow, in sum, explore these scales of power and geography not only to examine the ramifications of Bandung itself, but to add greater empirical depth to meanings of the postcolonial, a stronger area-studies perspective to cold war scholarship, and, at the broadest level, a more concerted emphasis on how political projects based in the “majority world” shaped global history during the latter half of the 20th century. But why this specific historical moment, and, furthermore, how might Bandung be situated and understood from the point of view of the present? In what ways does the Bandung conference complicate conventional exit-and-entry narratives of decolonization and generalized assertions about “the postcolony” by highlighting new forms of “political community” beyond the nation-state? In short, how does this history speak to concerns expressed with growing frequency regarding the disjunctures between 20th-century decolonization, postcolonial criticism, and the political problems of sovereignty in the global present by charting the possibilities and predicaments of the early postcolonial period? To answer these crucial questions, it is appropriate to start with a discussion of the precursors and afterlives of the Bandung moment.5
A Brief History of the Future, circa 1955

For many generations our peoples have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have been the unregarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation. Then our nations demanded, nay fought for independence, and achieved independence, and with that independence came responsibility. We have heavy responsibilities to ourselves, and to the world, and to the yet-unborn generations. But we do not regret them.

—President Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Opening Address of the Asian-African Conference, April 18, 1955

Decolonization poses fundamental challenges for the historian. From an empirical standpoint, it is both a contingent moment of political independence and a long-standing process with deep roots, at times originating with the act of initial colonization itself. It is an experience that is at once uniquely individual in scope—to people, communities, and nation-states alike—and in retrospect seemingly universal: the world witnessed a momentous wave of newly independent nation-states during the second half of the 20th century, more than doubling the number of members in the United Nations. Yet despite its relative ubiquity as a political process for many parts of the world, it is not easily contained within uniform frames of analysis, or time. The early episodes of decolonization in the Western hemisphere preceded that of Africa and Asia by almost two centuries, with the American Revolution (1776–83) and the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) subverting the imperial presence of Great Britain and France respectively in the New World. Indeed, the early modern political independence of nation-states in North and South America antedated the formal colonization of Africa and in ways influenced this new shift in political direction for Europe during the late 19th century. Asia similarly experienced European imperialism within a time frame of its own, with initial Western intrusion concurrent to parallel endeavors in the Americas during the early modern era and the final vestiges of this process relinquished as late as Great Britain’s handover of Hong Kong.

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Thus, the precolonial period in Africa does not overlap chronologically with Asia's precolonial period, in the same sense that Latin America's postcolonial period has existed for some time whereas it is still just starting for parts of Asia and Africa. Our schematic frames of chronological reference—the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras—accordingly face the challenge of synchronicity. The timing of decolonization can be out of joint when transnational and transregional comparisons are made. Further complicating such matters have been trends of subimperialism, the rise of former colonies.
such as the United States, South Africa, and China, for example, into roles of regional and global dominance, a development that decenter
Europe as a point of reference but introduces new complications in the chronological placement and meaning of decolonization in world history. Imperialism has reproduced itself in various changing forms over time and continues to do so to the present.6

Decolonization consequently presents a problem of narrative and analysis. It is not an expression that is easily transferred between contexts with a common definition intact. Like the nation-state with which it is intrinsically connected, decolonization on the surface lends itself wide use, as a process and baseline for narratives of autonomous economic development and political modernization. However, as with these issues, the outcomes are more often assumed than achieved, with a persistent risk being recourse to historical teleology to provide an explanatory structure.7 Mindful of this problem, social historians for the most part have focused on explorations of nationalism, interrogating its claims of representation, but venturing little beyond the boundaries of the nation-state at hand or chronologically further into the postcolonial period to follow its changing meanings.8 Recent work has attempted to address the internal, qualitative differences between settler and non-settler colonies, but, as underscored by the insights of diplomatic historians, other geopolitical contexts—the cold war in particular—must also be pointed to as crucial external factors in shaping and at times prolonging decolonization, as in Southeast Asia and southern Africa.9 From the vantage point of another involved field, postcolonial studies, the term “postcolonial” itself—to which decolonization is also intrinsically tied—has often been essentialized through interpretive assertions that have sought to read and inscribe a common set of experiences across much of the former colonial world.10 The universality of condition imparted by such terminology therefore deserves critical vigilance as well. Decolonization and its correlative expressions, in sum, present an ongoing predicament, enabling comparison while equally posing the concession of oversimplification. Furthermore, they underscore the disjunctive manner by which these issues are currently addressed among political scientists, economists, anthropologists, historians, and literature scholars. It is best approached as a situated process that requires

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attention to local case studies as well as broader patterns of event and meaning across space and time. Rather than simply signaling a linear, diplomatic transfer of power from colonial to postcolonial status, decolonization equally constitutes a complex dialectical intersection of competing views and claims over colonial pasts, transitional presents, and inchoate futures.

Opportunities are provided in this set of tensions as well. If empirical generalization is to be avoided, processes of decolonization offer an entry point for rethinking the specific conditions and local causes for political change, in addition to more broadly experienced continuities that have attended such shifts. As observed with the political dilemmas of many postcolonial leaders, the transition from colonial to postcolonial status was often thin on autonomy and thick with ongoing entanglements. Political sovereignty did not automatically translate into economic self-sufficiency or cultural independence, as seen in the writing of such figures as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Jawaharlal Nehru. Revisiting moments of decolonization consequently presents an opportunity for recapturing the senses of optimism, frustration, and uncertainty that characterized such occasions. Such emotive qualities found in the speeches and writings of figures who attended Bandung in 1955 reflect a lack of comfort through the absence of any stable trajectory, and they explain in part why contemporary narratives of anticolonialism and decolonization have often resorted to forms of romance, as David Scott has recently argued. In Scott’s view, anticolonial histories

have tended to be narratives of overcoming, often narratives of vindication; they have tended to enact a distinctive rhythm and pacing, a distinctive direction, and to tell stories of salvation and redemption. They have largely depended upon a certain (utopian) horizon toward which the emancipationist history is imagined to be moving.

This interpretive situation has in turn created a sense of disconnection between the failures of the postcolonial present and the complex visions of postcolonial futures expressed during moments of decolonization. Frederick Cooper, for example, has pointed to empirical
Introd. 2. Local popular reception of the arrival of international delegations in Bandung.

gaps in recent critical work that has assigned postcolonial blame on past colonial projects, a common approach that can often obscure the importance of the late colonial and early postcolonial period in shaping the era that followed. In this way, it is important to reexamine the events and features of decolonization in order to restore the competing strategies and complex visions that not only sought to achieve future outcomes, but at the time sought to inventively reshape the legacies of the past to serve such present endeavors.

Bandung was such an occasion. In retrospect, it can be seen as a pivotal moment placed in mid-century between colonial and postcolonial periods, between the era of modern European imperialism and the era of the cold war. It summarized an alternative chronology of world events attended by intellectuals and activists of color who had been subjected to forms of colonialism, racism, and class oppression. This historical sequence includes such precursors as the series of Pan-African Congresses that took place beginning in 1900, the 1911
Universal Races Congress in London, the League Against Imperialism meeting held in Brussels in 1927, and the two Pan-Asian People’s Conferences held in Nagasaki (1926) and Shanghai (1927). At a deeper level, Bandung also served as a culmination of connections and relationships that had crossed the Indian Ocean world for centuries. The common ground shared and frequently cited at the conference was the history of Western imperialism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East since the sixteenth century. These claims similarly extended to a broader set of thematic experiences including racism and cultural discrimination, which further attracted such noted observers as Richard Wright, the African American novelist. The meeting therefore captured and represented a complex global present, one that signaled political achievement but also future uncertainty. Of the twenty-nine countries that sent official delegations, many had attained independence, though there were others, particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa, which still remained under the last remnants of colonial rule. Not all were former colonies either. Constituting a diverse spectrum, participants included leading lights of the postcolonial world, such as India and Egypt, as well as countries that had recent imperial legacies of their own, namely Japan. From cultural, religious, and linguistic standpoints, the differences between attendees were equally pronounced. And yet, it is essential to recognize that the organizers themselves acknowledged such factors of division, resting their contingent solidarity and sense of purpose on a shared history of Western aggression.

The immediate backdrop to the conference were two meetings in 1954 between Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan—often referred to collectively as the Colombo Powers. Concerned with cold war tensions in Vietnam and Southeast Asia generally, one meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in April with a second held in Bogor, Indonesia, in December. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia, a vocal critic of Western intervention in Asia, originally proposed the idea of an Asian-African conference as a response to the 1954 founding of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) sponsored by the United States. Delegations were to be drawn from the existing Afro-Asian group within the United Nations. However,
the invitation list soon expanded, reflecting a diplomatic, rather than strictly continental, logic. Jawaharlal Nehru of India, for example, insisted that China be included as part of his foreign policy agenda to foster productive regional relations despite the forced acquisition of neighboring Tibet by China in 1950. This move eliminated Taiwan as a possible participant, given the tense Strait Crisis which then remained unresolved. Apartheid South Africa was also eventually excluded, as were North and South Korea which still maintained a cease-fire following the Korean War (1950–53). Israel was also voted down for fear that Arab and Muslim countries would not attend. Invitations ultimately were sent to Egypt, Turkey, Japan, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nepal, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, the Philippines, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Sudan, Liberia, and the Central African Federation.19 With China and the Colombo Powers included, twenty-nine countries in total attended, comprising a group nearly half the size of the U.N. and ostensibly representing

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an estimated 1.5 billion people, thus underscoring the numeric significance of the meeting. But of these countries, only six were from Africa, which tilted much of the agenda toward concerns found in Asia, including the Middle East.

The conference took place between April 18 and 24, 1955. The location of Bandung was significant, as it was one of the most important cities in Indonesia. Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno had received his university education and started his career as a political activist there, publishing the journal *Indonesia Muda* and helping found the Partai Nasional Indonesia. More importantly, the choice of a metropole outside the West marked a symbolic departure from its Pan-African and League Against Imperialism antecedents, underscoring the new geographic sphere of autonomy found in the nascent postcolonial world. Although a certain diplomatic complexity undergirded the meeting, the public atmosphere achieved at the conference evinced this sensibility of a new era in world history. Social activities, panels, and receptions scheduled throughout the week contributed to this mood of excitement, with the centerpiece of the conference being the opening addresses given by various heads of state, a who's who of postcolonial leaders. It was also this platform through which political tensions and opportunism emerged, posing immediate questions about the viability and longevity of Afro-Asianism as a political ideology and front. As with Sukarno, Bandung offered an unparalleled occasion for Nehru to consolidate his position as a recognized world leader, providing a diplomatic stage for his vision of nonalignment from the U.S. and Soviet Union, an idea that would gain traction in the years that followed. For Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, it enabled him to ascend to a status equivalent to that of Nehru—a position soon consolidated by the 1956 Suez Crisis—in spite of the ambiguities of the coup that placed him in power in 1952. Given its exclusion from the U.N., Zhou Enlai, China's foreign minister, similarly perceived Bandung as a moment of legitimating China in the purview of its regional neighbors. Despite tensions with the US over Taiwan and North Korea and its concurrent alliance with the USSR, the Bandung meeting presented a forum through which China could state its peaceful intentions and overcome a sense of isolation within the international community.
However, beyond this “great men” perspective on the conference were issues and situations that underscored not only competing visions of the future, but how such visions were informed and supported by the new global order being established by the United States and Soviet Union. In a recent acclaimed survey of the cold war, Odd Arne Westad has contended that this period’s greatest impact was on the Third World—not the theater of Europe as so often assumed—since American and Soviet policies ultimately formed a continued pattern of colonialism, if by revised means, with aspirations of political, economic, and ideological control. In many cases, the imperial “man on the spot” had been replaced by a member of the new postcolonial elite, as famously warned by Frantz Fanon. Among the participants, Communist China, with its then-close relations with the Soviet Union, was perhaps the most widely viewed proxy for superpower interests, although other countries maintained similar sets of connections. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, a member of NATO, had recently signed the Baghdad Pact with Great Britain on February 24, 1955 to form...
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) with the direct intention of limiting Soviet interests in the Middle East. In parallel, SEATO—with its members Thailand, the Philippines, and again Pakistan in attendance—had been formed in 1954 with the same intent. Japan and Saudi Arabia similarly had strong unilateral ties with the US. Yet, the most visible cold war fault line existed between North and South Vietnam, both of which took their opening addresses as an opportunity to accuse the other of escalating tensions within Indochina. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the 1954 Geneva Accords had granted independence to Vietnam, albeit dividing it into a pro-communist North and anti-communist South, eventually leading to the Vietnam War involving the US. Other speeches identified similar ongoing and future conflicts, perhaps most conspicuously the Palestinian and anti-apartheid struggles.

The conference thus captured a complex set of individual and group aims. The immediate outcome of the conference was a final communiqué that reinstated the desire for greater economic cooperation and cultural exchange, recognition for human rights and self-determination, the condemnation of new and future forms of imperialism, and the
need to pursue policies that would promote world peace. It is important to recognize that nonalignment as a stated principle shared by all in attendance was not an outcome of the Bandung meeting, yet again a reflection of the formal and informal security agreements that many participants had already arranged and, moreover, the priority placed on individual sovereignty. Indeed, only India, Burma, and Indonesia supported the idea explicitly. However, the more momentous result was the feeling of political possibility presented through this first occasion of “Third World” solidarity, what was soon referred to as the Bandung Spirit. In defining this sentiment of a new future that transcended the bounds of member states, Vijay Prashad writes

What they meant was simple: that the colonized world had now emerged to claim its space in world affairs, not just as an adjunct of the First or Second Worlds, but as a player in its own right. Furthermore, the Bandung Spirit was a refusal of both economic subordination and cultural suppression—two of the major policies of imperialism. The audacity of Bandung produced its own image.24

The Bandung Conference of 1955 consequently generated what has often been taken as self-evident: the idea of a Third World. Furthermore, in contrast to many contemporary understandings of this expression, the Third World was embraced as a positive term and virtue, an alternative to past imperialism and the political economies and power of the US and the Soviet Union. It represented a coalition of new nations that possessed the autonomy to enact a novel world order committed to human rights, self-determination, and world peace. It set the stage for a new historical agency, to envision and make the world anew. The recent history of imperialism and colonialism across Africa and Asia had informed these ideals. Although the 1952 origins of this expression preceded the conference by three years, Bandung captured in palpable form the potential of what this global coalition and its political imagination might mean.25

Still, the elusiveness of solidarity suggested by the word “spirit” equally characterized the aftermath of the conference. Indeed, although the sense of unity caught the Eisenhower administration off guard, the tense balance of cooperation and respect for individual
sovereignty among the delegates became more pronounced in the years that followed. Unilateral and regional security arrangements such as SEATO and CENTO remained unchanged with few exceptions, as with the departure of Iraq from CENTO in 1958. The United States and Soviet Union continued to make regional inroads during the 1950s, escalating tensions particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War alone demonstrated an inability of Afro-Asian nations to dispel foreign geopolitical influence and guaranteed that peace, as aspired to in the Bandung communiqué, would not be the prevailing norm in Asia during the cold war. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the late decline of white minority rule in southern Africa— in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and apartheid South Africa— would pose equally persistent challenges. Perhaps more politically damaging to the Bandung Spirit than these externally influenced cases were episodes of delegate nations themselves coming into conflict, at times violently. The Sino-Indian Border Conflict of 1962 as well as similar disputes between India and Pakistan undermined the
possibility of solidarity within the subcontinent. The Sino-Soviet split also presented a diplomatic complexity for former Bandung participants, despite the surface suggestion of a new nonalignment. A final setback to the principles of the communique was the gradual testing and acquisition of nuclear arsenals by China (1964), India (1974), and eventually Pakistan (1998).

Such factors accumulated over time, however, and the vision of future opportunities articulated at Bandung was not foreclosed in the short term. Nasser became an early beneficiary by quickly moving to position himself as a leader of the Third World, a status enhanced by the global support Egypt garnered during the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Great Britain and France failed, under international pressure, to regain control over the Suez Canal. In December 1957, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) was established in Cairo, marking a new endeavor in the wake of Bandung. The Soviet Union and China both became involved in its activities. AAPSO proved to have even wider reach than the Bandung meeting itself, by including a range of political and cultural organizations as opposed to official delegates from African and Asian states. The conferences it organized between 1958 and 1965 continued the Bandung Spirit by emphasizing professional exchange, cultural connections, women's coalitions, and youth participation (see the chapters by Bier and Brennan in this volume for the prominent role of Egypt). Furthermore, meetings were held within an expanding range of locales including Guinea, Ghana, and Tanzania. The most important post-Bandung development, however, was the institutionalization of nonalignment through the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations convened in September 1961 by Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, who sought greater autonomy from the USSR, initiated this formal alliance, revising once again the meaning of Afro-Asianism. The second conference held in Cairo in October 1964 had delegations from forty-seven states in attendance, a growth attributable to the wave of decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Combined, these two mutual, if at times competitive, efforts at sustaining a Third World bloc manifested a high point for Afro-Asian solidarity by 1964. However, this trend was dramatically cut
short a year later with the failure to coalesce the proposed second Afro-Asian meeting to be held in Algiers in 1965, the result of unresolved differences between China, Indonesia, India, and the Soviet Union, whose involvement in the intervening years had become ineluctable.27

With the period of colonial rule receding and the individual options and abilities of postcolonial political autonomy better understood, the original fervor of Afro-Asianism as an ideology shifted and declined thereafter, though it did not entirely disappear. The Vietnam War, the late decolonization of southern Africa, the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, and the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to offer reasons for protest against continuing forms of imperialism and Western intervention. In parallel, the “development” and “modernization” aspects of solidarity discourse gained ground aside the political, taking root in local contexts and leading to debates, struggles, and continued speculation over the viability of transposing certain ideas, like Maoism, beyond their place of origin (see chapters by Burgess, Monson, and Lee). Translation, in its pragmatic and ideological forms, was a constant issue. Still, new connections were also fostered, particularly in Latin America with the 1966 founding of the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America in Havana, Cuba, and the emergence of a broader tricontinentalism. If the reach of such projects embody in organizational form the kind of problematic essentialism of “the postcolonial” as addressed earlier, it is nevertheless important to recognize their institutional legacies that still continue today. In addition to the NAM, the Group of 77—established within the UN in 1964 to aggregate the interests of developing countries—has since enlarged to include 130 countries. The NAM itself continues, if in a weakened and less certain form after the cold war, to provide a forum for leaders and nation-states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.28

A more decisive failure on the part of the original “Bandung regimes”—as Samir Amin has called them—and their successors has been within the political realm internal to their borders, rather than the version of late internationalism they sought to define and mobilize.29 One-party states, authoritarian regimes, abuse of human
rights, and economic discrepancies between elites, workers, and peasants have all too often characterized the social and political conditions of nation-states within the Third World, contributing to its pejorative valence in expression. Although such conditions can be traced in many cases to the political influence and financial backing of the United States and the Soviet Union, they nevertheless point to failures of leadership and inherited structural legacies of rule—what Frederick Cooper has referred to as the “gatekeeper” state, wherein power is highly centralized and vertically structured, such that political participation is strictly regulated. Combined, such elements have undermined the core ideals of the Bandung communiqué. What Frantz Fanon warned in The Wretched of the Earth (1961) regarding the rise of a new comprador bourgeoisie in postcolonial countries has been consummated too often in too many places. Working from this horizon, David Scott has asked if our postcolonial present of “less developed countries” (LDCs)—whether located in Africa, Asia, or Latin America—is characterized by forms of failure, how might this condition be traced to the moment of decolonization? What alternative futures were present at the time, and why have so many been rendered moribund? He argues that such questions return us to a set of fundamental political foundations and serve to re-engage academic scholarship with the conditions and problems of the present. In a stimulating critique of Benedict Anderson, John Kelly and Martha Kaplan similarly have suggested that answers to the present may rest in the difference between “imagined communities” and “represented communities,” that decolonization was not so much an exit but instead an entry into a global political scenario that shared structures and protocols with the preceding colonial era. These concluding observations therefore highlight the analytic and political need for ongoing empirical investigation and critical vigilance; to develop more fully integrated conversations between diplomatic history, social history, and postcolonial criticism; and, in sum, to acknowledge the possibilities and contradictions of Bandung—its placement between constituting a moment and representing an era. The next section outlines how this volume intersects with this broad endeavor.
Imagined Communitas—Rethinking “Political Community” along the Afro-Asian Divide

Prasenjit Duara has written that there are “remarkably few historical studies of decolonization as a whole, despite the importance of the subject.” In a similar vein, Stephen Ellis has admonished historians of Africa for continuing to focus on the precolonial and colonial periods even though the postcolonial period and its history are continuing apace fifty years hence. Speaking to a Latin American audience, Gilbert Joseph has similarly cited the need for bringing Latin American studies—and, by extension, area studies—into better conversation with scholarship on the cold war, to achieve an intellectual rapprochement that recognizes their shared history and disciplinary origins. At the most fundamental level, the following essays aim to amend this research situation by contributing a set of case studies that help to outline the possible parameters of these related fields. In short, the scope of this volume is panoramic, extending beyond the event of the Bandung meeting to consider the locations, practices, and politics that created senses of community across the Afro-Asian divide. The history of connections between both continents, if not exactly hidden, has often been occluded by what have become the conventional concerns of area-studies scholars since the 1960s. Beyond occasional comparative studies, Afro-Asian relations have been marginalized until quite recently by conceptual frameworks that have either centered historical change as emanating from Europe—world-systems theory being a key example—or emphasized the local and regional dynamics of African and Asian communities making their own history, if not always under conditions of their choosing. Yet, as the Bandung meeting itself emphasized, the backdrop to these contrasting approaches has been the history of modern imperialism on both continents. Not only did acts of Western intervention serve as defining experiences in many locales, but they also left durable intellectual legacies that have shaped how such acts would be interpreted after their denouement. Area-studies scholars, who have been poised between such legacies and the possibility of their critique, have undertaken a range of efforts, both theoretical and empirical, to challenge the
uncritical reproduction of imperial knowledge. This endeavor has not only interrogated the internal contradictions of the colonial archive, but has variously sought to articulate countermodernities, alternative modernities, decolonial thought, and the “provincialization” of Europe—a sequence of related projects that have shared a common purpose designed to recover a space of agency, history, and social knowledge beyond Western influence.38

Attempting a shift away from such West-Rest dialectics, research on Afro-Asian relations has blossomed recently among a number of scholars drawn from cultural, literary, and American studies. In part, this research turn has been an outgrowth of multiculturalism in the American academy since the 1980s, further intersecting with contemporary concerns over US imperial ambitions during the 20th century. Within a brief space of time, this effort has underscored the historical importance of transracial coalitions in the making of modern social movements.39 However, a striking absence in this developing subfield is the presence of area-studies scholars and their views on intercontinental, rather than solely interethnic, Afro-Asian connections. Africa and Asia are symbolically invoked, but often empirically absent. In parallel, recent scholarship on the Indian Ocean world has made substantial headway in defining a new framework analogous to the Black Atlantic, thus creating a geographic and thematic space for reconsidering the histories of Africa and Asia in mutually constitutive ways. But these studies so far have centered on the precolonial and colonial periods, leaving open questions as to the shifting contours and meaning of this setting for the postcolonial period.40 Finally, a third agenda of interest—related to the critical projects mentioned previously, albeit with a stronger empirical focus—has been the writing of new imperial histories. Building upon the prescient insights of such thinkers as Hannah Arendt, Aimé Césaire, and Edward Said, this turn has helped account for interregional dynamics by examining the circuits of knowledge and experience that transformed European and colonial worlds alike.41 Similar to Indian Ocean studies, this field by its very nature has remained entrenched in the colonial era, exploring the tensions of empire but leaving the tensions of postcoloniality aside. Overall, these loosely
related agendas have shared a common purpose to work against conventional analytic binaries and to push geographic boundaries through critical explorations of how political space is defined. Even the contours and dynamics of continental thinking having come under scrutiny, with questions as to how the geographies that define our expertise have intellectual structures that furtively limit our spatial frames of reference and interpretation.42

This collection is situated amid these multilayered conversations. Its key distinctions from these existing projects are, first, its active attempt to move chronologically into the postcolonial and cold war periods—thus departing from the new imperial agenda and current work on the Indian Ocean—and second, to locate more firmly an intercontinental geography of historical agency and meaning, in order to avoid certain risks of parochialism found in area studies as well as the existing US-centered Afro-Asian literature. Indeed, to interrogate the area-studies paradigm is to readdress an enduring intellectual legacy of the cold war era that is still with us, a critical task of which we are quite conscious. But beyond these concerns over time, place, and disciplinary knowledge rests, at the center of our agenda, the question of “political community”—specifically, what its contours, content, and viability have been in the context of the postcolonial world beyond the archetype of the nation-state. This basic question dwelled at the heart of the Bandung meeting as the preceding section suggests, yet it is an idea that has animated a number of events and political formations of the modern era, from ideologies of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism to more recent intergovernmental organizations at regional and global levels such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Nonaligned Movement itself. For sure, these ideas and bodies are diverse in their outlooks—serving varying degrees of cultural, economic, and political intent—and, although transnational in principle, they have typically been instruments at the service of individual state agendas. However, despite these limitations, which evince the risks of overdetermining their import, these bodies do outline a realm of community politics situated between the nation-state as such and outsized global political entities, namely the United Nations. Indeed, the contin-
ued use and dependence on political units—in particular, the nation-state and empire—which matured during the 19th and 20th centuries marks a distinct analytic constraint in contemporary scholarship, given the proliferation of these alternative political models. These new structures are not entirely defined by these existing categories, nor do they approximate alternative community forms, such as diaspora, that have been anchored by descent-based identities. In this view, political conditions have outpaced the evolution of our mainstream analytic vocabulary. The recent imperial turn to explain contemporary US foreign policy appears to be an all-too-clear reflection of this state of categorical impasse, making presumptive conclusions of behavior instead of raising new questions of definition and practice.43

Rethinking political community requires, then, a removal from this safety of terminology. A better strategy is needed beyond labeling multipolar phenomena as transnational. This proposal does not necessarily mean inventing new language per se. Rather, recourse to empiricism and social process—how such terminology is understood and redefined on the ground—is needed. Attention to the relationships between decolonization, the rise of interregional bodies, and the interpersonal, sociopolitical practices that constituted such efforts is required. The term “community,” of course, is generic enough for wide application. But it does possess a deep genealogy and an existing set of distinct uses. In his classic study Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887), Ferdinand Tönnies drew a distinction between “community” (Gemeinschaft) and “society” (Gesellschaft), the former organized around a shared set of values and the latter characterized by self-interest.44 These elements for thinking through the dynamics of community have carried over in contemporary employment of the expression. The most influential recent use of the term “community” has arguably been in relation to nationalism and the nation-state, as outlined by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities (1983). Anderson’s argument contains a compelling focus on the role of popular imagination as a political practice, enabled through the rise of print media. This approach has sparked debate, though, with critics such as Partha Chatterjee and Manu Goswami drawing attention to the structural role of colonialism and global capital in the making of

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national territorial spaces and, more generally, a functional nation-state system in the wake of mid-20th century decolonization.45

Other scholars have embraced Anderson’s intervention, but have also cited a need to expand the parameters of his expression. Extending Chatterjee’s question of whose imagined community, Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, has suggested that scholars should “breathe heterogeneity into the word ‘imagination’” in order to open its wide-ranging sites and expressive possibilities.46 Taking a different angle, Frederick Cooper has similarly decried two prevailing misuses of “community”: first, its synonymous relationship with the nation-state, which reduces the diverse meanings of the term and the complex scale of relations they have inhabited; and second, how “community” is often employed to capture a sociohistorical alternative or counterpoint to Western modernity and its claims to universalism, rather than being mobilized to create a link between the two. Simplification in both cases has reproduced categorical norms that fail to highlight examples of innovation and entanglement that have animated connections between individuals, organizations, and states.47 Returning to the question of representation, Martha Kaplan and John Kelly have cited the related insufficiency of “imagination” as a means for explaining community formation during the colonial and postcolonial periods. A better grasp of the institutional limitations and the ritual practices of community legitimation is needed to understand the political and material obstacles that postcolonial countries have faced.

These comments that derive primarily from research on the colonial and early postcolonial periods equally pertain to the present. Contemporary globalization has generated wide-ranging discussion about the function and meanings of community in a context increasingly defined and managed by nonstate actors. Arjun Appadurai has pointed to how states have sought “to monopolize the moral resources of community” through heritage projects and equating “state” with “nation,” in order to counter competing trends of transnational separatist movements.48 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, echoing Cooper, have criticized how “the nation becomes the only way to imagine community,” that too often the “imagination of a community becomes overcoded as a nation, and hence our conception of community is severely impoverished.”49
Meanwhile, David Held has contended that national governments are not the arbiters of power they once were, since the contemporary rise of “political communities of fate”—which he defines as “a self-determining collectivity which forms its own agenda and life conditions”—increasingly transcend their boundaries of control.\(^50\) Recent changes in the global scale of political interaction therefore do not herald the deterioration or end of “community” as such but have only escalated its role and stature. This “return to community”—through incipient nationalisms, indigenous-people movements, and the mobilization of religious identities—has refreshed questions of individual-versus-group interests in determining the viability of political ideals of equitable justice and democratic practice.\(^51\)

This volume takes such contemporary developments seriously, as highlighted at the start. But it seeks to flesh out the history between late colonialism and these observations of the global present.\(^52\) Indeed, this book does not seek to overdetermine Bandung as a direct precursor to current political trends or suggest that contemporary China-Africa relations have assumed without revision the mantle of mid-20th-century Afro-Asianism. Instead, it aims to articulate a complex history composed of a constellation of political communities that have cut across the Asia–Africa divide during the 20th and early 21st centuries. These communities have been inspired by ideas that transcend conventional political geographies. But they have also been made by individuals who have been both empowered and limited by political resources, language, and other day-to-day realities (see Bier, Brennan, Burgess, Monson, Lee, and Prestholdt in this volume).

As proposed here, unifying these diverse and challenging conditions and the way people managed them is not only the question of “community” but the practices and habits of *communitas*. This expression is most closely associated with the ethnographic work of Victor Turner on social custom and ritual. But taken as a political process, it offers several compelling features that apply to the concerns of this volume. First, *communitas* is related to, but also distinct from, community, which Turner describes as grounded in a particular geography. Instead, *communitas* is defined by “social relatedness” that comprises a “community of feeling.” Turner references Tönnies’s use of

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*Gemeinschaft* as a point of orientation, with this expression’s argument for community based on sentiment, not locality or blood. The second important feature of *communitas* is its transitory, liminal status and subsequently antistructural character. Unlike the more generic and static expression “community,” which conveys a ready-made quality, *communitas* is in movement, an interval moment of creative possibility and innovation, and therefore an active rite of passage thought to be necessary, yet equally perceived as destabilizing. It embraces what Andrew Apter has called “critical agency,” a capacity to mobilize social discourse and challenge existing norms.53

Applied here, *communitas*—and its existential, normative, and ideological forms—provides a term for capturing the complex dimensions and meaning of decolonization and the diverse political communities inaugurated by it.54 It cites the demands and rituals of what it takes to be a community—nation-state or otherwise—on the world stage, as well as the potential for challenging those rules. Of particular use is its emphasis on political feeling rather than a structured community per se, which relates to the spirit of Bandung, but also its inventive, transitional qualities that reflect the cold war fluidity of political alignments and nonalignments. Employing Turner’s taxonomy to its full extent, one can argue that an existential *communitas*—based on a shared experience of Western imperialism—formed an ideological *communitas* that intended to provide a distinct, even utopian alternative to the preceding era through a discourse of Afro-Asian solidarity. Indeed, as the previous section noted, the US and Soviet Union were quick to intervene to mitigate the possibility of a permanent and influential Afro-Asian bloc from taking hold—what Turner would call a normative *communitas*. The idea of an imagined *communitas* proposed here, therefore, conjoins Turner and Anderson with the intent of advancing a more active notion of “community,” one emphasizing elements of movement and innovation in the face of existing structures of a global nation-state system. It aims to step beyond the subjective and often rhetorical qualities of “imagination” to represent both the strong sense of political purpose postcolonial communities had as well as the practical limitations they faced, diplomatic and otherwise. Embracing *communitas* as a political phenomenon at this level therefore asks what it takes to be a viable
community international in scope, the diplomatic rituals of recognition as well as the more local practices of self-constitution involved. It demands examination of the strengths and weaknesses of such communities, with their potential for alternative views that provide forms of critical authority, but also the challenges they face based on political feelings that could shift and subside.

These observations intimate the constraints of the translocal communities that followed Bandung and, at a broader level, the improbability of long-term Afro-Asian solidarity. Yet their histories, if at times ephemeral in nature, offer another angle as well: that significant patterns of interaction can be pointed to, addressed, and explored in depth. The chapters that follow present case studies that examine the grounded ways this interaction took place and held influence, charting a history intended to flesh out empirically the period between Bandung and the global present. They are at once social and intellectual, diplomatic and cultural, and are defined as much by strategic intention as they are by geographic obstacle. They reveal not tensions of empire, but tensions of postcoloniality—the complex and at-times contradictory set of aims and conditions situated between the rhetoric of revolution and the pragmatism of governance, defiance of the West and continued forms of economic and political need. Tensions of postcoloniality, in sum, refer to inherited colonial legacies and possible postcolonial futures that African and Asian countries had to negotiate. Whether in “strong” or “weak” form, the political communities described here serve to reposition how the term “community” itself might be understood against the paradigms of empire and the nation-state, by working through variable modes of communitas as a means of understanding the opportunities and impediments for alternative communities of fate and the realm of political futures they have had to offer.

**Tensions of Postcoloniality—Locations, Practices, Politics**

This edited volume works at three levels. First, it aims to enhance developing discussions on this neglected aspect of world history.
through focused case studies—from South Africa, to Tanzania, to Egypt, to Southeast Asia, to Central Asia—that demonstrate the variety, complexity, and wide-ranging geography of Afro-Asian relations during the last century. It should be emphasized that, with several key exceptions (see Chakrabarty, Go, Adas, and Burton), this topic is approached from the vantage point of scholars working within Africa. In this regard, the essays here intend to speak to contemporary Afro-Asian relations, particularly those with China, as suggested at the start of this introduction. Yet this volume also seeks to de-center a narrow emphasis on China, pointing to multiple histories of connection between both continents. This relates to a second level. Through a case-study approach, the essays of this book equally demonstrate the research and methodological possibilities of this field: from empirically based examples that locate the state and nonstate archives of such history, to more conceptually driven pieces that provide ways of interpreting and thinking about the Afro-Asian world. As stated before, the precursors and afterlives of the Bandung moment present an opportunity to rethink the interactions between social history, cultural history, intellectual history, and diplomatic history—the last in particular a genre that remains underdeveloped within area studies, especially for Africa.

At the broadest level, this collection aspires to address and contribute to contemporary debates over transnationalism, globalization, and the crossing of area-studies boundaries—to articulate the meaning of these expressions and agendas through grounded illustrations. We do not propose an autonomous realm of knowledge or experience beyond the West—a turn that continues to reemerge, whether under the rubric of “alternative modernities” or “decolonial” thought—but rather we seek to interrogate the historical relations of power at micro- and macro-levels that make such agendas at best limited. Such positions not only risk simplifying the spatial dimensions of political and cultural power to generic locations of “inside” and “outside,” but in the same manner they reinstate rather than dissolve the very perception of such boundaries that were first established through histories of imperialism, and later redeployed by cold war politics. This third dimension of the book therefore encapsulates the thrust of the project
as a whole: to identify the contours of a new research agenda that speak to, and build upon, existing discussions in area studies, global history, and postcolonial studies that are critical of such preexisting conventions of geography and power and their genealogical origins. This volume does not pretend to offer complete coverage or conclusively answer the questions it raises. It does not chart a sequence of diplomatic events typical of many cold war histories. Rather, it positions the Bandung meeting as a means of bringing the aforementioned issues and disciplines together. Straddling the colonial and postcolonial worlds, Bandung provides a new chronology and an event-centered focus for examining the postcolonial period.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first section—entitled “Framings: Concepts, Politics, History”—is devoted to a conceptual and empirical stage setting for the essays that follow. Dipesh Chakrabarty leads off with a study of three key concepts—anticolonialism, postcolonialism, and globalization—by examining their genealogical origins and interrelations in various decolonization projects, including Bandung. This chapter is an effort at outlining and unifying these interrelated, though often separate, ideas that have defined a broad agenda shared by many area-studies scholars working today. It furthermore offers a useful historical and theoretical structure for the essays that follow. Michael Adas, for example, examines the effects that World War I had on the genesis of anticolonialism during the interwar years. As his wide-ranging chapter underscores, these effects were not isolated but formed a broader pattern of experience and meaning across Africa and Asia against the effects of European imperialism. In sum, his essay outlines the political terrain and intellectual origins of rationales that would lead to Bandung in 1955. Julian Go follows with a similar set of political questions posed after World War II, examining how postcolonial independence in Africa and Asia can be fruitfully understood through a lens informed by constitutional law, thus serving to separate the rhetoric of autonomy from the demands of legal realpolitik. Go’s essay therefore refrains from uncritically valorizing the spirit of Bandung by instead situating the development and reconfiguration of the post–World War II global order from the perspective of constitutional practices that typically underscored continuity,
rather than departure, from Western practices. In sum, these essays examine the early challenges of community formation faced in the Afro-Asian world.

With this foundation, the second section—entitled “Alignments and Nonalignments: Movements, Projects, Outcomes”—transitions to the multiple afterlives of the Bandung moment, with particular attention to the role of local contexts, practices, and meanings in the articulation of this broader geography. Laura Bier’s essay explores how Afro-Asianism intersected with a nascent Third World feminist movement based in Cairo through AAPSO during the late 1950s and 1960s. Despite the open embrace of these two ideologies as a common front, Bier underscores how cultural challenges remained, with prevailing views that were often informed by Western cultural discourse inherited from the colonial period. James Brennan similarly examines the importance of Cairo, offering a detailed discussion of how the Egyptian government under Nasser mediated discourses of anticolonialism and pan-Islamism in East Africa during the 1950s and 1960s through the Swahili broadcasting of Radio Cairo. His essay underlines the technological means of diplomatic engagement that states and anticolonial movements had at their disposal for communicating ideas of Third World solidarity, yet also the local dynamics of race and nationalism that complicated any easy acceptance of Afro-Asian solidarity. Venturing further in this geographic direction, the next two chapters explore Chinese-sponsored “development” projects in East Africa. Gary Burgess investigates the exchange of students, official visitors, and “modernization” experts between Zanzibar and China during the 1960s, along with the corresponding complexity of the ideological connections between Mao, Nyerere, and Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, each of whom aspired to a “usable future.” In parallel, Jamie Monson discusses the history of Chinese development experts and African workers on the TAZARA railway in postcolonial Tanzania and Zambia during the 1960s and 1970s. Complementing Burgess’s chapter, this essay points to the more practical demands and day-to-day aspects of Afro-Asian interaction beyond rhetorical gestures toward “modernization,” as well as the deep history of cooperation with China that has reemerged today. Moving to a different
context, Christopher Lee’s biographical essay on father-son activists James and Alex La Guma examines the role travel had in fostering diplomatic relationships between South African activists and the Soviet government over the course of the 20th century. Central Asia proved to be a particularly important site of these travels, illustrating the development possibilities that a socialist South Africa might experience as described by Alex in his memoir *A Soviet Journey* (1978).

The final section of the volume—“The Present: Predicaments, Practices, Speculation”—builds upon the empiricism of the previous section and returns to the conceptual questions in the first. Moving beyond state-and-social-history narratives, the chapters of this section address present challenges developing between Africa and Asia, exploring issues of continuity and change in relations between both continents since the end of the cold war. Denis Tull’s essay provides a useful overview of China’s growing involvement in Africa and how it suggests more problems than benefits for African nation-states, thus marking a decisive shift in Afro-Asianism as an ideology of solidarity since Bandung. Focusing on a separate set of politics that are equally important, Jeremy Prestholdt offers a parallel analysis of the rise of Osama bin Laden as an icon of anti-Western revolution among communities in the Indian Ocean region, especially coastal Kenya, today. Building upon recent work by Mahmood Mamdani and others, he questions whether bin Laden has joined the symbolic ranks of Mao and Che Guevara and what the implications this discourse has for understanding Afro-Asian political ideologies of the present. Combined, both essays suggest the continued growth of regional interaction with patterns that recall the past as well as signal different visions of the future.

In sum, this volume considers the past, present, and future of political communities in this contingent world. It intimates an alternative history and geography of the 20th century that challenges not only Eurocentric accounts, but also contributes to ongoing discussions of transnationalism and globalization in a committed empirical fashion. It presses for a reconfiguration of viewpoint and consequently a reassessment of conventional accounts of the 20th century. Indeed, as Antoinette Burton suggests in her insightful epilogue, the occasion of Bandung forces a
reorientation not only with how the fields of postcolonial and cold war studies might be readdressed chronologically and empirically, but also how the mobility and redefinition of race, class, and gender in the wake of Bandung subsequently demand a thorough reappraisal of how these categories were transformed in variable ways between the receding experience of modern imperialism and our global present.

To those who were present and those who observed from afar, the 1955 Bandung Conference was a watershed moment, a historical juncture that served as a summary point for previous anticolonial activism and a new baseline by which the accomplishments of the postcolonial world were to be measured. Although essays found here address pertinent theoretical issues connected to this moment, the majority provide historical case studies that lend substantive empirical weight to the premises of the volume. The net effect of these strengths is that we can start to move beyond the theory-driven conventions of postcolonial studies and, armed with evidence, begin to think more concretely and extensively about how to sharpen our reconception of postcolonial history and that of the 20th century. Bandung must not be understood as an isolated moment, but instead be situated within a rich and varied history of intercontinental exchange that it shaped and still continues today.

Notes


3. For recent work on Afro-Asianism, which has been unusually, if not entirely, American-focused, see, for example, Vijay Prashad, Everybody Was Kung-Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); Robin D. G. Kelley, Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), chapter 3; Andrew F. Jones and Nikhil Pal Singh, eds., The Afro-Asian Century, special issue of Positions 11, no. 1 (2003); Bill V. Mullen, Afro-Orientalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Heike Raphael-Hernandez and Shannon Steen, eds., Afro-Asian Encounters: Culture, History, Politics (New York: New York University

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17. Turkey and China also had imperial legacies, if not as recent as Japan’s.
19. The British Central African Federation—consisting of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi)—did not send a delegation.
25. On the 1952 origins of the expression “Third World,” see ibid., 10, 11.


32. Scott, Refashioning Futures.

33. Kelly and Kaplan, Represented Communities, 5.

34. Duara, ed., Decolonization, 1.


44. Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris, trans. Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).


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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles Chasteen, eds., Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

46. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 149.


49. Hardt and Negri, Empire, 107. It should be emphasized although a common ground is cited here, Cooper has been sharply critical of Chakrabarty and of Hardt and Negri. See Cooper “Empire Multiplied”; Cooper, Colonialism in Question, ch. 1.


51. For discussion, see Janna Thompson, “Community Identity and World Citizenship,” in Re-imagining Political Community, 179–97.

52. Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 17, 18.


55. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2004).